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“Science does not know its debt to imagination.”
— Ralph Waldo Emerson
Letters and Social Aims (1876)
“It is the spur of ignorance, the consciousness of not
understanding, and the curiosity about that which lies
beyond that are essential to our progress.”
— John Pierce
What does it mean to be rational? It is fair to say that this simple question has
raised many debates over the past years and across various disciplines including
philosophy, economics, psychology, and sociology. Yet, despite the difficulty for
scientists to provide a clear definition, the term “rational” surprisingly appears to
be overly used in everyday conversations, thereby indicating that people at least
have a general idea of its concept. Indeed, everybody would agree that, broadly
speaking, rationality involves thinking and behaving reasonably or logically. How-
ever, such a simplistic definition remains largely ambiguous as it simply pushes
the problem away: what does it mean to think and behave reasonably? As an
attempt to give a more precise answer to this question and investigate the role
that such a principle plays in human cooperation, this dissertation combines var-
ious approaches and methodologies from computer science (logic) and economics
(game theory, experimentations). However, in order to justify the need for such
an interdisciplinary study, let us start by distinguishing between the concepts of
reason and rationality: while one may indeed define reason through the psycholog-
ical capacity for establishing and verifying facts based on perceived information,
rationality is instead rather involved with the process of optimizing choices. In
this case, as such conscious choices clearly result from some internal thinking, one
can state that rationality naturally implies the use of reason.
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Furthermore, it is customary among philosophers to distinguish between the
notions of theoretical and practical rationality (see e.g., Kalberg [1980]). On one
hand, theoretical rationality, which relies on evidential and argumentative support,
simply deals with regulating one’s own beliefs1. On the other hand, practical
rationality corresponds to the strategy of living one’s best possible life, achieving
one’s most important goals, and maximizing one’s own preferences in as far as
possible.
In order to illustrate these philosophical concepts, suppose that I know that
abundant smoking kills, and that it implies that if I smoke, it will certainly de-
teriorate my physical health. Assuming that I prefer to stay alive and in good
health for as long as possible, then I would be practically irrational to smoke even
one cigarette because this choice alone would then not lead me to be in the best
possible health (i.e., it is not optimal). Alternatively, being practically rational to
smoke would require me to reconsider either my beliefs (e.g., I do not believe that
smoking will deteriorate my health) or my preferences (e.g., I somehow do not care
to have a long-lasting life). On the other hand, I may be theoretically rational to
believe the fact that smoking a single cigarette will only have a negligible effect on
my health. However, note that it would be theoretically irrational to believe that
it will not deteriorate my health at all (this would conflict with my initial belief
of the opposite statement).
Following this intuitive example, it should be clear that human beings are not
rational by definition, but they can think and behave rationally or not, depending
on whether they apply the strategy of theoretical and practical rationality to the
thoughts they accept and to the actions they perform. Moreover, it is worth noting
that both of these concepts are mutually supportive. In fact, while theoretical
rationality can clearly help me accomplish my practical aims, practical rationality
can allow me to improve the quality of my beliefs. Given the high relevance of both
of these notions of rationality to the functioning of human behavior, especially in
the context of social interactions, they will therefore together characterize the main
focus of this dissertation.
Over the last decades, investigating the role that practical rationality actu-
ally plays in the social world has become the primary goal of many economists
whose aim has been to use mathematical tools to model decision making. This
interest has naturally led to the development of the area of game theory, which
represents the study of strategic decision making through mathematical models of
conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational agents (Gintis [2000]; Myerson
[1997]; Osborne and Rubinstein [1994]; Osborne [2004]). The concept of a game
1To be more rigourous, acceptances should be distinguished from beliefs, as argued in
Tuomela [2000]: although both concepts are cognitive states, beliefs are involuntary (i.e., they
are not subject to direct voluntary control), whereas acceptances are voluntary and intentional.
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such a theory refers to can theoretically represent any sort of social interaction.
Formally, a (non-cooperative) game1 can be described as a set of players, a set
of actions (or strategies) available to those players, and a specification of payoffs
for each combination of actions. One should note that, although game theory was
primarily rooted in economics, it is now also extensively used and studied in other
fields such as political science, psychology, as well as in philosophy and biology.
In particular, the interest has more recently expanded to the area of computer
science through the growing development of artificial intelligence and multi-agent
systems. Real world applications are manifold and include robotics, electronic
communication networks (e.g., electronic commerce), interactive education and
entertainment (i.e., human-computer interactions), and resolving problems in se-
curity and safety. In any such situations, in order for artificial agents to efficiently
interact with human beings, they must clearly be able to understand the basic
principles of social behavior, as it is elicited in human societies. Such a problem-
atic therefore strongly suggests the need for a formal theory of rationality in the
context of social interactions.
However, despite its undeniable relevance to the study of practical rationality,
classical game theory does not appear to be the most efficient tool to investi-
gate the underlying connections with theoretical rationality. In fact, as suggested
before, theoretical rationality basically deals with following some consistent and
optimal way of reasoning, and game theory does not provide a sufficiently rich
language that allows to unambiguously model this sort of thinking. In order to
meet the needs to formalize some logical thinking, the use of propositional logic is
often considered by computer scientists. Such a formal system is indeed concerned
with reasoning about propositions, each of which basically represents a possible
state of the world: for example, given two propositions p and q, if p is true and
it is the case that “if p is true, then q is true”, then it can be inferred that q is
also true (this inference rule is known as Modus Ponens). However, in return for
being very simple, such a logic is also not sufficient to express relevant statements
defining the various types of mental states that may be elicited by human beings in
social interactions. For this purpose, an alternative formal system was introduced
to extend this logic with the addition of extra operators expressing modalities of
the sort “it is possible/necessary that . . . ”, “it is permitted/obligatory that . . . ”,
“one believes/knows that. . . ”, etc. . . These additional modal operators are indeed
of particular interest to the study of rationality because they allow to formally
express and reason about some agents’ mental attitudes. For example, one can
define the following rule in such a formal language: if individual i believes that
1A game is non-cooperative in the sense that it represents a detailed model of all the moves
available to the players, in contrast with cooperative games, which abstract away from this level
of detail and describes only the outcomes that result when the players come together in different
combinations.
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proposition p is true, then i believes that i believes that p is true (this rule is
usually known as positive introspection). This type of logic, which is known as
modal logic (Blackburn et al. [2002]; Chellas [1980]; Hintikka [1962]; Hughes and
Cresswell [1968]), is also often associated with other logics such as epistemic logic
(reasoning about knowledge), temporal logic (reasoning about time), deontic logic
(reasoning about obligations), and dynamic logic (reasoning about complex pro-
grams). More generally, applications of modal logic are particularly important
in philosophy, linguistic, and various areas of computer science such as artificial
intelligence, distributed systems, database theory, program verification, and cryp-
tographic theory. One aim of this thesis is to show that it is also particularly
relevant to the field of economics.
Nevertheless, although the combination of game theory and logic clearly repre-
sents a powerful analytical tool to theoretically investigate the essential principles
of rationality, their only limitation lies in the highly idealized views they often
offer. As suggested earlier, the main motivation for formalizing rationality is to
be able to accurately predict human behavior in social interactions. In fact, being
rational becomes useless if I mistakenly believe that other individuals are rational,
which may eventually lead me to perform poor actions with possibly catastrophic
consequences. It is now widely accepted that classical game theoretic models have
indeed failed to their original motivation to accurately predict human decision-
making, which explains the recent growing interest for economic experimentation.
Similarly to the physical sciences, the use of controlled experiments has indeed
proven to be highly relevant to study economic questions (Camerer [2003]; Roth
and Kagel [1995]). In order to test the validity of some economic theories, such ex-
periments usually use cash to motivate human subjects in order to mimic real-world
incentives. Such empirical methods allow to explore very important concepts such
as altruism, fairness, reciprocity, and emotions, which have all, for a long time,
been ignored by classical economics theories. In fact, some extensive empirical
evidence already suggests that human beings are genuinely other-regarding in so-
cial interactions. However, while such studies have allowed to clarify the way in
which every individual can actually contribute to the promotion of a society (e.g.,
through fair and cooperative behavior), one may wonder about the impact that
a given society can have on its own members. Indeed, any human society simply
consists of a group of individuals related to each other through more or less persis-
tent social relationships. It therefore seems reasonable to claim that one’s social
environment is largely responsible for determining one’s own well-being. After all,
one’s contribution to the welfare of a society has for main (if not only) purpose to
improve one’s quality of life within that society.
The main contribution of this dissertation is therefore to investigate this issue
by studying some crucial aspects of human rationality as it is actually exhibited
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in the context of social interactions. We attempt to provide an explanation of
how these factors can eventually lead to some social behavior that promotes the
welfare of the society as a whole. For the purpose of obtaining a realistic formal
definition of the complex concept of social rationality, this study relies on the var-
ious methodologies that were previously introduced: game theory, modal logic,
and economic experimentation. More specifically, we will argue that the follow-
ing components are essential to the definition of social rationality in interactive
situations:
• Individual preferences. Since practical rationality deals with optimizing goals,
one indeed needs to be able to express what is the best outcome for every
given individual. The approach that we follow here is quantitative regarding
this matter, that is, it relies on agents measuring their utility for every event
that may occur.
• Knowledge and beliefs. It is clear that theoretical rationality largely depends
on the epistemic state an agent may hold. Considering the above example, if
I do not know that smoking kills, then it can be rational for me to smoke. In
the context of social interactions, the problem becomes even more complex
since all agents must also consider what they know about what each other
knows.
• Social bonds between individuals. This factor is generally not mentioned in
the literature when defining rationality. We here claim that the type of so-
cial relationships that may exist between individuals involved in some social
interactions has some effect on their respective rationality. More precisely,
we argue that the level with which each agent is tied with every other agent
directly affects his individual preferences, and consequently his behavior.
More precisely, this dissertation is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we provide a brief overview of the existing formal theories un-
derlying the concept of rationality. More precisely, we present utility theory along
with classical game theory in order to represent rational preferences as well as ra-
tional decision making in the context of social strategic interactions. As a means to
reason about knowledge and beliefs, we similarly introduce a description of modal
epistemic logic along with a simple example that illustrates its expressive power.
Furthermore, we demonstrate the need for extending classical game theory so that
it can incorporate the types of reasoning that are carried out by human subjects in
various economic experiments. Our main claim will be that the apparent evidence
for irrational behavior may, in fact, often not conflict with the classical assumption
of rationality.
Through Chapter 3, we investigate the epistemic foundations of rationality
through a logical analysis of social sequential interactions. Although similar work
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have already been done in economics (e.g., Aumann [1995, 1999a]; Aumann and
Brandenburger [1995]), the particularity of this analysis is that it relies on formal
modal logic. In fact, we argue that modal logic is an invaluable tool that allows
in-depth analyses while expressing concepts that are either informally or vaguely
claimed to be captured by the classical game-theoretic language. In particular, we
show that such a formal tool is ideal to unambiguously model the agents’ knowledge
about what each other knows. This study therefore refers to the quite recent
subarea called “Formal Interactive Epistemology” (a term coined by Aumann in
Aumann [1999b]), which deals with the logic of knowledge and belief when there
is more than one agent. Furthermore, the other main characteristics of this work
is that it considers the temporal dimension of rationality, which is often ignored in
the literature. We therefore show that the large expressive power of the proposed
logic allows to bring some insight about the existing relationship between time and
knowledge in social interactions. In order to illustrate the use of such a logic, we
provide a syntactic proof of Aumann’s well known theorem stating that backward
induction in perfect information games can be derived from the assumption of
common knowledge of mutual rationality (Aumann [1995]). As a result, we show
that such a logical study not only allows to clearly identify the required epistemic
assumptions that are only implicit in Aumann’s original proof of the theorem, but
also leads to weaken its original statement and answer relevant questions related
to the mechanisms of learning and recalling, positive and negative introspections,
temporal reasoning and bounded rationality. Moreover, we show that such an
analysis further allows to give a formal answer to the main criticism of Aumann’s
theorem from the game theory literature (see Stalnaker [1998]).
Following this epistemic analysis of individual rationality, the next chapters
then restrict their focus on assuming that human beings are not solely driven
by pure individualism. In fact, over the last few decades, the failure of classical
economic theory has naturally led to the development of the field of behavioral
economics, which basically consists in providing alternative explanations to any
observed deviation from an optimal individualistic behavior. Most existing work
in this area supports the influence of relevant genuine factors such as fairness,
altruism, reciprocity, trust, and emotions on rational behavior (e.g., Berg et al.
[1995]; Güth et al. [1982]). However, while those theories clearly allow for a more
realistic view of social interactions, it also assumes the following strong assumption:
one’s behavior is independent of the identity of the persons that are involved in
a given interaction. Indeed, is one’s behavior likely to be the same when one
interacts with a perfect stranger as when one interacts with one’s best friend? The
most intuitive answer to this question clearly appears to be negative.
It is therefore our aim through Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 to study the nature
of social relationships (between, e.g., friends, married couples, family relatives,
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colleagues, class mates, teammates, etc. . . ) as a possible explanation of human
cooperative behavior. More specifically, Chapter 4 consists of a theoretical analysis
of social ties through the design of a particular type of two-player game, which, we
show, allows to disentangle predictions from theories based on self-interest, social
preferences (i.e., inequity aversion, fairness), and social ties. Such a study therefore
suggests the need to introduce a novel theoretical model built upon the main
hypothesis that such social relationships influence a player’s choice by modifying
his preferences. In order to verify our theoretical predictions, we then present,
in Chapter 5, the design of an experiment that is based on the previous game.
Such an experimental study involves subjects who share some genuine bonds with
one another (selected participants were members of a sport club). In addition to
varying the strength of social ties by allowing multiple interactions with individuals
from different groups, we further measure the influence of two different types of
social ties: a subjective tie determining how one feels about a social tie, and an
objective tie specifying what is the actual value of a social tie.
Finally, we present, in Chapter 8, a generalization of the previous model of
social ties as a means to formally represent rational cooperative behavior in the
context of strategic interactions possibly involving more than two individuals. We
illustrate the advantage of this model by performing a detailed comparative anal-
ysis with another relevant theory from the economics literature that can similarly
explain cooperation when agents act as members of the same group: Bacharach’s
theory of team reasoning (Bacharach [1999]). As a result of this study, we demon-
strate that the proposed model of social ties provides a simpler and more intuitive
approach to modeling collaborative actions in the context of complex social inter-
actions where competing groups may coexist.
One should note that the work presented throughout this dissertation are based
on various important collaborations. More precisely, Chapter 3 is an extension of
a joint work with Emiliano Lorini that has been published in Lorini and Moisan
[2011]. This work was presented at the 4th workshop on Logical Aspects of Multi-
Agent Systems (November 2011, Osuna, Spain). Chapter 4 is based on an arti-
cle co-authored with Giuseppe Attanasi, Astrid Hopfensitz and Emiliano Lorini,
which has been accepted for publication in the journal Phenomenology and the
Cognitive Sciences. This work was also presented at the 2012 Social Networks
and Multiagent Systems symposium (July 2012, University of Birmingham, UK),
and at the Collective Intentionality VIII conference (August 2012, University of
Manchester, UK). Furthermore, Chapter 5 corresponds to a joint work in progress
with Giuseppe Attanasi, Astrid Hopfensitz and Emiliano Lorini, which was pre-
sented at the 2012 international ESA (Economic Science Association) conference
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(June 2012, New York University, USA) as well as at the international conference
of game theory (July 2013, Stony Brook University, USA). Similarly, Chapter 8
represents a joint work in progress with Emiliano Lorini, which was presented at
the seventh workshop in Decision, Game, and Logic (June 2013, KTH Stockholm,
Sweden) and at the international conference of game theory (July 2013, Stony
Brook University, USA).
It is also worth mentioning that, for the consistency of this dissertation, some
other relevant published work have voluntarily not been included here: in an article
co-authored with Andreas Herzig, Emiliano Lorini and Nicolas Troquard (Herzig
et al. [2011]), we have presented a dynamic logic of propositional assignments that
allows to represent and reason about normative systems. Moreover, in another
joint work with Andreas Herzig and Emiliano Lorini (Herzig et al. [2012]), a similar
simple logic has also been proposed to model the concept of trust (as it is theorized
in Castelfranchi and Falcone [1998, 2010]; Falcone and Castelfranchi [2001]).
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Chapter 2
Rationality in Social Interactions
“Do I really look like a guy with a plan? You know
what I am? I’m a dog chasing cars. I wouldn’t know
what to do with one if I caught it. You know, I
just. . . do things.”
— The Joker (Heath Ledger)
The Dark Knight (2008)
“Scratch an altruist and watch a hypocrite bleed.”
— Michael Ghiselin
The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex
(1974)
Through his famous claim that “man is a rational animal”, Aristotle asserts that
rationality is an essential property of humankind, i.e., what distinguishes man
from beast. While this principle has since been subject to many criticisms among
philosophers, it has also been considered as a primary assumption in economics.
More generally, everybody (including Aristotle himself) would agree that having
the capacity for acting rationally does not prevent one from behaving irrationally.
Instead, what the above principle suggests is that human beings have a natural
tendency to use their reason as a means to seek and attain their highest possible
level of welfare, thereby leading them to a perpetual “pursuit of happiness”.
Following this interpretation, we therefore present, through this chapter, an
overview of the most relevant formal theories underlying the concept of rationality
in the context of social interactions: a theory of measuring and representing ra-
tional preferences, a theory of strategic interactions, a theory of reasoning about
knowledge and beliefs, and a theory of other-regarding interests.
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2.1 Rational preferences
Preferences are obviously crucial in defining rationality as they basically represent
what drives an individual towards a particular goal (i.e., what is most preferred).
Moreover, such preferences play a particularly important role in this dissertation
as we will later argue that they are partly shaped by some social factors. We
therefore present, through this section, the two main economic approaches that
allow to measure and formalize an individual’s preferences over a set of alternatives:
a theory of ordinal utility, and a theory of cardinal utility.
2.1.1 Ordinal utility
Given an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive outcomes or consequences O =
{o1, . . . , on} describing some possible states of the world (e.g., o1 may state that
“it rains today in Toulouse”), let us consider a ranking over O that defines one’s
preferences. Formally, we introduce a weak preference relation , which is defined
as follows:
: O ×O
oi  oj therefore reads “outcome oj is at least as good as outcome oi”.
Alternatively, note that an individual’s preferences can also take other forms:
• Strict preference of outcome oj over outcome oi (noted oi ≺ oj) occurs when-
ever oj is weakly preferred to oi, and oi is not weakly preferred to oj. For-
mally, this means that oi ≺ oj if and only if oi  oj and not oj  oi.
• Indifference between two outcomes oi and oj (noted oi ≈ oj) occurs whenever
oj is weakly preferred to oi, and oi is weakly preferred to oj. Formally, this
means that oi ≈ oj if and only if oi  oj and oj  oi.
Moreover, in order to be rational, the preferences must at least satisfy the two
following axioms:
• Completeness: all outcomes can be ranked in terms of preference. For-
mally, given two outcomes oi and oj, we have that either oi  oj or oj  oi
(or both in the case of indifference between oi and oj).
• Transitivity: all outcomes can be compared with other outcomes. Formally,
given three outcomes oi, oj, and ok, if oi  oj and oj  ok, then we have that
oi  ok.
However, an individual’s preferences are often described by a utility function or
payoff function. Thus, such a function, noted U , specifies a real number assigned
by the individual for each available outcome:
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U : O → R
One can then state that such a utility function U represents a preference re-
lation  that satisfies the above axioms if and only if, for every two outcomes
oi, oj ∈ O, U(oi) ≤ U(oj) implies oi  oj. In this case, if U represents , then it
implies that  is complete and transitive.
As an illustration of this ordinal utility function U , suppose that I prefer out-
come o1 the most, followed by o2, o3, and o4, that is o4  o3  o2  o1. If it is
required to assign real numbers to these outcomes to reflect this ordering, then
there are innumerable ways. One possible immediate assignment would be:
U(o1) = 4;U(o2) = 3;U(o3) = 2;U(o4) = 1
Clearly, there exists an uncountably infinite number of utility functions U to
define my preferences. Note that, while such an ordinal utility function captures
the ranking of preferences, it says nothing regarding how much an outcome is more
preferred over another one (i.e., the absolute or relative magnitude of preferences is
ignored here). While determining such ordinal preferences can be achieved easily,
it however does not characterize a very precise measure. We therefore consider an
alternative approach that allows to fill this gap.
2.1.2 Cardinal utility
In contrast with an ordinal scale for measuring preferences, as presented in the
previous section, let us now assume that not only the order of utilities is impor-
tant, but the ratios of differences between utilities are also meaningful. Such an
interpretation then refers to U as a cardinal utility function. However, the problem
of comparing the sizes of utilities does not appear to be an easy task. In fact, while
I may say that eating an apple pie is preferable to eating a cheese cake, it is more
difficult for me to say that it is twenty times preferable to the cheese cake. The
reason is that the utility of twenty cheese cakes is hardly twenty times the utility
of a cheese cake, by the law of diminishing returns.
This is why Von Neumann and Morgenstern suggested an extremely elegant
theory for determining cardinal utilities in Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944].
Their idea is indeed to consider lotteries instead of simple outcomes. More specif-
ically, given a set of possible outcomes O (as in the previous section), one can
define a lottery L as a discrete distribution of probability on O (i.e., for every
outcome o ∈ O, L(o) specifies the probability that o occurs). In this case, note
that ∑o∈O L(o) = 1.
For example, given O = {o1, o2}, the lottery L defined by L(o1) = 0.75 and
L(o2) = 0.25 denotes the scenario where the probability for outcome o1 to occur
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is 0.75 and that of outcome o2 is 0.25.
Based on this concept, Von Neumann and Morgenstern introduce a way to
rationally compare such lotteries. Indeed, they generalize the relation  from the
previous section so that it now defines a preference ordering over lotteries. In this
case, writing L  L′ means that “L′ is at least as good as L” (i.e., “L′ is weakly
preferred to L). Note that strict preferences and indifference between lotteries can
also be expressed as before. In order for such preferences to be rational, they then
propose the following set of axioms:
• Completeness: all lotteries can be ranked in terms of preferences. Formally,
we have that, given two lotteries L and L′ defined on the same set of outcomes
O, either L  L′ or L′  L (or both).
• Transitivity: preferences over lotteries are consistent. Formally, given three
lotteries L, L′, and L′′ defined on the same set of outcomes O, if L  L′ and
L′  L′′, then L  L′′.
• Continuity: there exists a “point” between being better than and worse
than a given middle option. Given three lotteries L, L′, and L′′ defined on
the same set of outcomes O, if L  L′  L′′, then there exists a probability
p ∈ [0, 1] such that p · L+ (1− p) · L′′ = L′.
• Independence: it assumes that a preference holds independently of the
possibility of an alternative outcome. Given two lotteries L and L′ defined
on the same set of outcomes O, for any lottery L′′ (also defined on O) and any
probability p ∈ [0, 1], L  L′ if and only if p·L+(1−p)·L′′  p·L′+(1−p)·L′′.
The Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem is then defined as follows:
Theorem 2.1 Given a set of outcomes O and a preference relation  over lotter-
ies defined on O that satisfies completeness, transitivity, continuity, and indepen-
dence, there exists a utility function U : O → R such that, for any two lotteries L
and L′ defined on O:
L  L′ if and only if EU(L) ≤ EU(L′)





Following this new concept of rational preferences, as it is usually called in
economics, one can then specify an intuitive method for measuring cardinal util-
ities. As a means to illustrate such a procedure, let us now consider a simple
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set of three outcomes O = {o1, o2, o3} such that the following preference ordering
holds: o3 ≺ o2 ≺ o1. The first step is to assign arbitrary utility values to both
the most preferred outcome o1 and the least preferred outcome o3, with the only
constraint that the utility of o1 must be larger than that of o3. For example, let us
take U(o1) = 200 and U(o3) = 100. The difficult part comes with determining the
utility of outcome o2, which can be solved using Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
theory for rationally comparing lotteries, as shown in Theorem 2.1. In fact, let
us consider the lottery L that o2 occurs with probability 1 (i.e., L(o2) = 1 and
L(o1) = L(o3) = 0). In this case, note that the expected utility of lottery L simply
corresponds to the utility of outcome o2, that is, EU(L) = U(o2). Let us further
define some lottery L1 specifying that outcome o1 occurs with probability p (i.e.,
L(o1) = p) and o3 occurs with probability 1 − p (i.e., L(o1) = p, L(o3) = 1 − p,
and L(o2) = 0). One then only has to determine which lottery is preferred:
• if L ≺ L1, then it implies that the utility of outcome o2 is strictly lower than
the expected utility of lottery L1, that is, U(o2) < p ·U(o1) + (1− p) ·U(o3);
• if L1 ≺ L, then it implies that the utility of outcome o2 is strictly higher than
the expected utility of lottery L1, that is, U(o2) > p ·U(o1) + (1− p) ·U(o3);
• if L ≈ L1, then it implies that the utility of outcome o2 is equal to the
expected utility of lottery L1, that is, U(o2) = p · U(o1) + (1− p) · U(o3).
It is then straightforward to show that, by repeating this procedure through
various meaningful values of probability p (i.e., asking the same question as above
while replacing L1 with other lotteries), one can converge towards a realistic utility
value for outcome o2.
However, one might wonder whether such a cardinal utility function is a real-
istic representation of preferences. Are people really capable of expressing their
preferences over lotteries? As any answer to this question would clearly be subject
to debate, let us instead discuss on the actual need for such a function in the first
place. In fact, it appears that cardinal utility has already proven its relevance in
solving problems related to decision making under risk, representing inter-temporal
preferences, or determining collective welfare evaluations. Throughout this thesis,
we therefore follow this theory as a means to later express group preferences that
are based on the members’ individual preferences. In particular, although it has
been argued that aggregating cardinal utilities across persons is unrealistic (mainly
because different people may indeed have different “zeros” on their utility scale),
we will show in later chapters that such interpersonal comparison of cardinal utility




In this section, we present the most well known theory used to study and model
rational decision making in social interactions. Game theory is a central topic in
this dissertation because it represents a great tool to formally characterize the un-
derlying principles of conflict and cooperation between intelligent agents. In order
to provide a brief overview of the main concepts of game theory, we distinguish
between two different types of games through the following sections: simultaneous
and sequential games (see Gintis [2000]; Myerson [1997]; Osborne and Rubinstein
[1994]; Osborne [2004] for more detailed introductions).
2.2.1 Simultaneous games
Let us consider the following situations. Two individuals, say Alice and Bob, have
been arrested by the police as they are suspected for committing a crime together.
However, the police admits there is not enough evidence to convict the pair on
the principal charge. As a means to obtain some confession, the individuals are
isolated from each other (i.e., they have no way to communicate with each other).
The police then visit each of them individually and offer them the same following
deal: the one who offers evidence against the other can be freed immediately. More
precisely, if none of them agrees to betray the other, they are in fact cooperating
with each other and against the police, and as a consequence, both of them will
get to spend two years in jail, which corresponds to a rather limited punishment
because of lack of proof. However, if only one of them betrays the other, by
confessing to the police, the corresponding defector will be freed. The one who
remains silent, on the other hand, will receive a severe punishment by having to
serve ten years in prison, as a result of being uniquely held responsible for the
crime. Of course, there is a catch to the story: if both prisoners testify against
each other, both will be sentenced to five years in jail.
This particular scenario is called a simultaneous game because it involves in-
dividuals that have to make simultaneous decisions (i.e., both players have no
information about the other’s choice). The question that naturally follows from
this game is then: what should each individual tell the police? As a means to
answer such a question, game theory actually offers an elegant way of representing
the corresponding problem. In fact, let us consider the corresponding graphical
representation of the above scenario depicted in Figure 2.1, where, for each indi-
vidual i (with i referring to either Alice or Bob), actions Ci and Di respectively
stand for i’s choice to stay silent (i.e., cooperating with the other individual), and
to confess to the police (i.e, betray the other individual).
Figure 2.1 therefore specifies both individuals’ utilities for every possible out-








Figure 2.1: Prisoner’s dilemma
ple, (−10, 0) represents the outcome for Alice performing Ca and Bob choosing
Db, which can be interpreted as follows: in the case of occurrence of this outcome,
Alice’s utility is −10 (i.e., she gets ten years in jail) while Bob’s is 0 (i.e., he gets
to be freed).
Based on such a representation of the above situation, it then becomes straight-
forward to observe that the best action for both agents is to select Da and Db. In
fact, no matter what the other does, one appears to be always better off confessing
to the police. This interpretation then leads to the following dilemma: while both
agents would get five years in jail if they both optimally defect (i.e., by selecting
Di), it happens that it would be better for each of them to simultaneously choose
Ci as they would then each get only two years in jail. We however postpone the
more detailed analysis of such a game to Chapter 8.
Let us now present the general representation of any such simultaneous game,
as shown through the following definition.
Definition 2.1 (Standard Strategic Game) A strategic game is a tuple G =
〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉 where:
• Agt is a finite set of agents involved in the game;
• for every agent i ∈ Agt, Si defines the set of pure strategies available to i;
• for every agent i ∈ Agt, Ui : ∏j∈Agt Sj → R defines a total payoff function
mapping every combination of strategies to some real number.
Note, from Definition 2.1, that the concept of a pure strategy can be reduced
to a simple action. A more complex definition of a pure strategy will however
be introduced in the next section. As an illustration, the above situation can be
represented as the strategic game G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉 where:
• Agt = {Alice, Bob};
• SAlice = {Ca, Da}, SBob = {Cb, Db};
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• UAlice(Ca, Cb) = UBob(Ca, Cb) = −2, UAlice(Da, Db) = UBob(Da, Db) = −5,
UAlice(Ca, Db) = UBob(Da, Cb) = −10, and UAlice(Da, Cb) = UBob(Ca, Db) =
0.
Let us further abbreviate SJ as the combination of strategies among agents in
J , that is, SJ =
∏
i∈J Si. In this case, we write S instead of SAgt , and S−i instead
of SAgt\{i}.
In such strategic games, a solution concept then represents a formal rule that
predicts how the game will be played. The most well know solution concept in
the economics literature is the Nash equilibrium, which specifies a combination of
strategies such that, no player has anything to gain by changing his own strategy
unilaterally. The formal form of this equilibrium concept is found in Definition
2.2.
Definition 2.2 (Pure strategy Nash equilibrium) A pure strategy Nash equi-
librium in a strategic game G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉 is a combination
of pure strategies s ∈ S such that, for every i ∈ Agt:
Ui(s′i, s−i) ≤ Ui(si, s−i) for every s′i ∈ Si
Applying this principle to the above prisoner’s dilemma from Figure 2.1, the
only Nash equilibrium is for both players to defect (i.e., Alice choosesDa while Bob
selects Db). It is usually assumed in game theory, that such a Nash equilibrium
reflects some optimal behavior that each individual can rationally aim at.
Moreover, one may extend this concept so that it also considers mixed strate-
gies. A mixed strategy for some agent i then simply corresponds to a random-
ization of i’s pure strategies from Si. For example, in the above game, instead
of choosing between the choices Ca and Da, Alice may throw a dice in order to
determine her actual choice (e.g., choosing Ca with probability 2/3 and choosing
Da with probability 1/3). Formally, this leads us to define the mixed extension of
a strategic game, as in Definition 2.3.
Definition 2.3 (Mixed extension) Given a strategic game G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈
Agt}, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉, the mixed extension of G is the strategic gameMG = 〈Agt, {∆(Si)|i ∈
Agt}, {EUi|i ∈ Agt}〉 such that:
• for every agent i ∈ Agt, ∆(Si) is the set of probability distributions over Si;
• for every agent i ∈ Agt, an expected utility function EUi : ∏j∈Agt ∆(Sj) →
R assigns to each combination of mixed strategies α ∈ ∏j∈Agt ∆(Sj), the









Following this consideration of mixed strategies, one can therefore also define
the concept of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.4 (Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium) A mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium in a strategic game G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉 is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in its mixed extension MG according to Definition 2.3.
2.2.2 Sequential games
In the previous section, we considered simultaneous games that assume that the
players do not observe each other’s actions. However, it is clear that such an
assumption is unrealistic in many situations that involve individuals interacting
sequentially with one another. As an illustration, let us consider the following
scenario, which is often referred to as the ultimatum game in the economics litera-
ture. Suppose that two players, say Alice and Bob, have to decide how to divide a
sum of money (e.g., 10e) that is given to them. Alice first proposes how to divide
the sum between the two players, and Bob can then either accept or reject this
proposal. For any proposal from Alice, if Bob rejects it, neither player receives
anything. On the other hand, if Bob accepts it, the money is split according to
the proposal.
Such a game is played sequentially because, when taking his decision, Bob
may take into account Alice’s previous choice. In other words, Bob has a full
observation over Alice’s decision at the time of his decision.
As shown in Figure 2.2, such an interactive situation can be graphically repre-
sented by a game tree, where each vertex defines a decision node, each edge defines
a particular action, and each leaf corresponds to an outcome of the game.
Figure 2.2 represents a binary version of the above ultimatum game where the
players only have binary options. In this case, vertex v0 defines Alice’s decision
node while vertices v1 and v2 define Bob’s. Vertices v3, v4, v5, and v6 denotes
the terminal nodes of the game where no player can make any decision (i.e., they
express the outcomes of the game). Furthermore, actions Ca and Da respectively
stand for “Alice suggests to split equally the amount” and “Alice suggests to split
the amount in her favour”. Similarly, Cb andDb respectively stand for “Bob accepts
Alice’s proposal” and “Bob rejects Alice’s proposal”.
Looking at the game representation from Figure 2.2, one can observe that, at
both vertices v1 and v2, Bob is always better off playing Cb. In response to this
behavior, Alice should then select Da at v0. In other words, this prediction reflects
the only solution that survives common knowledge of both players’ rationality in
the ultimatum game.
As a means to perform a more detailed analysis of such sequential games, let
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Figure 2.2: Binary ultimatum game
definition1.
Definition 2.5 (Extensive game with Perfect Information) An extensive game
with perfect information is a tuple EG = 〈Agt,V ,EndV ,Q, A, next, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉
where:
• Agt is a finite set of agents involved in the game;
• V is a finite set of vertices defining the nodes of the game tree;
• EndV ⊆ V is the set of terminal nodes;
• for every vertex v ∈ V \EndV , Q(v) ∈ Agt defines the agent that moves at
v;
• for every vertex v ∈ V \EndV , A(v) defines the set of actions available at v;
• for every vertex v ∈ V \EndV and every action a ∈ A(v), next(v, a) ∈ V
defines the successor node that can be reached by performing a at v;
• there exists a unique initial vertex v0 ∈ V \EndV such that, for every w ∈
V \EndV and every a ∈ A(w), next(w, a) 6= v0;
1We here restrict our analysis to extensive games with perfect information as they are the
primary concern of the following chapters of this dissertation. For an analysis of games with
imperfect or incomplete information, see, e.g., Gintis [2000]; Myerson [1997]; Osborne and Ru-
binstein [1994]; Osborne [2004]
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• for any vertex v ∈ V \{v0}, there exists a unique vertex w ∈ V and a unique
action a ∈ A(w) such that next(w, a) = v;
• for every agent i ∈ Agt, the utility function Ui : EndV → R defines i’s
preferences over the set of terminal nodes. Note that Ui represents cardinal
utilities that can be determined as shown in Section 2.1.
Definition 2.5 specifies a particular type of sequential games, which are with
perfect information. This characteristics simply means that, at any moment of
the game, all players have a full observability over each other’s choices. In other
words, a player’s only uncertainty in such a game is about other players’ choices.
As an illustration of this formalization, one can define the binary ultimatum game
from Figure 2.2 as EG = 〈Agt,V ,EndV ,Q, A, next, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉, where:
• Agt = {Alice, Bob};
• V = {v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6};
• EndV = {v3, v4, v5, v6};
• Q(v0) = Alice, Q(v1) = Q(v2) = Bob;
• A(v0) = {Ca, Da}, A(v1) = A(v2) = {Cb, Db};
• next(v0, Ca) = v1, next(v0, Da) = v2, next(v1, Cb) = v3, next(v1, Db) = v4,
next(v2, Cb) = v5, next(v2, Db) = v6;
• UAlice(v3) = UBob(v3) = 5, UAlice(v5) = 8, UBob(v5) = 2, UAlice(v) = UBob(v) =
0 for every v ∈ {v4, v6}.
Following this definition of an extensive game, one needs to define the concept
of a strategy in order to be able to determine Nash equilibria. For every agent
i ∈ Agt, a pure strategy simply specifies an action at every decision node for i.
This formally leads to Definition 2.6.
Definition 2.6 (Pure strategies) Given an extensive game EG = 〈Agt,V ,EndV ,Q,
A, next, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉, and the set of nodes HJ = {v ∈ V \EndV |Q(v) ∈ J} where
any agent i ∈ J moves, a pure joint strategy for J in EG is a total function sJ on
HJ such that, for every v ∈ HJ , sJ(v) ∈ A(v).
For every non-empty group of agents J ⊆ Agt, let SJ denote the set of joint
strategies for the group J such that SJ =
∏
i∈J Si. In this case, for notational
convenience, we write S instead of SAgt , which represents the set of strategy profiles
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(i.e., every s ∈ S specifies an action for every vertex of the game), Si instead of
S{i}, and S−i instead of SAgt\{i}.
Furthermore, let Ps ⊆ V define the set of vertices that constitutes the actual
path predicted by a given strategy s ∈ S such that:
• there exists a unique initial vertex v0 ∈ Ps, that is, for every vertex w ∈ V
and every a ∈ A(w), next(w, a) 6= v0;
• there exists a unique terminal vertex vn ∈ Ps, that is, vn ∈ EndV ;
• for every v ∈ Ps\{v0, vn}, v is the successor of another node from Ps, that is,
there exists a unique vertex w ∈ Ps\{vn} and an agent i = Q(w) such that
next(w, si(w)) = v.
Based on the above definition of a pure strategy as well as the previous concept
of an actual path, one can express any extensive game in terms of a strategic game,
as shown through Definition 2.7.
Definition 2.7 (Strategic form game) Given an extensive game EG = 〈Agt,V ,EndV ,
Q, A, next, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉, the strategic form of EG is the strategic game G =
〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {U ′i |i ∈ Agt}〉 where:
• for every agent i ∈ Agt, every strategy si ∈ Si is defined according to Defini-
tion 2.6.
• for every agent i ∈ Agt and every strategy profile s ∈ S, there exists a unique
vertex v ∈ Ps ∩ EndV such that U ′i(s) = Ui(v).
As a result, determining a Nash equilibrium in an extensive game EG simply
corresponds to finding a Nash equilibrium in the strategic form of EG according
to Definitions 2.7 and 2.2 (or Definition 2.4 if considering mixed strategies).
As an illustration of Definition 2.7, let us consider again the binary ultimatum
game presented earlier. In fact, it appears that the extensive game depicted in
Figure 2.2 can alternatively be represented in terms of the strategic game from
Figure 2.3 where the players’ actions are considered as strategies.
In Figure 2.3, while Alice’s set of strategies simply matches her set of actions
at vertex v0 in the original game (i.e, SAlice = A(v0)), it is slightly more complex
to define Bob’s. Indeed, a strategy for Bob consists of a combination of his actions
at each of his decision node. More specifically, a strategy (Cb, Db) simply specifies
that bob would play Cb if vertex v1 is reached, and alternatively, he would play Db
if vertex v2 is reached. Note that this example clearly illustrates the counterfactual











(Cb, Db) (Db, Db)(Db, Cb)
(0,0)
(8,2)
Figure 2.3: Binary ultimatum game in strategic form
what an agent will actually do, it also expresses what that agent would do at every
decision node, including those that may never be reached.
Following such a transformation in a strategic game, it then becomes straight-
forward to determine the set of Nash equilibria through Definition 2.2 (or Definition
2.4 if considering mixed strategies). For example, applying this principle to the
strategic form of the ultimatum game depicted in Figure 2.3 yields three different
Nash equilibria: (Da, (Cb, Cb)), (Ca, (Cb, Db)), and (Da, (Db, Cb)). However, one
should note that, according to our initial basic analysis of the game in Figure 2.2,
only the solution (Da, (Cb, Cb)) was predicted to be rational. In fact, it appears
that the other two solutions rely on some incredible threat made by Bob. As an
illustration, let us interpret solution (Ca, (Cb, Db)) as follows: suppose that, at the
beginning of the game, the two individuals are allowed to talk to each other, and
Bob tells Alice that, if she plays Da first, he will then play Db. If Alice believes
this threat, then it becomes rational for her to choose Ca, and consequently, Bob
will rationally select Cb. However, it does not make sense for Alice to believe Bob’s
threat because it would otherwise imply that Bob will be irrational if Alice first
plays Da (at v3, it is indeed never rational for Bob to play Db). The same reason-
ing can also apply to the other solution (Da, (Db, Cb)). As a result, this example
demonstrates that the concept of Nash equilibrium is too general and does not
necessarily specify a fully rational solution.
This interpretation therefore suggests a need for an alternative solution concept
that allows for such a refinement on the Nash equilibrium that rules out any
incredible threat. As a means to introduce such a solution, let us first define the
concept of a subgame according to Definition 2.8.
Definition 2.8 (Subgame) Given an extensive game with perfect information
EG = 〈Agt,V ,EndV ,Q, A, next, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉, a subgame of EG is an extensive
game with perfect information EG′ = 〈Agt,V ′,EndV ′,Q′, A′, next ′, {U ′i |i ∈ Agt}〉
such that:
• V ′ ⊆ V ;
• EndV ′ ⊆ EndV ;
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• for every vertex v ∈ V ′, Q′(v) = Q(v);
• for every vertex v ∈ V ′, A′(v) = A(v);
• for every vertex v ∈ V ′\EndV ′ and every action a ∈ A′(v), next ′(v, a) =
next(v, a).
• there exists a unique initial vertex v0 ∈ V ′\EndV ′ such that, for every w ∈
V ′\EndV ′ and every a ∈ A′(w), next ′(w, a) 6= v0;
• for every agent i ∈ Agt and every vertex v ∈ EndV ′, U ′i(v) = Ui(v).
Following Definition 2.8, one can introduce an alternative equilibrium solution
called the subgame perfect equilibrium, which is defined according to Definition
2.9.
Definition 2.9 (Subgame perfect equilibrium) Given an extensive game with
perfect information EG = 〈Agt,V ,EndV ,Q, A, next, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉, a subgame
perfect equilibrium is a combination of strategies s ∈ S such that s induces a Nash
equilibrium in the normal form of every subgame of EG.
Applying this new concept to the above binary ultimatum game, one can ob-
serve that (Da, Cb, Cb) is the only solution that satisfies Definition 2.9. In other
words, the subgame perfect equilibrium can simply be considered as a Nash equilib-
rium that does not rely on any incredible threat, which leads to state the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.2 Given an extensive game with perfect information EG = 〈Agt,V ,EndV ,
Q, A, next, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉, if Nash ⊆ S defines the set of pure strategy Nash equi-
libria in the normal form of EG and SPE ⊆ S defines the set of subgame perfect
equilibria in EG, then:
SPE ⊆ Nash
One should note that there exists an alternative and more intuitive way to
compute a subgame perfect equilibrium in some extensive game. Such a method,
which relies on some backward induction reasoning, appears to better reflect the
way in which the players reason in such sequential situations. More details about
this principle will be provided in Chapter 3.
Following the basic principles of game theory that have been introduced in this
section, one may argue that the notion of rationality assumed here remains quite
ambiguous. Let us therefore clarify what game theory does actually tell us about
one’s rationality. The main assumption made by game theory, which directly fol-
lows from Section 2.1, is that rationality is strongly based upon the maximization
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of one’s own preferences. However, the various analyses in this section clearly
indicate that this is not sufficient. In fact, in order to be fully rational in the
context of social interactions, it appears that one also needs to consider the pref-
erences of other individuals involved, and assume that they will similarly aim at
maximizing those preferences. In other words, game theory introduces a strate-
gic component to the definition of rationality. Such an interpretation is clearly
illustrated through the various solution concepts presented here (i.e., the Nash
equilibrium and the subgame perfect equilibrium), which reflect the fact that an
agent’s rational behavior relies on what everybody would rationally do.
However, despite its high relevance, there is an obvious limitation in such game
theoretic thinking: it makes the strong assumption that everything that charac-
terizes a social interaction (i.e., the agents’ actions, strategies, and preferences) is
common knowledge among all individuals involved. Moreover, none of the above
concepts clearly allows to explicitly capture the more general notion of rationality
as an intrinsic property of an individual. One may indeed wonder whether any
deviation from these solution concepts should be interpreted as an actual irrational
behavior. In order to investigate this issue, we claim that an agent’s knowledge
must be taken into consideration as it plays a major role in determining one’s
rationality. Such a relevant concept is therefore the object of the following section.
2.3 Interactive epistemology
Through Section 2.1 and Section 2.2, we have demonstrated that one’s rationality
strongly relies on the preferences of everybody that is involved in a social inter-
action. However, while it is reasonable to assume that an individual is genuinely
aware of his own preferences over outcomes, it is more controversial to assume
that he similarly knows the exact preferences of other individuals he is interact-
ing with. And even if all preferences were perfectly known, it is reasonable to
assume that an individual may still be uncertain about the way other people will
behave. Such an intuitive argument therefore suggests the need for deeply study-
ing the role that knowledge and beliefs play in defining rationality. The concept of
epistemic games have been extensively studied in economics in the so-called inter-
active epistemology area (see e.g., Aumann [1999a]; Aumann and Brandenburger
[1995]; Battigalli and Bonanno [1999]; Bonanno [2008]; Brandenburger [1992]; Gin-
tis [2009]). In this kind of games, players decide what to do according to some
general principles of rationality while being uncertain about several aspects of the
interaction such as other agents’ choices, or other agents’ preferences. More pre-
cisely, in Aumann [1995], Aumann elegantly introduces the notion of epistemic
rationality, which states that an individual is rational whenever he does not know-
ingly play a strategy that yields him less than he could have gotten with a different
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strategy. The epistemic reference in this definition is crucial as it implies that an
individual may actually be rational to choose an action that will not necessarily
result in the most optimal option for him (e.g., he may be uncertain about other
individuals’ moves or preferences). More interestingly, the role of knowledge also
appears to go beyond the definition of rationality itself. In fact, the overly ide-
alistic assumption that is made in classical game theory is that this concept of
rationality is commonly known among all rational agents. Many existing works
have already investigated this important issue (see e.g., Aumann [1995]; Aumann
and Brandenburger [1995]; Battigalli and Bonanno [1999]; Brandenburger [1992])
through analysing the necessary and/or sufficient epistemic conditions of various
equilibrium notions (e.g., the Nash equilibrium, the subgame perfect equilibrium).
Throughout this section, we therefore present two relevant approaches that allow
to formalize such reasoning about knowledge: Aumann’s set-theoretic model, and
modal logic.
2.3.1 Aumann’s common knowledge
In Aumann [1999a], Aumann introduces a simple way to formalize the notion of
interactive knowledge. We here describe the corresponding set-theoretic represen-
tation that leads to a mathematical characterization of common knowledge. For
this purpose, let us define Aumann’s epistemic model as follows.
Definition 2.10 (Aumann’s epistemic model) Aumann’s epistemic model is
a tuple A = 〈Agt,Ω, ξ, {Ii|i ∈ Agt}〉 where:
• Agt is a non-empty set of agents;
• Ω is a non-empty set of states of the world;
• ξ is a non-empty set of outcomes E ⊆ Ω, each of which consists of a subset
of states;
• every Ii is a total function Ii : Ω → 2Ω that represents the set of states that
agent i cannot distinguish from ω ∈ Ω such that, ω ∈ Ii(ω), and if ω′ ∈ Ii(ω),
Ii(ω′) = Ii(ω).
Note that an outcome E is defined as a subset of states of the world. For
example, assuming that E describes the outcome that “it will rain tomorrow”, E
consists of all possible states from Ω at which it will rain tomorrow.
Furthermore, for any two states ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and any agent i ∈ Agt, Ii(ω) and
Ii(ω′) are either disjoint (i.e., Ii(ω) ∩ Ii(ω′) = ∅) or identical (i.e., Ii(ω) = Ii(ω′)).
This implies that every function Ii simply forms an information partition of Ω,
that is, ∪ω∈ΩIi(ω) = Ω.
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Then, for every agent i ∈ Agt, one can construct a total function Ki : ξ → ξ
such thatKi(E) defines the set of all states ω ∈ Ω at which i knows that E contains
ω, that is:
Ki(E) = {ω ∈ Ω|Ii(ω) ⊆ E}
In other words, Ki(E) simply reads “agent i knows that outcome E obtains”.
As a result of this definition, one can notice that the knowledge operator Ki has
the properties depicted in Table 2.1 (for all outcomes E,F ⊆ Ω).
According to Property (2.1), an agent can only know something if it is true.
Property (2.2) says that, if an outcome E entails another outcome F , then know-
ing E entails knowing F . Property (2.3) expresses that, if an agent does not know
something, then he knows that he does not know it. This principle is often called
negative introspection. Similarly, Property (2.4) defines what is often called pos-
itive introspection, that is, if an agent knows something, then he knows that he
knows it. Finally, according to Property (2.5), an agent knows two things if and
only if he knows each of them independently.
As a result, the knowledge operators Ki for every agent i ∈ Agt allows to
express the concept of common knowledge. An outcome E is common knowledge
among all members of Agt if and only if all know E, all know that all know E, all
know that all know that all know E, and so on ad infinitum. Formally, let CK(E)
denote that outcome E is common knowledge among all members of Agt:
CK(E) = K1(E) ∩K2(E) ∩K3(E) ∩ . . .
where K1(E) = ∩i∈AgtKi(E) and, for any m > 0, Km+1(E) = K1Km(E).
However, while Aumann states that such a semantic representation is conve-
nient to use (it is indeed based on a simple framework, as shown through Definition
2.10), he agrees that it is also not so straightforward and involves some non-trivial
issues (Aumann [1999a]). More specifically, he points out some relevant questions
that arise from this strictly semantic approach: do the agents know about the
Ki(E) ⊆ E(2.1)
E ⊆ F implies that Ki(E) ⊆ Ki(F )(2.2)
¬Ki(E) ⊆ Ki(¬Ki(E))(2.3)
Ki(E) ⊆ Ki(Ki(E))(2.4)
Ki(E ∩ F ) = Ki(E) ∩Ki(F )(2.5)
Table 2.1: Some properties of operator Ki
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model itself? In other words, do they know about the information partitions of
the set of states (i.e., the functions Ii)? What explicitly describes a state of the
world? In fact, a complete description of a state of the world ω would include a
list of all the states that cannot be distinguished from ω by any particular agent.
In other words, every state should describe every agent’s uncertainty at that state.
More generally, Aumann argues in Aumann [1987, 1999a] that “such a description
of the ω’s involves no ‘real’ knowledge; it is only a kind of code book or dictionary”.
In other words, one’s knowledge simply depends on what is the true state of the
world. As a result, while an agent i may be ignorant about what another agent j
knows, i cannot be ignorant about j’s information function Ij.
In order to allow for a more explicit description of knowledge and clarify all
such ambiguities, the most convincing solution lies in a syntactic approach, which
appears to be more intuitive while expressing any such concepts with transparency.
Therefore, as this analysis clearly suggests the need for a correspondence between
both a semantic and a syntactic representation, we claim, through the next section,
that modal logic represents the ideal tool to formally characterize knowledge in
interactive situations.
2.3.2 Epistemic modal logic
Modal logic is similar to traditional propositional logic with the addition of extra
operators that can be used to express modalities of truth, including possibility and
necessity. Epistemic modal logic then represents a subclass of such a modal logic
that allows to reason about knowledge (Blackburn et al. [2002]; Chellas [1980];
Hintikka [1962]; Hughes and Cresswell [1968]; van der Hoek and Pauly [2006]).
In order to justify the need for such a logical formalism, let us consider the
following famous puzzle. Two children, say Alice and Bob, come back from the
garden, both with mud on their forehead. Their father looks at them and says:
“at least one of you has mud on his/her forehead”
Then he asks:
“those who know whether they are dirty, step forward!”
In this case, nobody steps forward. So the father asks again:
“those who know whether they are dirty, step forward!”
This time, both Alice and Bob simultaneously step forward and claim to know
that they are dirty.
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As a means to explicitly interpret the epistemic reasoning that is involved in
this scenario (which we will refer to as the muddy children puzzle), let us construct
a basic epistemic logic as follows.
First, we consider a set of atomic propositions Atm and a non-empty finite set
of agents Agt. The language of such an epistemic logic (Halpern and Moses [1992])
is then given by the following BNF (Backus-Naur Form) grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | [Ki]ϕ
where p ranges over Atm and i ranges over Agt. The classical Boolean connec-
tives >, ∧, → and ↔ can then be abbreviated as follows:
• > def= ¬⊥
• ϕ ∧ ψ def= ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
• ϕ→ ψ def= ¬ϕ ∨ ψ
• ϕ↔ ψ def= (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)
The intuitive meaning of [Ki]ϕ is “agent i knows that ϕ is true”. [Ki] is called
a modal operator. Moreover, one can add the following abbreviation:
〈Ki〉ϕ def= ¬[Ki]¬ϕ
In this case, 〈Ki〉ϕ reads “it is possible for i that ϕ is true”.
As a consequence, a formula in this logic simply consists of any combination
of the elements from the above language. As an example, let two propositions
muddyAlice and muddyBob express the respective facts that “Alice has mud on
her forehead” and “Bob has mud on his forehead”. In this case, the formula
[KAlice]muddyBob ∧ 〈KAlice〉muddyAlice means that “Alice knows that Bob has
mud on his forehead, and it is possible for her that she also has mud on her
forehead”.
One then needs to specify the conditions under which a given formula, like the
one above, is true or false. For this purpose, we introduce a model that gives a
formal meaning to all operators of the above language.
The models that we are considering here rely on a possible worlds semantics,
as it was introduced by Kripke (Kripke [1963]). The basic idea of such a model
is that it considers a set of possible worlds, each of which describing a particular
state (as in Aumann’s model from Section 2.3.1), and only one of those is reported
to be the actual world. An agent’s epistemic state is then defined in each world w
as the set of worlds that cannot be distinguished from w.
Formally, such a model is defined as follows.
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Definition 2.11 (Epistemic model) An epistemic model is a tupleM = 〈W, {Ei|i ∈
Agt}, pi〉 where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• every Ei is an equivalence relation on W ;
• pi : Atm → 2W is a valuation function on worlds.
In Definition 2.11, such a modelM is sometimes referred to as a type of Kripke
structure. Given a model M = 〈W, {Ei|i ∈ Agt}, pi〉, the pair F = 〈W, {Ei|i ∈
Agt}〉 is often called a frame (Blackburn et al. [2002]), while pi is called a valuation.
More specifically, for every agent i ∈ Agt, all relations Ei characterize i’s knowledge
in M . In this case, note that every relation Ei is:
• Reflexive: for every w ∈ W , wEiw;
• Symmetric: for every v, w ∈ W , vEiw implies wEiv;
• Transitive: for every v, w, q ∈ W , vEiw and wEiq together imply vEiq;
• Euclidean: for every v, w, q ∈ W , vEiw and vEiq together imply wEiq.
Given two worlds w, v ∈ W , wEiv means that agent i cannot distinguish world
v from world w. We alternatively write Ei(w), describing the set of worlds that i
cannot distinguish from w. One should note that these relations Ei are analogous
to Aumann’s information partition Ii as it was introduced in Definition 2.10 from
Section 2.3.1.
As an illustration, let us represent a Kripke model that characterize the above
muddy children initial situation. Therefore, we suppose that Agt = {Alice, Bob}
and Atm = {muddyAlice,muddyBob}. In this case, we can construct the model
M corresponding to the above muddy children puzzle as follows:
• W = {w1, w2, w3, w4};
• EAlice(w1) = EAlice(w2) = {w1, w2}, EAlice(w3) = EAlice(w4) = {w3, w4},
EBob(w1) = EBob(w3) = {w1, w3},EBob(w2) = EBob(w4) = {w2, w4};
• pi(muddyAlice) = {w1, w3}, pi(muddyBob) = {w1, w2}.
Note that any such model can easily be represented as a graph where the
vertices correspond to the worlds, and the edges are defined through every relation
Ei. Figure 2.4 depicts such a graphical representation of the above muddy children
model M .
In order to define how to evaluate modal formulas over such a Kripke model,
one then needs to give a formal meaning to every basic operator of the language,















Figure 2.4: Muddy children model M
Definition 2.12 (Truth conditions) Truth of a formula in a model M at a
given world w is defined as follows:
• M,w |= p iff w ∈ pi(p);
• M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ;
• M,w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ or M,w |= ψ;
• M,w |= [Ki]ϕ iff M,w′ |= ϕ for all w′ such that wEiw′.
According to Definition 2.12, M,w |= ϕ reads “formula ϕ is true at world w
in model M”. In this case, we say that a formula ϕ is true in a model M (noted
M |= ϕ) if and only if M,w |= ϕ for every world w in W . Furthermore, ϕ is valid
(noted |= ϕ) if and only if ϕ is true in all possible Kripke models. Then we further
say that ϕ is satisfiable iff ¬ϕ is not valid.
Regarding the knowledge operator [Ki], the formula [Ki]ϕ is true at a world w
in the model M if and only if ϕ holds in all worlds that are considered possible for
agent i. In this case, the higher the number of such worlds, the more i is ignorant
at w. On the other hand, if i knows everything at w, then it means that w is the
only possible world for i, that is, Ei(w) = {w}.
Following this interpretation of knowledge, one should note the distinction that
such a logical framework makes with Aumann’s epistemic model from Section 2.3.1
In fact, it is clearly suggested here that one’s knowledge is not to be evaluated in
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the whole model, but instead in what appears to be the true state of the world: as a
consequence, one’s knowledge may reasonably be different depending on what the
actual world is. Such a transparent and straightforward representation therefore
allows to resolve all ambiguities that were previously raised through Aumann’s
model (see Section 2.3.1).
However, while the previous epistemic logic clearly provides the combination of
a semantic representation with a syntactic formalism, one still needs to explicitly
relate the two approaches and formalize their exact correspondence. This step
can be done through an axiomatization of the logic. The formulas from Table 2.2
correspond to axioms related to every knowledge operator [Ki] (for every agent
i ∈ Agt), which follow from the above properties of the equivalence relation Ei:
these formulas are therefore necessarily true at all worlds in all Kripke models.
In Table 2.2, AxiomK, which is usually called the distribution axiom, expresses
understanding of the material implication, that is, if some agent i knows that ϕ
and i knows that ϕ implies ψ, then i also knows ψ. Axiom T, which is called the
truth axiom, indicates that an agent can only know facts. Furthermore, Axiom 4
expresses the agents’ positive introspection through the fact that if an agent knows
something, then he knows that he knows it. Similarly, negative introspection is
expressed through Axiom 5, which states that if some agent i does not know
something, then he knows that he does not know it.
In this case, the current epistemic logic is completely axiomatized by all prin-
ciples of classical propositional logic and the set of axioms from Table 2.2. In this
case, we write ` ϕ to mean that ϕ can be derived by means of the principles given
in Table 2.2 and those of classical propositional logic. The resulting logic is called
S5n where n denotes the number of agents in Agt (i.e., n = |Agt|). Traditionally,
S5 is the logic with only one knowledge operator associated with one equivalence
relation, and so S5n simply corresponds to the fusion of n logic S5.
Moreover, one should note that such a S5n logic also consists of logical laws
that allow to draw conclusions from premises. Examples of such inference rules
are introduced through Table 2.3.














Table 2.3: Inference rules
In Table 2.3, Modus Ponens expresses that if the formulas ϕ and ϕ→ ψ are
true in the model (i.e., M |= ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)), then so is ψ (i.e., M |= ψ). Similarly,
Necessitation states that if a formula ϕ is true in the model, then everybody
knows that ϕ is true. Monotony further indicates that if an implication is true
in the model, then everybody knows about it.
Note that the axioms from Table 2.2 along with the rules of inference from
Table 2.3 correspond to the properties of Aumann’s knowledge functions as they
were introduced in Section 2.3.1 (see Table 2.1).
Furthermore, it is worth noting that Aumann’s concept of common knowledge,
as it was introduced semantically in Section 2.3.1, can also be expressed in the
language of this epistemic logic. In fact, let us define [EK]ϕ as an abbreviation
of ∧i∈Agt [Ki]ϕ, i.e. every agent knows ϕ (if C = ∅ then [EK]ϕ is equivalent to >).
Then we define by induction [EKk]ϕ for every natural number k ∈ N:
[EK0]ϕ def= ϕ
and for all k ≥ 1,
[EKk]ϕ def= [EK]([EKk−1]ϕ)
Similarly, we define for all natural numbers n ∈ N:
[CK0]ϕ def= ϕ





[CKn]ϕ therefore expresses common knowledge that ϕ up to n iterations, i.e.
everyone knows ϕ, everyone knows that everyone knows ϕ, and so on until level n.
As a means to illustrate the syntactic power of such an epistemic logic, let us go
back to our muddy children puzzle. According to the model M depicted in Figure
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2.4, which represents both children’s background knowledge, we assume that the
actual world corresponds to that where both Alice and Bob are muddy (i.e., world
w1). In this case, one can express the following facts about Alice that are true at
w1 (similar statements can be made for Bob):
• “Alice knows that Bob is muddy”:
M,w1 |= [KAlice]muddyBob
• “Alice knows that Bob knows whether she is muddy or not”:
M,w1 |= [KAlice]([KBob]muddyAlice ∨ [KBob]¬muddyAlice)
• “Alice knows that Bob does not know that she is muddy if and only if he
knows that she is not muddy”:
M,w1 |= [KAlice](¬[KBob]muddyAlice↔ [KBob]¬muddyAlice)
Furthermore, let us now concentrate on what Alice gets to learn from the
father’s public announcement that “at least one of the children is muddy”, which
becomes common knowledge among both children. In this case, the following facts
become true at the actual world w1 in the updated model M ′ depicted in Figure
2.5:
• “it is common knowledge among Alice and Bob that at least one of them is
muddy”:
M ′, w1 |= [CKn](muddyAlice ∨muddyBob) for any n ∈ N
• “Alice knows that Bob knows that one of them is muddy”:
M ′, w1 |= [KAlice][KBob](muddyAlice ∨muddyBob)
• “Alice knows that, if Bob does not know that he is muddy, then she is
muddy”:
M ′, w1 |= [KAlice](¬[KBob]muddyBob→ muddyAlice)
As shown in Figure 2.5, the corresponding semantic interpretation of these
statements is that the father’s announcement simply rules out the world w4 as a
possibility to be the actual world (in w4, no children is muddy, which contradicts
the father’s announcement). In other words, Alice is now only uncertain about
whether the actual world is w1 or w2. Similarly, Bob is only uncertain about
whether the actual world is w1 or w3.
Finally, let us look at what Alice learns from the fact that Bob does not step
forward after the father’s first announcement. The following formulas then hold












Figure 2.5: Muddy children model M ′ (first update)
• “Alice knows that Bob does not know that he is muddy”:
M ′′, w1 |= [KAlice](¬[KBob]muddyBob)
• “Alice knows that she is muddy”:




Figure 2.6: Muddy children model M ′′ (second update)
As shown in Figure 2.6, the corresponding interpretation that follows is that
both children know exactly that w1 is the actual world.
However, the above logic may also be subject to some criticism regarding its
axiom system and the various rules of inference. In fact, one may argue from
Table 2.2 that the truth axiom T is very strong and therefore not so realistic when
modeling human reasoning. An agent may indeed believe something to be true
even though it is not. In order to allow for such a weaker notion of knowledge,
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Table 2.4: Alternative axiom schemas for the modal operator Ki (KD45)
one may redefine the semantics of operator [Ki] so that it replaces the truth axiom
T with a seriality axiom D. The resulting axiom schema for every [Ki] is depicted
in Table 2.4 and define what is usually called a doxastic logic (note that in such a
logic, the belief operator [Bi] is generally used instead of [Ki]).
In order to obtain the axiom schema from Table 2.4, one must also redefine
the epistemic relations Ei for every agent i ∈ Agt: Ei must indeed be transitive,
Euclidean, and serial (i.e., for every w ∈ W , there exists some v ∈ W such that
wEiv). Furthermore, it is worth noting that other similar criticisms can still apply
to such a logic, especially concerning the axioms of introspection (4 and 5).
More generally, another problem that can arise from such a system concern
logical omniscience. In fact, it appears that the previous axioms along with the
rules of inference listed in Table 2.3 can lead to some unrealistic assumptions about
the reasoning power of an agent. In fact, according to the above logic, if I know all
the axioms and inference rules of Peano arithmetic, then I know whether Fermat’s
last theorem is true or false. The limitations of cognitive abilities clearly point out
a weakness of the above logical formalism for modeling human reasoning.
However, despite the undeniable relevance of this remark, the epistemic logic
presented here appears to be extremely useful in the field of game theory as it
suffices to investigate the type of reasoning process that may lead an agent to follow
a particular behavior. More specifically, not only this formalism clearly allows to
capture the epistemic characterization of rationality as it is introduced by Aumann
in Aumann [1995], it also allows to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions
that lead rational agents to play according to the game-theoretic predictions.
Following the mathematical approaches of various economists (see, e.g., Au-
mann [1995]; Aumann and Brandenburger [1995]; Brandenburger [1992]) to in-
vestigate these issues, this argument justifies the more recent growing interest for
combining modal logic with game theory in order to provide an in-depth analysis of
epistemic games both in strategic form and in extensive form (see, e.g., Battigalli
and Bonanno [1999]; Bonanno [2002]; Lorini [2010]; Lorini and Schwarzentruber
[2010]; Van Benthem [2003]; van Benthem [2007]). In fact, the various logical
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frameworks that are proposed in those works clearly allow to reason about ac-
tions, preferences, and knowledge. However, there also appears to be another
important aspect that has been much less studied in such games: temporal rea-
soning. Obviously, the type of social interactions that we are referring to here
consists of sequential games. As shown by the distinction between strategic games
and extensive games in Section 2.2, considering the temporal component of such
interactions leads to dramatically more complex representations. Indeed, while a
strategy in a strategic games simply consists of a type of action (see Section 2.2.1),
a strategy in an extensive form game expresses not only the sequence of actions
that will occur next, but also the actions that would occur in every vertex of the
game (see Section 2.2.2 for details). Although we demonstrated in Section 2.2.2
that any extensive game could be expressed in terms of a strategic game, it is
clear that the temporal factor of such games can have a non-negligible effect on
the agents’ way of thinking: an agent may then learn as he advances through the
game, based on what has happened before. Similarly, one may forget about what
happened before, or one may even think about what could have happened had
another course of action taken place.
Yet, despite the high relevance of such epistemic games in extensive form, there
exists no logic that has been shown to be sufficiently general to reason about ac-
tions, preferences, knowledge, and time. While it is shown in van Benthem et al.
[2011] and van Benthem et al. [2006] that reasoning about actions only is suffi-
cient to compute solution concepts like the backward induction, such game logics
cannot express the notion of substantive rationality as in Aumann’s definition
from Aumann [1995], which fully considers the temporal aspect of the concept
of strategy (i.e., current and future choices, as well as counterfactual choices). In
de Bruin [2004], a logic, which enables to reason about the epistemic aspects of ex-
tensive games, can deal with several game-theoretic concepts such as knowledge,
rationality and backward induction. Nevertheless, all these notions are atomic
propositions of the logic managed by an ad hoc axiomatization. Moreover, the
logical approach to extensive form games proposed in de Bruin [2004] is purely
syntactic: no model-theoretic analysis of extensive form games is proposed.
It is therefore our attempt to fill this gap in Chapter 3 by introducing a logical
formalism with a corresponding formal semantics for extensive form games, which
allows:
• to express in the object language time-based solution concepts like backward
induction,
• to derive syntactically the epistemic and rationality conditions on which such
solution concepts are based.
We will also show, in Chapter 3, that such a detailed epistemic analysis further
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allows to clearly identify the bounds of rationality. In fact, in many interactive
situations, it appears that most (if not all) actions available at a given moment
can be performed rationally by some individual with limited knowledge. In other
words, any such choice can be justified by some sound and rational arguments.
However, while such an interpretation can allow to explain some observed deviation
from a game-theoretic prediction, one should note that it may not always suffice.
We investigate this issue through the next section.
2.4 Towards social rationality
Although we have already provided a rather precise definition of some crucial
aspects of rationality through the previous sections of this chapter, there still
remains one major component that also needs to be considered. This component
relates to the fact that human beings are social creatures, living their life through a
high level of interactions with one another. One may then argue that such a social
feature is already taken into account by classical game theory. In fact, we have
shown, through Section 2.2, that one’s behavior is not only driven by one’s own
preferences, it also largely relies on the preferences of other individuals involved
in the interaction. However, according to game theory, an agent’s motivation is
assumed to be purely individualistic, driven by the ultimate goal of maximizing
one’s own profit by taking advantage of others (whatever it may cost them). In
other words, while game theory clearly allows to specify strategic behavior, it does
not say anything about actual social behavior, which consists in making choices
that are oriented towards the welfare of the group, rather than the individual. Yet
the plausibility of such other-regarding behavior is clearly justified by the existence
of social attitudes such as altruism, fairness, justice, reciprocity, and equity, which
we all constantly witness in our everyday lives.
As a consequence, the high relevance of such properties of social behavior
suggests an extension of game theory that relies on empirical measurements. The
purpose of this section is therefore to introduce such an experimental methodology,
and demonstrate how it allows to more accurately model human rational behavior
in the context of social interactions.
2.4.1 Experimental game theory
Running laboratory experiments has only recently become a common practice in
the field of economics. Following the work of Chamberlin who conducted the first
market experiment (Chamberlin [1948]), many have similarly obtained important
results using this approach, either to support traditional economic theory or to
develop more accurate models of decision making (see, e.g., Berg et al. [1995];
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Bolton and Ockenfels [2000]; Charness and Rabin [2002]; Fehr and Schmidt [1999];
Kahneman and Tversky [1979]; Levine [1998]; Roth [1995]; Smith [1962]). One of
the main advantages of all these empirical studies is that they come as a comple-
ment of the important theoretical work (see the previous sections). This approach
has led to the development of experimental economics, which can be distinguished
from experimental social psychology that ignores the existence of an analytical
tool as powerful as game theory to model observed social behavior.
Moreover, another major interest of using game theoretic tools concerns the
design of the experiment itself. In fact, the abstract representation of social inter-
actions, as proposed by game theory, clearly allows to determine what situation
would be best suited to answer a particular research question. For example, one
can distinguish an important subclass of games, which characterize situations that
hold “zero-sum” properties. A zero-sum game basically corresponds to a social
interaction in which any participant’s gain (or loss) of utility is exactly balanced
by the losses (or gains) of the other participants. In other words, if the total gains
of the players are added up, and the total losses are subtracted, they will sum to
zero. A very intuitive example of such a zero-sum situation is the game of chess,
in which both players repeatedly interact with each other so that only one of them
eventually wins, thereby implying that the other loses. In the context of such a
game, one can state that the theory of rationality presented through the previous
sections then suffices to accurately explain the corresponding behavior elicited by
human agents. In this case, although one may reasonably argue that people do
not often play chess very optimally, one may justify it by their cognitive limita-
tions, which simply prevents them from fully internalizing the extremely complex
situation.
Historically, the original motivation of studying zero-sum games, which later led
to the development of non-cooperative game theory itself (Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern [1944]), was based on the assumption that many types of real-life social
interactions shared this zero-sum property (e.g., business transactions). However,
many studies have since indicated that such a strong and pessimistic assumption
clearly appears to oversimplify reality. As it has been theorized in Wright [2000],
society becomes increasingly non-zero-sum as it becomes more interdependent.
This argument can also be summarized as follows:
“The more complex societies get and the more complex the
networks of interdependence within and beyond community and
national borders get, the more people are forced in their own
interests to find non-zero-sum solutions. That is, win-win solu-
tions instead of win-lose solutions.” (Bill Clinton, 2000)
As most empirical works in economics involve the study of such non-zero-sum
games, let us clarify the reason why they are often considered as a threat to the
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concept of rationality.
The first main issue in such games concerns the notion of co-operation, which
simply consists of the process of individuals working or acting together. It is indeed
straightforward to observe that cooperation can only be involved in situations that
carry out some non-zero-sum property (zero-sum games instead necessarily imply
the existence of some “losing” individual). In order to illustrate the main problem
raised by cooperation, we consider a specific category of simultaneous games (cf.
Section 2.2.1) that involve a coordination problem, i.e., a situation where the
players have to coordinate with one another in order to reach a profitable outcome.
More specifically, suppose a situation where two individuals (Alice and Bob) face
the same choice between two options A and B. Assuming those players have no
way to communicate with each other, if they both select A, then they will each
receive 5e, and if they both select B, then they will each receive 1e. However, if
both select different options, then they will get nothing (i.e., 0e). What should
each individual do in this case? This very simple scenario, whose payoff matrix








Figure 2.7: Hi-Lo matching game
The nice property of this simple game is that it clearly illustrates a limitation of
classical game theory. In fact, as shown in Bacharach [2006]; Colman et al. [2008],
when actually playing this simple game, people largely coordinate on the most
rewarding outcome for both individuals, that is, they both select A. However, even
though such an empirical result clearly appears to be intuitive, it cannot be reached
through some classical game theoretic reasoning. While considering the game from
Figure 2.7, one can indeed distinguish two different Nash equilibria: (A,A) and
(B,B). In other words, game theory applied to this scenario simply remains
indecisive (i.e., both playing A and playing B can be selected rationally). While
predicting the solution (A,A) is not problematic as it corresponds to what people
actually do, let us explain why (B,B) is also predicted as a credible outcome. In
order for Alice to play B, she must believe that Bob will also play B. Yet one may
wonder how she could form such a belief state. This belief can indeed be justified
by her belief that Bob believes that she plays B. Similarly, this belief can be
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reached as a consequence of believing that Bob believes that she believes that he
plays B. This reasoning, which can obviously be repeated indefinitely illustrates
the concept of common knowledge or belief, as it was presented in Section 2.3.
As a result of this interpretation, the game from Figure 2.7 clearly illustrates the
failure of classical game theory to explain how people actually behave the way they
do. More precisely, it also demonstrates the limitation of the theory of rationality
that has been considered so far. Note that, although some refinements to the Nash
equilibrium solution concept have been proposed in the past (see, e.g., the notions
of risk dominance and payoff dominance proposed in Harsanyi and Selten [1988],
which exclude the (B,B) outcome to be a valid equilibrium solution in the Hi-Lo
game from Figure 2.7), those do not allow to explain how individual rationality
should be revised in order to reach the predicted behavior, as it is argued in
Bacharach [2006]. In order to fill this gap, some theories of bounded rationality
have been considered, such as the principle of insufficient reason (see, e.g., Gintis
[2003]), which can be described as follows in the context of the above Hi-Lo game:
as a best response to believing that the co-player has insufficient reason and will
randomize over the set of actions (i.e., select A and B with equiprobability), one’s
only rational move is therefore to select option A (under this belief, selecting B
is no longer rational). While it is clear that such a bounded rationality argument
indeed suffices to justify the observed behavior in the Hi-Lo game, it also reveals
the following weakness: in order to predict outcome (A,A) as the unique solution,
this asymmetric model (each player treats the other as unlike himself) requires
each agent to wrongly believe in the other’s insufficient reason, which is clearly
a strong and unrealistic assumption. The extreme simplicity of this game indeed
makes it reasonable to claim that, on the contrary, each player rationally selects A
while believing in each other’s full rationality. As a result, the above Hi-Lo game
clearly represents a paradox that standard models of game theory cannot solve, as
indicated in Bacharach [2006].
Furthermore, the difficulty for explaining such rational cooperation points out
to yet another important issue that can often be found in non-zero-sum games:
social dilemmas. Such dilemmas simply consist of situations in which collective
interests are in conflict with private interests (again, note that, for obvious reasons,
such dilemmas cannot be found in zero-sum games). In many economic studies,
the use of games that involve such dilemmas is indeed often preferred, as it offers a
credible alternative to the classical prediction of rationality. A well known example
of such a game is the prisoner’s dilemma that was introduced in Section 2.2.1 (see
Figure 2.1). As shown before, this game indeed yields a unique rational choice
that leads to mutual defection. However, mutual cooperation appears to be also
appealing as it would then result in the best outcome for the group, and it is a
better solution for each individual than mutual defection (i.e., it corresponds to a
39
“win-win” solution). In fact, the various studies involving this particular game have
provided empirical evidence that such a social dilemma has some non-negligible
effect on human behavior. For example, it is shown in Shafir and Tversky [1992],
that the cooperation rate in such scenarios varies between 30-40%.
Alternatively, such social dilemmas can also be found in sequential games (cf.
Section 2.2.2), which are therefore regularly used in experiments to test the ro-
bustness of the classical game-theoretic models assuming selfish preferences and
equilibrium. In this case, the advantage of the temporal component of such games
is manifold: it allows to measure the effects that important psychological factors
such as reciprocity, trust and emotions, can have on behavior. As an illustration of
this kind of situations, let us consider the following game that again involves two
players: first, Alice is given a certain amount of money, say 20e, and is asked to
choose either to fairly share the amount (i.e., 10e for each player), which ends the
game, or to give the full amount away to Bob. In the latter case, Bob receives the
amount offered by Alice multiplied by 3 (i.e., 3 × 20e = 60e) and then faces the
following dilemma: he has to either fairly share the total amount with Alice (30e
for each player), or to keep the whole amount for himself. In the latter case, Bob
therefore earns 60e while Alice earns nothing and the game ends. The graphical
representation of this trust game, as it is usually called in economics (Berg et al.











Figure 2.8: Binary trust game
Applying game theory to the game in Figure 2.8 yields a unique rational argu-
ment: if given the chance, Bob’s only rational move is then to play D. Knowing
that, Alice’s unique best response is therefore to play D. However, an alternative
interpretation of this game can be the following: by playing C, Alice then “trusts”
Bob to later perform C. As a result, playing C for Bob corresponds to a form of
positive reciprocity to Alice’s initial trust. Furthermore, a similar form of negative
reciprocity (i.e., punishment) can also be found in a variant of the above game,
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which is called the ultimatum game (for an illustration, see Figure 2.2 in Section
2.2.2).
As another interesting property of such games, one should note that they can
also allow the elicitation of various types of social emotions. For example, one may
argue that Bob’s choice to play C in the above trust game from Figure 2.8 is led
by some form of guilt aversion, as suggested in Battigalli and Dufwenberg [2007];
Ellingsen et al. [2010]. Other relevant social emotions such as reproach, regret,
anger, and disappointment, also appear to have similarly non-negligible effect on
social behavior, especially in the context of those sequential games.
While we have demonstrated that the choice of a particular type of social
interaction largely depends on the scientific objective (for an exhaustive list of
well known games used in experimental economics, see Camerer [2003]; Roth and
Kagel [1995]), one should note that, as for any other experiment from the physical
sciences, the methodology for designing an experiment is crucial to the success
of the corresponding economic study. In fact, as game theory considers social
interactions through abstract representations, an important step is to specify a set
of sufficiently explicit rules or instructions so that the participants actually play
the game as they are intended to. More precisely, one may argue that the two
main factors that need to be controlled through experiments are the individuals’
preferences and uncertainty.
Concerning preferences, the subjects involved in economic experiments are gen-
erally incentivized with real money payoffs. Such financial incentives, which are
rarely used in other scientific areas (e.g. psychology), have the advantage to be,
in average, similarly valued by human agents. Moreover, past experiments clearly
indicate that, in general, subjects participate more seriously and show more effort
with such incentives. Using monetary payoffs therefore represents the best known
method for manipulating people’s preferences over outcomes.
Regarding the other issue of controlling the subjects’ uncertainty, things are
not so simple. First, the instructions of a game must be determined through a
careful choice of wording that lies at the right level of abstraction: a too abstract
description of the game can clearly obscure the situation to the players, whereas
too specific instructions can bias their perception of the game. Similarly, one also
has to control the subjects’ available information about what each other knows.
For example, such common knowledge of the game itself can be reached through
reading the game’s instructions out loud in front of all the participants. Further-
more, an individual’s knowledge about the identity of the other participants is
also a particularly important issue. In most experiments, anonymity is assured
between subjects, as a means to avoid any reputation effect. Similarly, in the
case of several interactions, the subjects must also be informed about any possible
change in the identity of the partner(s): e.g., in order to avoid any learning effect,
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the participants should know that they cannot be matched with the same part-
ner more than once. However, one should clearly admit that control over one’s
actual beliefs is a difficult task. This is why many experiments often make use of
complementary questionnaires, as a means to provide some additional information
about the subjects’s background, their understanding of the game, their beliefs,
and occasionally their feelings and emotions.
Given the complexity of designing such economic experiments, it is worth not-
ing that this methodology has been subject to various criticisms in the past, which
denounce a lack of realism in making decisions in a lab. More specifically, those
objections include the “strangeness” of the game designs representing situations
that are rarely met in real life. For example, while many experiments involve
one-shot anonymous interactions, one may claim that most daily life situations
are concerned with repeated interactions between people that often know each
other. Although such an argument can hardly be denied (we will come back to
it in the next section), one should note that one-shot anonymous games are how-
ever not rare outcomes, especially within advanced market societies: as argued
in Gintis [2009], most interactions we have with strangers in daily life are of this
form. Moreover, as pointed out in Camerer [2011], it must be clarified that the
primary concern of economic experimentation is not to generalize from the lab to
the field, it is instead “to establish a general theory linking economic factors, such
as incentives, rules, and norms, to behavior”.
2.4.2 Other-regarding preferences
So far in this chapter, we have assumed very little about what defines an agent’s
preferences. In fact, in Section 2.1, we have only described the constraints un-
derlying rational preferences, and presented a way to measure those preferences
(through either ordinal or cardinal utility functions). However, those theories say
nothing about the different types of preferences one may hold. We therefore at-
tempt to fill this gap throughout this section.
The most common assumption that has been made in many existing economic
theories is to consider human beings as self-centered agents that aim at reaching
the best possible outcome for satisfying their own primary desires. Those desires
then include all sorts of physical or psychological needs that can improve one’s
own welfare. This type of material preferences often refers to the well known
principle of homo economicus in the literature. As shown through Section 2.2, in
the context of social interactions, such a self-regarding rational agent thus cares
about other players’ preferences and behavior only insofar as these impact his own
payoff. Formally, given a set of agents Agt and a set of outcomes O, let us define a
material payoff function pii that specifies, for each agent i ∈ Agt and each outcome
o ∈ O, a measure of how much o is good or bad to i.
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pii : O → R
Note that this function simply corresponds to the measure of agent i’s cardinal
utility, as specified in Section 2.1.2.
However, while it is clear that this type of individualistic behavior can actually
be followed in some particular situations (e.g., in various types of markets), it
also appears to be largely ignored in many everyday interactions. As an example,
suppose that I am queuing at a cinema ticket center. I may then want to cut the
line to buy my ticket because waiting is materially more costly to me than not
waiting (e.g., it makes me bored). Such a behavior then appears to be the only
rational move for me: given everybody else stays in line, it is in my best interest
to cut the line. Yet, I may eventually choose not to do it because it would not be
fair to other people in the queue. Is this behavior then irrational? Our claim is
that irrationality is not the issue in this case. Instead, my preferences may simply
be sensitive to the welfare of other individuals involved in the situation. In other
words, my utility does not only rely on my own material payoffs, it also depends
on others’ material payoffs. Formally, for every agent i ∈ Agt, i’s utility function
ui can be defined such that, for every outcome o ∈ O, the value ui(o) corresponds
to an aggregation of the material payoffs of every agent from Agt (i.e., pij(o), for
every j ∈ Agt).
This type of utility function is said to specify one’s other-regarding preferences
(also called social preferences). However, one may wonder about the possible
definitions of the above utility function ui. Let us therefore briefly discuss various
well known theories that have already been proposed in the economics literature.
In Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Fehr & Schmidt have provided empirical evidence that
people are genuinely sensible to equality, that is, an individual dislikes being either
better off or worse off than any other person. As a result, they provide a concrete
expression of the above function ui that satisfies such a theory of inequity aversion.
More details about this theory can be found in Section 4.5.1 from Chapter 4.
Similarly, in Charness and Rabin [2002], Charness & Rabin present an alternative
model of fairness, which relies on, what they call, quasi-maximin preferences. More
specifically, they assert that one’s utility is defined by a combination of one’s own
material payoffs, and the social welfare of the group as a whole. According to their
theory, such a social welfare is determined as a trade-off between satisfying the
worst off individual and maximizing the total utility of the group (such preferences
are inspired by Rawls’ theory of justice from Rawls [1971]). More details regarding
this alternative interpretation of function ui can also be found in Section 4.5.2
from Chapter 4. Furthermore, in Levine [1998], Levine introduces another theory
of social preferences that is based upon the concept of altruism. More precisely,
he defines an individual’s adjusted utility according to one’s propensity to be
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altruistic/selfish/spiteful, and one’s regard for altruistic/selfish/spiteful opponents.
Through the previous theories of social (or other-regarding) preferences, which
are all supported by experimental data, one can observe that they do not contradict
the classical theory of rationality that we have been exploring so far. In fact,
once an individual’s utility is correctly adjusted according to either of the above
interpretations, then the rationality principle can still hold. In other words, those
models explain deviation from self-regarding behavior, not by rejecting rationality,
but instead by refining one’s preferences, which may simply be influenced by the
welfare of other individuals involved in the interaction. Those results therefore
lead to the relevant distinction that can be made between being self-regarding
and being self-interested: as pointed out in Gintis [2009], while it makes sense to
say that a self-regarding agent is necessarily self-interested, the reverse may not
always hold. For example, I may indeed get great pleasure from offering you a gift
that makes you particularly happy, even though it is costly for me to do so. In
this particular case, although I am clearly not self-regarding, I am however self-
interested in the sense that the increase of your welfare somehow also contributes
to improving my own well-being.
According to the previously mentioned studies, it is worth summarizing the
general result as follows: any given individual tends to rank outcomes according to
everybody’s social preferences in the actually occurring outcome. Formally, if some
other-regarding agent i ∈ Agt is asked to subjectively compare two outcomes o1 ∈
O and o2 ∈ O, then i will consider the material payoff functions of every other agent
from Agt when applied to these two outcomes. More precisely, instead of simply
comparing pii(o1) with pii(o2) as a self-regarding agent, i will instead compare ui(o1)
with ui(o2). However, this points out to an important remark: in comparing the
two outcomes, agent i may also actually take into account preferences related to
other alternative outcomes that could have occurred. In order to illustrate this
point, let us consider the following game that involves two players (Alice and Bob).
As for the Hi-Lo matching game presented earlier (see Figure 2.7), both players
have the same choice set, that is, each can choose between some option A and
some option B. The game is also symmetric, in the sense that no matter the
actual outcome, both agents will necessarily earn the same material payoff. The
corresponding payoff matrix (i.e., piAlice and piBob) is depicted in Figure 2.9.
According to this game, if both players select A, then they both get 10e. If
they both play B, then they each get 5e. However, if Alice plays A and Bob plays
B, then they each get 6e. Similarly, whenever Alice plays B while Bob plays A,
then each gets 50e.
In this context, let us now look at Alice’s preferences in more details through the
following question. Does Alice prefer outcome (A,A) over outcome (B,B)? A pos-









Figure 2.9: Game with possible regret
that caring about Bob’s desires according to any of the above theories of social pref-
erences cannot change Alice’s preferences. In other words, for any relevant function
uAlice that defines Alice’s utility, we similarly have that uAlice(A,A) > uAlice(B,B).
However, one should note that there exists another intuitive interpretation to the
way Alice views this problem. If outcome (A,A) actually occurs, Alice would re-
alize that she could have allowed a much higher payoff (for the group, Bob and
herself) had she played B instead of A. This negative feeling may then consider-
ably lower Alice’s utility for this outcome. On the other hand, if outcome (B,B)
actually occurs, then Alice does not have such a strong negative feeling as she
could not have reached a much better payoff for anybody (or for the group) by
behaving differently. As a result of this interpretation, Alice’s utility may actually
be lower for outcome (A,A) than for outcome (B,B).
As a means to justify this alternative interpretation, one may consider a well
known social emotion: regret. Indeed, psychologists and economists (e.g., Loomes
and Sugden [1982]; Sugden [1985]; Zeelenberg [1999]; Zeelenberg et al. [1998]) agree
that regret is a negative, cognitively determined emotion that we experience when
realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better, had we
acted differently. Applied to the above scenario, Alice can feel such regret in the
case of outcome (A,A). On the other hand, the trigger of such a social emotion
is reasonably expected to be negligible in the case of outcome (B,B) (i.e., payoffs
are not very different in outcome (B,B) and in outcome (A,B)). Consequently, if
Alice is sufficiently regret averse, she will then prefer outcome (B,B) over outcome
(A,A).
More generally, the above game from Figure 2.9 illustrates the fact that one’s
utility for a given outcome o may not only rely on everybody’s material payoffs
related to o, but also on those material payoffs related to other alternative outcomes
from O.
Formally, given some agent i ∈ Agt, one can refine i’s utility function Ui such
that, for every outcome o ∈ O, the value Ui(o) depends on the material payoffs
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of every agent from Agt in every possible outcome from O (i.e., pij(o′), for every
j ∈ Agt and every o′ ∈ O).
Furthermore, it is worth indicating that all the above theories of other-regarding
preferences rely on some properties that are intrinsic to the individuals. In fact,
they claim that different individuals may naturally have different levels of fairness,
altruism, inequity aversion, or regret aversion. However, those theories remain
vague about whether an individual’s sensitivity to such attitudes depends on the
individuals’ identities. In other words, are the identities of the persons one inter-
acts with irrelevant to defining one’s social preferences? The above models can
clearly not answer this question as they strictly apply to situations of anonymous
interactions. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned in Section 2.4.1, it is clear
that many real-life situations involve a high number of interactions between in-
dividuals that are socially tied with one another. Intuitively, it therefore makes
sense to state that one often behaves differently in the same situation depending
on whether the persons involved are good friends or perfect strangers.
This leads us to claim that knowing the identities of the persons one interacts
with also directly affect one’s own preferences. In other words, when making a
decision in a social situation, one may value other individuals’ interests differently
depending on their level of social closeness. The main consequence of this theory of
social ties is that it still does not conflict with the classical concept of rationality,
it simply refines it further. In fact, a rational behavior still consists in maximizing
one’s own preferences, given one’s beliefs about others’ choices. The only difference
with classical economic theory lies in those preferences that are not only composed
of one’s own material interest, but also incorporate one’s concern for the relative
welfare of other socially tied individuals. As a result, we introduce the concept of
social rationality to denote the type of rationality displayed by individuals in multi-
agent decision-making situations that involve various types of social relationships.
In order to formally characterize this notion of social rationality, we will first
present in Chapter 4 the study of a particular type of two-player coordination
game with the following interesting properties: the interactive situation involves
a problem of co-operation similar to that discussed in Section 2.4.1 (see Figure
2.7). Furthermore, it allows the participants to face a particular social dilemma,
which somewhat also resembles that from the trust game presented in Figure
2.8. Following such a theoretical study, Chapter 5 introduces the corresponding
empirical analysis, which provides evidence of the actual effects of social ties on
human behavior, and justify the need for defining an alternative theoretical model.




Epistemic Rationality in Dynamic
Games
“The doorstep to the temple of wisdom is a knowledge
of our own ignorance.”
— Benjamin Franklin
“It is only when we forget all our learning that we
begin to know.”
— Henry David Thoreau
Journal, 4 October 1859
The aim of this chapter is to propose a modal logic framework that allows to rea-
son about epistemic games in extensive form. In this kind of games, players decide
what to do according to some general principles of rationality while being uncertain
about several aspects of the interaction such as other agents’ choices, other agents’
preferences, etc. We therefore propose both a semantic and a syntactic analysis of
such sequential games in modal logic. In particular, we introduce a multi-modal
logic interpreted on a Kripke-style semantics which integrates the concepts of ac-
tion, strategy, knowledge and preference and which allows to reason about the
properties of extensive form games. In order to illustrate the expressive power of
the logic, we define in its object language the well known concepts of rationality
and backward induction, as they are defined according to economic theory. Based
on these definitions, we then provide a syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem that
states the following: “for any non degenerate game of perfect information, com-
mon knowledge of rationality implies the backward induction solution” (Aumann
[1995]). While there exist other logics that formalize similar theorems, none of
these is expressive enough to provide syntactic proofs that would emphasize the
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various requirements assumed for the theorems. For example, while Baltag et al.
[2009] presents a logic that can correctly define the statement of Aumann’s theo-
rem, no syntactic proof of it is provided, and its language does not allow to verify
whether the theorem holds when the epistemic conditions are weakened. Indeed,
if one realistically only considers common knowledge to be bounded to some finite
level, then the maximal depth of the game represents an important variable to the
proof of the theorem. By considering the temporal dimension of such extensive
form games, we demonstrate its relevance to the proof of some weaker version of
the theorem.
More generally, our intention, throughout this chapter, is not to show that a
syntactic derivation of Aumann’s theorem is interesting in itself. Instead, we wish
to demonstrate that this kind of analysis is useful to identify specific assumptions
about the relationship between players’ knowledge and the game structure that
are needed in order to prove the theorem.
The syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem is given in Appendix A.
3.1 A modal logic of actions, strategies, knowl-
edge and preferences
We present in this section the modal logic ELEG (Epistemic Logic of Extensive
Games) integrating the concepts of action, strategy, knowledge and preference.
This logic supports reasoning about games in extensive form in which an agent
might be uncertain about the other agents’ current and future choices of actions.
3.1.1 Syntax
The syntactic primitives of the logic ELEG are the finite set of agents Agt, the
set of atomic propositions Atm, a nonempty finite set of atomic action names
Act = {α1, α2, . . . , α|Act|}, a non-empty finite set of N integers I = {0, . . . ,N}.
The language L of the logic ELEG is given by the following BNF (Backus-Naur
Form) grammar:
χ ::= p | α | turni | end | ki
ϕ ::= χ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ | AXϕ | [Ki]ϕ | Xϕ
where p ranges over Atm, i ranges over Agt, α ranges over Act, and k ranges
over I. Formulas χ are called atomic formulas. The classical Boolean connectives
⊥, >, ∧, → and ↔ are defined from ∨ and ¬ in the usual manner.
The formula α has to be read “the action α is performed”, while turni and ki
are read respectively “it is agent i’s turn to play”, and “the current strategy profile
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will ensure a payoff k to agent i”. Finally, end is meant to stand for “the current
vertex of the game is an end vertex”.
The operator  is used to quantify over strategy profiles of the current game.
ϕ has to be read “ϕ holds for all strategy profiles of the current extensive game”.
The operator AX is used to quantify over next vertices of the current extensive
game. AXϕ has to be read “ϕ is true at every possible next vertex along the
current strategy profile”.
The formula [Ki]ϕ is read as usual “agent i knows that ϕ is true”. X is the
standard temporal operator of next. The formula Xϕ has to be read “ϕ will be
true next”.
Moreover, the following abbreviations are given:
3ϕ
def= ¬¬ϕ AX0ϕ def= ϕ
EXϕ def= ¬AX¬ϕ AXn+1ϕ def= AX(AXnϕ)
〈Ki〉ϕ def= ¬[Ki]¬ϕ AX≤nϕ def= ∧0≤m≤n AXmϕ
αi
def= α ∧ turni EXnϕ def= ¬AXn¬ϕ
X0ϕ def= ϕ EX≤nϕ def= ¬AX≤n¬ϕ
Xn+1ϕ def= XXnϕ
3ϕ has to be read “ϕ holds for at least one strategy profile of the current extensive
game”, whereas EXϕ has to read “ϕ is true in at least one possible next vertex
along the current strategy profile”. 〈Ki〉ϕ has to be read “agent i thinks that ϕ is
possible”, whereas αi has to be read “agent i performs the action α”. Xn has to be
read “ϕ will be true n steps from now”. Operators AXnϕ and AX≤nϕ respectively
read “ϕ is true in every vertex that can be reached in exactly n step(s) from now,
along the current strategy profile” and “ϕ is true in every vertex that can be
reached within n step(s) from now, along the current strategy profile”. Finally the
corresponding dual operators EXnϕ and EX≤nϕ can be interpreted as “ϕ is true in
at least one vertex that can be reached in exactly n step(s) from now, along the
current strategy profile” and “ϕ is true in at least one vertex that can be reached
within n step(s) from now, along the current strategy profile”.
As common in Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL), we introduce an operator
of sequential composition “;”. We define the set Seq of action sequences as the
smallest set such that: α ∈ Seq for any α ∈ Act, and if 1, 2 ∈ Seq then 1;2 ∈ Seq.
Moreover, we consider Seqn ⊆ Seq to be the set of action sequences of length n.
The fact that a given action sequence will occur and ϕ will be true afterwards can
be defined in the object language by means of the following definition:





We use [EKC ]ϕ as an abbreviation of
∧
i∈C [Ki]ϕ, i.e., every agent in C knows
ϕ (if C = ∅ then [EKC ]ϕ is equivalent to >). Then we define by induction [EKkC ]ϕ
for every natural number k ∈ N:
[EK0C ]ϕ
def= ϕ
and for all k ≥ 1,
[EKkC ]ϕ
def= [EKC ]([EKk−1C ]ϕ)
Similarly, we define for all natural numbers n ∈ N:
[CK0C ]ϕ
def= ϕ






[CKnC ]ϕ expresses C’s common knowledge that ϕ up to n iterations, i.e., everyone
in C knows ϕ, everyone in C knows that everyone in C knows ϕ, and so on until
level n.
3.1.2 Semantics
A strategic structure includes a set of vertices, a set of strategy profiles, a suc-
cessor function associating vertices and strategy profiles to vertices, a turn-taking
function assigning agents to vertices. The set of vertices includes end vertices.
Definition 3.1 (Strategic structure) A strategic structure is a tuple T = 〈V ,Q, S, next,
EndV 〉 where:
• V is a non-empty set of vertices;
• Q is a total function Q : V −→ Agt mapping vertices to agents;
• S is a nonempty set of strategy profiles on V , and every strategy profile s ∈ S
is a total function s : V −→ Act mapping vertices to actions;
• next is a partial function next : V × S −→ V mapping vertices and strategy
profiles to vertices such that:
C1 if s(w) = s′(w) then next(w, s) = next(w, s′);
• EndV ⊆ V is the set of end vertices such that:
C2 w ∈ EndV if and only if, next(w, s) is undefined for every s.
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Q(w) = i means that at vertex w it is agent i’s turn to play, and next(w, s) = w′
means that w′ is the next vertex of w with respect to the strategy profile s. We
call index a pair (w, s) with w ∈ V and s ∈ S. We define H = V × S the set of
all indices.
considers every vertex of the game and is not restricted to a single player’s
moves as usually done in game theory. Moreover, for every s ∈ S, a single player
i’s strategy si can be defined as the restriction of s to the vertices in which it is
agent i’s turn to play.
According to the Constraint C1, two strategy profiles selecting the same action
at a given vertex lead to the same next vertex. According to the constraint C2,
an end vertex is a vertex which does not have a next vertex.
Definition 3.2 (Successor) R is a relation on vertices such that:
for every w, v ∈ V , wRv if and only if there is s ∈ S such that next(w, s) = v.
wRv means that vertex v is a successor of vertex w.
An extensive game model is nothing but a strategic structure supplemented
with accessibility relations for agents’ knowledge over strategy profiles, agents’
preferences and a valuation of atomic propositions.
Definition 3.3 (Extensive game model) An extensive game model is a tuple
M = 〈T, {Ei | i ∈ Agt}, {Pi | i ∈ Agt}, pi〉 where:
• T is a strategic structure;
• every Ei is an equivalence relation on S such that:
C3 if sEis′ and Q(w) = i, then s(w) = s′(w);
• every Pi is a total function Pi : H −→ I mapping every index to an integer
such that:
C4 if next(w, s) = w′, then Pi(w, s) = k if and only if Pi(w′, s) = k;
C5 if w ∈ EndV and s(w) = s′(w) then Pi(w, s) = Pi(w, s′).
• pi : Atm −→ 2H is a valuation function on indices.
sEis
′ means that agent i cannot distinguish strategy profile s from the strategy
profile s′. Pi(w, s) = k means that the strategy profile s played at the vertex w
will ensure a payoff k to agent i.
Constraint C3 is the assumption that every agent knows his choice when it is
his turn to play Aumann [1995]; Battigalli and Bonanno [1999]. Constraint C4 cor-
rectly expresses the fact that in an extensive form game, preferences are built over
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histories, where a history is nothing but a sequence of indices (w0, s), . . . , (wn, s), . . .
such that next(wi, s) = wi+1 for every 0 ≤ i. According to Constraint C5, two
strategies selecting the same action at an end vertex lead to the same payoff for
an agent. In other words, at an end vertex the payoff of an action is uniquely
determined.
Example In order to illustrate the use of our logic ELEG to model extensive
form games, let us consider a well known game in economics, namely the trust
game (Berg et al. [1995]). The binary version of the trust game (BTG) involves
two players, the truster (Alice) and the trustee (Bob), playing sequentially in the
following way: first Alice can choose between leaving the game and divide the
amount of 2e equally with Bob (i.e., 1e for each) or let Bob play. In the latter
case, Bob can either divide the amount of 6e equally with Alice (i.e., 3e for each)
or keep the whole amount for himself (i.e., 6e for himself and 0e for the truster).












Figure 3.1: Binary Trust Game (BTG)
In Figure 3.1, let us consider Alice, as the truster who plays at vertex v,
and Bob, as the trustee who plays at vertex w. At each leaf of the tree, payoffs
take the form (X, Y ), where Alice gets X e and Bob gets Y e. Moreover, actions
named Ca and Da respectably stand for “Alice cooperates” and “Alice defects”.
Similarly, actions named Cb and Db respectably stand for “Bob cooperates” and
“Bob defects”.
Therefore, we suppose Agt = {Alice, Bob}, Act = {Ca, Cb, Da, Db}, V =
{v, w}, EndV = {w}, and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4};
Let us now represent the extensive game model corresponding to the binary
trust game in ELEG:
• next(v, s1) = w, next(v, s2) = w;
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• Q(v) = Alice,Q(w) = Bob;
• EAlice(s1) = EBob(s2) = {s1, s2};EAlice(s3) = EAlice(s4) = {s3, s4};
EBob(s1) = EBob(s3) = {s1, s3};EBob(s2) = EBob(s4) = {s2, s4};
• PAlice(v, s1) = PAlice(w, s1) = PAlice(w, s3) = 3,
PBob(v, s1) = PBob(w, s1) = PBob(w, s3) = 3,
PAlice(v, s2) = PAlice(w, s2) = PAlice(w, s4) = 0,
PAlice(v, s3) = PAlice(v, s4) = PBob(v, s3) = PBob(v, s4) = 1,
PBob(v, s2) = PBob(w, s2) = PBob(w, s4) = 6
This model represents the four possible strategy profiles s1, s2, s3 and s4 of the
BTG, each of which includes the same two vertices v and w where various actions
occur:
• s1 corresponds to strategy profile (Ca, Cb);
• s2 corresponds to strategy profile (Ca, Db);
• s3 corresponds to strategy profile (Da, Cb);
• s4 corresponds to strategy profile (Da, Db);
Vertices v and w represent the nodes within the game where respectively Alice and
Bob have to play. The epistemic relations EAlice and EBob, as they are defined in
this model, represent perfect uncertainty for each player over the strategy profiles.
One should note however that these epistemic relations are only examples and
could possibly be defined differently without modifying the strategic structure of
the game.
Definition 3.4 (Truth conditions) Truth of a formula in a model M at a given
index (w, s) is defined as follows:
• M,w, s |= p iff (w, s) ∈ pi(p);
• M,w, s |= ¬ϕ iff M,w, s 6|= ϕ;
• M,w, s |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M,w, s |= ϕ or M,w, s |= ψ;
• M,w, s |= α iff s(w) = α;
• M,w, s |= turni iff Q(w) = i;
• M,w, s |= end iff w ∈ EndV ;
• M,w, s |= ki iff Pi(w, s) = k;
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• M,w, s |= Xϕ iff if next(w, s) is defined then M, next(w, s), s |= ϕ;
• M,w, s |= ϕ iff M,w, s′ |= ϕ for all s′ ∈ S;
• M,w, s |= AXϕ iff M,w′, s |= ϕ for all w′ ∈ V such that wRw′;
• M,w, s |= [Ki]ϕ iff M,w, s′ |= ϕ for all s′ such that sEis′.
A formula ϕ is true in an extensive game model M iffM,w, s |= ϕ for every vertex
w in V and every strategy profile s in S. ϕ is ELEG-valid (noted |= ϕ) iff ϕ is true
in all extensive game models. ϕ is ELEG-satisfiable iff ¬ϕ is not ELEG-valid.
3.1.3 Some validities
Table 3.1 provides an exhaustive list of ELEG validities that will be sufficient to
provide in Section 3.3 a syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem.
Let us prove the validity Perm[Ki],AX as an example. Assume M,w, s |=
[Ki]AXϕ for an arbitraryELEGmodelM . This is equivalent to say thatM,w, s′ |=
AXϕ for all s′ such that sEis′ which, in turn, is equivalent to say thatM,w′, s′ |= ϕ
for all (w′, s′) such that sEis′ and wRw′. The latter is equivalent to say that
M,w′, s |= [Ki]ϕ for all w′ such that wRw′ which, in turn, is equivalent to say that
M,w, s |= AX[Ki]ϕ.
In the sequel, we will write `ELEG ϕ to mean that ϕ can be derived by means
of the list of principles given in Table 3.1. The study of a complete axiomatization
of the logic ELEG is postponed to future work.
3.2 Backward induction and rationality
We here define two fundamental concepts in Aumann’s epistemic analysis of exten-
sive form games: the concept of backward induction and the concept of rationality.
As a matter of simplicity to later prove Aumann’s Theorem, we only provide
in this section simplified formal definitions that only apply to games of uniform
depth. One should note however that more general definitions of both backward
induction and rationality can easily be expressed in ELEG.
In order to define the concept of backward induction, we first introduce the
well known Nash equilibrium, which can also be expressed in ELEG.
3.2.1 Nash equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium is a well known solution concept, according to which ev-
ery player chooses a strategy such that none of them can benefit by individually
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All principles of classical propositional logic(CPL)
All S5 principles for (S5)
All S5 principles for every [Ki](S5[Ki])
All K principles for X(KX)









turni → (α→ [Ki]α)(Aware) ∨
k∈I
ki(CompletePref)
ki → ¬hi if k 6= h(SinglePref) ∨
α∈Act
α(OneAct)
α→ ¬β if α 6= β(SingleAct) ∨
i∈Agt
turni(TurnTaking)
turni → ¬turnj if i 6= j(SingleTurn)
¬end→ (ki ↔ Xki)(TimePref)
(end ∧ α ∧ ki)→ (α→ ki)(EndAct)
(α ∧ Xϕ)→ (α→ Xϕ)(StrAct)
Table 3.1: Some validities of ELEG
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changing his own strategy. In other words, every agent plays a strategy that is a
best response to others. In order to define this concept for extensive form games,
one first needs to express the following notion of Best Response (BR) in ELEG.
For the case n = 0 we define (for i ∈ Agt, k ∈ I):
BR0i (k)




For every n > 0 we define (for i ∈ Agt, k ∈ I):
BRni (k)
def= XBRn−1i (k) ∧ (turni → AX(
∨
h∈I:h≤k
hi ∧ BRn−1i (k)))
This notion of best response therefore reads as follows: M,w, s |= BRni (k) if
and only if agent i cannot obtain a payoff higher than k by individually deviating
from his current strategy from s, when starting from vertex w from the finite game
of uniform depth n (assuming other agents play their own strategies from s).
Based on the previous concept, the corresponding formal definition in ELEG






ki ∧ BRni (k)
In this case: M,w, s |= Nashn if and only if the current strategy profile s,
when starting from vertex w, corresponds to a Nash solution for the finite game
of uniform depth n.
One should note that this concept of Nash equilibrium implies that each chosen
action at every vertex along the actual path does maximize the player’s payoff.
Theorem 3.1 For every n ∈ N, we have:
`ELEG Nashn+1 → XNashn
However, this definition does not guarantee local best response at vertices that
are not on this path.
6`ELEG Nashn+1 → AXNashn
In other words, this definition implies that a best response action may rely
on some alternative paths that are not necessarily local best responses themselves.
Such a weakness of the Nash equilibrium in the context of extensive games is known
in the economic literature through the concept of non-credible threats: the Nash
solution can indeed consider some threats that rational players would actually not
carry out, because it would not be in their best interest to do so. In order to
rule out such threats, one then needs to consider the Nash equilibrium not only at
every vertex along the actual path, but also at every vertex along every alternative
path of the game. Such a strengthening corresponds to the concept of backward
induction solution that is defined below.
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3.2.2 Backward induction
The notion of backward induction represents the process of reasoning backwards in
time, starting from each end vertex of the game in order to determine a sequence
of optimal actions. This method is generally used to compute the subgame perfect
Nash equilibria in sequential games. The backward induction (BI) solution in a
game of depth n (i.e., where at most n steps are necessary to reach an end vertex
of the game) can be computed by iterating the process n times, as the BI solution
at one state relies on the BI solution at every possible successive state. Therefore,
the first step BI solution (n = 0) corresponds to the maximization of preferences
for the last player to play at each possible end vertex of the game. The BI solution
after n + 1 (n > 0) steps corresponds to the maximization of the current player’s
preferences, considering only those that satisfy the BI solution after n steps at any
possible next state.
The recursive formal definition in ELEG of the BI solution in a finite game of
uniform depth n is as follows.
For the case n = 0 we define:
BI0 def= end ∧ ∨
i∈Agt,k∈I




For every n > 0 we define:
BIn def= ¬end ∧ ∨
i∈Agt,k∈I




Therefore: M,w, s |= BIn if and only if the current strategy profile s, when
starting from vertex w, corresponds to a backward induction solution in the sub-
game of uniform depth n, which can be computed in n+ 1 steps.
Note that without any additional constraint on the game involved, none of
these definitions does guarantee that a unique BI solution will be found after each
step.
Moreover, as the backward induction computes the subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium, the following formula therefore becomes valid in ELEG:





One should also note that the backward induction simply corresponds to a
restriction on the Nash equilibrium:
`ELEG BIn → Nashn
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3.2.3 Epistemic rationality
The following ELEG definition characterizes a notion of material rationality that
is supposed in Aumann’s epistemic analysis of extensive form games:
Ratendi







Ratendi means that an agent i is rational at an end vertex (i.e., at some end vertex
of the game) if and only if i chooses an action that maximizes his individual payoff.
Note that in this case, rationality does not rely on any epistemic component.
Rat¬endi







Rat¬endi means that an agent i is rational at any intermediate vertex (any node
that is not an end vertex of the game) if and only if i chooses an action in such a
way that what he considers possible to happen afterwards is not strictly dominated
by some alternative future he would consider, had he chosen any other action. In
other words, as every possible next vertex corresponds to one of i’s possible actions,
i is rational if and only if each of these vertices is not strictly dominated, according
to i’s uncertainty, by the next actual vertex (corresponding to the actual action
chosen by i).
Rati def= Ratendi ∧ Rat¬endi
Note that introspection on material rationality is expressed by the following
valid formula in ELEG (see the syntactic proof of Lemmas A.1 and A.2 in Ap-
pendix A for details):
`ELEG Rati ↔ [Ki]Rati
From the previous definition of material rationality, one can easily define Au-
mann’s concept of substantive rationality. In fact, according to Aumann, an agent
is substantively rational if and only if “no matter where a player finds himself -
at which vertex - he will not knowingly continue with a strategy that yields him
less than he could have gotten with a different strategy” (Aumann [1995]). The
corresponding definition in ELEG is as follows:
SRatni
def= AX≤nRati
SRatni reads “agent i is substantively rational up to some depth n”. In order
to deal with perfect substantive rationality, the n parameter should not be lower
than the maximum depth of the game tree.
Moreover, introspection on substantive rationality can also be deduced through
Axiom Perm[Ki],AX. The following formula is therefore valid in ELEG:
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Theorem 3.3 For every n ∈ N, i ∈ Agt, we have:
`ELEG SRatni ↔ [Ki]SRatni
3.3 A syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem
As already stated in the previous section, a fundamental assumption of Aumann’s
theorem is that the game is in “general position”, i.e., every history of the game
is associated to a unique preference value for every agent. This important notion






AX≤n((ki ∧ 〈〉end)→ (〈〉end↔ ki))
In our syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem we only consider game structures
with uniform depth, that is, games whose end vertices have the same distance from
a given vertex.
The following construction Depthn means that “the current game has a uniform
depth of degree n from the current vertex”. In other words, no matter what actions
will be chosen in the future, an end vertex will be reached in exactly n steps. This
concept is thus captured by the following ELEG formula:
Depthn def= (X)nend
This assumption, which is not stated in Aumann’s original theorem, is used here
only to simplify the formal proof. One should note however that any extensive
game can be represented by an extensive game with uniform depth (i.e., by adding
“dummy decision nodes” where players have only one feasible action).
According to Aumann’s theorem, the following constraints must be satisfied in
order for the current strategy profile to be a backward induction solution:
• the game is finite;
• the game has a uniform depth of degree n from the current vertex;
• the game is in the general position;
• there is common knowledge up to level at least n that at every future vertex
(up to depth n) all agents are rational.




SRatni ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)→ BIn
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Note that the proof of Theorem 3.4 only requires to prove the case where m = n
(see Lemma A.3 for details).
The syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem clearly demonstrates that the tem-
poral factor actually plays an important role in the case of reasoning in extensive
form games and interpreting the backward induction. Indeed, the maximum depth
of the game tree clearly justifies the level of common belief in substantive ratio-
nality required to derive the backward induction solution (i.e., m = n in Theorem
3.4). Moreover, the proof in Appendix A also shows that the hypothesis of com-
mon knowledge among all agents is not necessary to reach the backward induction.
The following weaker assumption indeed suffices to derive it:
⇒ in a game of maximum depth n, at every vertex where the maximum depth
of the remaining subgame tree is m ≤ n, it is common knowledge up to some
level m among players in J ⊆ Agt that all players in J are substantively
rational (where J only includes those agents who may play at some future
vertex).
3.4 A more convenient characterization of knowl-
edge
Based on the previous statement of Aumann’s theorem, one can note from the
syntactic proof in Appendix A that Theorem 3.4 can be weakened through a
reinterpretation of the epistemic operator. Indeed, every proof step from Theorem
3.4 using Axiom T for the S5 knowledge operator [Ki] can still be proved using
KD4 principles for the belief modal operator. Such an observation implies that
a simple notion of belief (which is not necessarily truthful) is sufficient to prove
Aumann’s theorem. The detailed proof of Theorem 3.4 in Appendix A shows that
such a weakening of the epistemic operator is made possible mainly by Axiom
Aware that requires agents to have introspection on their own performing action
(see specific proofs of Lemmas A.1 and A.3 in Appendix A for details). In other
words, agents always believe without a doubt what they’ll actually perform.
Another interesting observation from the syntactic proof of Theorem 3.4 is that
agents do not require to have negative introspection over their knowledge: indeed
axiom 5 from the knowledge operator [Ki] is not required to the proof. However,
one should note that this axiom is required so that rationality introspection holds
(see Lemma A.2 in Appendix A for details). As a direct implication, this sim-
ply means that Theorem 3.4 does not require agents to be aware of their own
rationality.
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3.5 Beyond Aumann’s theorem
A well known disputed argument in game theory questions the derivation of
the backward induction from the hypothesis of common belief in rationality. In
fact, Aumann’s theorem considers substantive rationality in the hypothesis, which
means that in every vertex of the game, the players will be rational. Such a def-
inition is criticizable because it requires players to be even rational in vertices
that will never be reached given some expected strategy. In Stalnaker [1998],
Stalnaker criticizes Aumann’s concept of substantive rationality, and claims that,
under common belief in some more realistic notion of rationality, the backward in-
duction solution may not always be predicted in games that are in agent form (i.e.,
in games where agents may play more than once). Stalnaker thus differentiates
the following interpretations about conditionals: an agent i’s beliefs about what
would happen at some hypothetical vertex is to be distinguished from i’s beliefs
if that same vertex were actually reached. This relevant distinction can easily be
characterized through the semantics of our logic ELEG.
In order to illustrate such an argument, let us consider a three round version
of the well known centipede Game (Rosenthal [1981]), as shown in Figure 3.2.
b b b
w1 w3w2




Figure 3.2: The centipede Game (Alice plays at w1 and w3; Bob plays at w2)
In order to formalize the game depicted in Figure 3.2 (where (x, y) reads “Alice
gets a payoff of x while Bob gets a payoff of y”), let us construct the following
model in ELEG.
We supposeAgt = {Alice, Bob}, Act = {a1, d1, a2, d2, a3, d3}, V = {w1, w2, w3},
EndV = {w3}, and S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8};
S includes the eight possible strategy profiles s1, . . . , s8 of the centipede game,
each of which includes the same three vertices from V where various actions occur:
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s1 corresponds to strategy profile (d1, d2, d3)
s2 corresponds to strategy profile (d1, d2, a3)
s3 corresponds to strategy profile (d1, a2, d3)
s4 corresponds to strategy profile (d1, a2, a3)
s5 corresponds to strategy profile (a1, d2, d3)
s6 corresponds to strategy profile (a1, d2, a3)
s7 corresponds to strategy profile (a1, a2, d3)
s8 corresponds to strategy profile (a1, a2, a3)
The corresponding ELEG model is constructed as follows:
• next(w1, s) = w2 for s ∈ {s5, s6, s7, s8};
next(w2, s) = w3 for s ∈ {s3, s4, s7, s8};
• Q(w1) = Q(w3) = Alice;
Q(w2) = Bob;
• PAlice(w1, s) = PBob(w1, s) = 1 for s ∈ {s1, s2, s3, s4};
PAlice(w1, s) = 0 and PBob(w1, s) = 11 for s ∈ {s5, s6};
PAlice(w1, s7) = 16 and PBob(w1, s7) = 10;
PAlice(w1, s8) = PBob(w1, s8) = 15;
PAlice(w2, s) = 0 and PBob(w2, s) = 11 for s ∈ {s1, s2, s5, s6};
PAlice(w2, s) = 16 and PBob(w2, s) = 10 for s ∈ {s3, s7};
PAlice(w2, s) = PBob(w2, s) = 15 for s ∈ {s4, s8};
PAlice(w3, s) = 16 and PBob(w3, s) = 10 for s ∈ {s1, s3, s5, s7};
PAlice(w3, s) = PBob(w3, s) = 15 for s ∈ {s2, s4, s6, s8};
As shown in Halpern [2001], Stalnaker illustrates his argument by extending
Aumann’s model with a selection function that characterizes a notion of “closeness”
between two strategy profiles for every given vertex.
This corresponds to extending an extensive game model in ELEG with the
following function F :
• F is a total function F : S ×W −→ S mapping every strategy profile and
vertex to a strategy profile such that:
F1 if F (s, w) = s′, then for every v ∈ V s.t. wR∗v, s(v) = s(v)′;
F2 if F (s, w) = s′, and vR∗w, and v 6= w, then ∃v′ ∈ V s.t. next(v, s′) = v′
and v′R∗w.
(Where R∗ denotes the reflexive transitive closure of R)
In other words, given s, s′ ∈ S and w ∈ W , F (w, s) = s′ if and only if s and s′
specify the same actions at every vertex that can be reached from w. Applied to
the above centipede game, F can partially be defined as follows:
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• F (w1, s1) = s1; F (w2, s1) = s5;F (w3, s1) = s7;
F (w1, s3) = s3; F (w2, s3) = s7;F (w3, s3) = s7;
Thus, according to Stalnaker, an agent i is rational at some vertex v along
some strategy profile s if i is rational at v in F (s, v). Following this interpretation,
it is easy to check that common belief in substantive rationality (according to the
above rule) does not imply the backward induction outcome (see Halpern [2001]
for a detailed analysis).
However, while Stalnaker’s concept of substantive rationality is more realistic
than Aumann’s, the main remaining weakness carried out in both models con-
cerns the structure of the epistemic relation that only considers states/strategy
profiles. Indeed, both models restrict agents to have the same epistemic state at
every vertex from the same strategy profile (i.e., agents have the same uncertainty
regarding strategy profiles no matter which vertex they are in). Such a constraint
can be observed through the semantic definition of Ei in ELEG. Moreover, Axiom
Perm[Ki],AX reflects the unrealistic structure of such epistemic relations. Obviously
Axiom Perm[Ki],AX is very strong as it assumes that players know at the begin-
ning of the game what they will do at any reachable state in the future where they
have to play. This simply means that players can neither learn nor forget through
the gameplay. In order to allow the players to revise their beliefs and act more
realistically as they advance through the game, one therefore needs to consider
vertices along with strategy profiles within the epistemic relation. In this way, a
player who finds out that a possible strategy is discarded by another’s move at
some vertex may then update his knowledge, allowing him to later act accordingly.
However, unlike in Aumann and Stalnaker’s models discussed above, the bidi-
mensional semantics of ELEG allows such a revision: indeed, every ELEG for-
mula is interpreted with respect to a vertex/strategy profile pair. Hence, we can
here interpret the epistemic modal operator by means of an equivalence epistemic
relation Ewi on strategy profiles from S for every agent i ∈ Agt and every vertex
w ∈ V . Consequently, agents’ uncertainty over strategy profiles can evolve through
time.
Given this change on the epistemic relations, the truth condition of the knowl-
edge operator then becomes:
• M,w, s |= [Ki]ϕ iff M,w, s′ |= ϕ for all s′ such that sEwi s′.
Considering these new epistemic relations Ewi , the previous Constraint C3 has
to be reformulated as follows:
C3∗ if sEwi s′ and Q(w) = i, then s(w) = s(w)′
Moreover, the following constraints need to be introduced in order to keep
Axiom Perm[Ki],AX as in Table 3.1:
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C6 if sEvi s′ and wRv then sEwi s′
C7 if sEwi s′ and wRv then sEvi s′
According to Constraint C6, agents will never forget their current uncertainty
over strategy profiles in every reachable vertex. In other words, C6 simply means
that agents will always have a perfect recall of their past uncertainty throughout
the game. According to Constraint C7, agents are always aware of their future
uncertainty over strategy profiles in every reachable vertex. In other words, C7
means that agents will never be able to discard strategy profiles and therefore learn
as they advance through time.
Let us provide the axiom corresponding to Constraint C6 alone (without Con-
straint C7):
[Ki]AXϕ→ AX[Ki]ϕ(Perm∗[Ki],AX)
Note that Axiom Perm∗[Ki],AX is simply a weaker version of the initial Axiom
Perm[Ki],AX from Table 3.1. It is clearly showed in Appendix A that Constraint
C6 along with its corresponding Axiom Perm∗[Ki],AX are sufficient to the syntactic
proof of Theorem 3.4. Such an observation simply implies that Aumann’s theorem
holds even though agents are learning through the game (i.e., Constraint C7,
which is not necessary, can be removed). As another interesting consequence of
removing Constraint C7, agents may not even be aware of their own future moves
(Constraint C3∗ only requires them to be aware of their current move).
However, it is worth noting that the following intuitive condition should hold,
independently of previous constraints C6 and C7:
C8 if Q(w) = i and wRv, then sEvi s′ iff sEwi s′
According to ConstraintC8, an agent’s action cannot affect his epistemic state:
one’s uncertainty should remain the same before and after performing a given
action.
The axiom corresponding to Constraint C8 in ELEG then becomes as follows:
turni → ([Ki]AXϕ↔ AX[Ki]ϕ)(Perm∗∗[Ki],AX)
As for Axiom Perm∗[Ki],AX, Axiom Perm
∗∗
[Ki],AX is also a weaker version of the
initial Axiom Perm[Ki],AX from Table 3.1.
In order to demonstrate that Constraint C6 is necessary and Constraint C8 is
not sufficient to the proof of Theorem 3.4, let us construct an epistemic model M
for the above centipede game such that ConstraintC8 holds while both constraints
C6 and C7 are removed. Figure 3.3 illustrates the epistemic relations in M where
reflexive relations are implicit for every strategy profile at all vertices, and F






























(c) At vertex w3
Figure 3.3: Epistemic model M in ELEG
EwAlice(s5) = EwAlice(s7) = {s5, s7} for every w ∈ {w1, w2};
EwAlice(s) = {s} for every s ∈ S\{s5, s7} and every w ∈ {w1, w2};
Ew3Alice(s) = {s} for every s ∈ S;
EwBob(s3) = EwBob(s4) = {s3, s4} for every w ∈ {w2, w3};
EwBob(s7) = EwBob(s8) = {s7, s8} for every w ∈ {w1, w2, w3};
Ew1Bob(s) = {s} for every s ∈ S\{s7, s8};
EwBob(s) = {s} for every w ∈ {w2, w3} and s ∈ {s1, s2, s5, s6};
In the above model, let us assume that s3 is the actual strategy profile. At w1
in s3 (see Figure 3.3(a)), both players know what would happen at every possible
future vertex (i.e., at w1 in s3, each player knows that Alice plays d1 at w1, Bob
would play a2 at w2, and Alice would play d3 at w3). However, at the unexpected
vertex w2 in s3 (see Figure 3.3(b)), Bob somehow becomes uncertain about Alice’s
move at w3. It is easy to show that Bob is rational at w2 in s3, and consequently
Bob is substantively rational at w1 in s3. Similarly, as Alice is rational to play d1
at w1 (see Figure 3.3(b)) and also to play d3 at w3 (see Figure 3.3(c)), she is also
substantively rational at w1 in s3. Therefore, this implies that common knowledge
of substantive rationality holds at w1 in s3. Following the same reasoning, it can
easily be shown that common knowledge of substantive rationality also holds at
65
w1 in s1. Note that common knowledge of Stalnaker’s substantive rationality (see
above) similarly holds for both s1 and s3 at w1.
However, performing a game theoretic analysis of the above centipede game
leads to the following unique backward induction solution: Alice plays strategy
(d1, d3) while Bob plays strategy (d2). One should note that s1 is indeed the only
strategy profile that fits the backward induction restriction because the game is
in general position (i.e., with different payoffs at all leaves for every player). The
above epistemic model therefore illustrates that common knowledge of rationality
does not necessarily imply backward induction.
Therefore, this analysis indicates that Constraint C6 and corresponding Axiom
Perm∗[Ki],AX are necessary to allow common knowledge of substantive rationality
to derive backward induction. In other words, agents are simply required to have
perfect recall through the game in order to follow this prediction. However, such
a constraint clearly remains very strong since it implies that, even in the case of
some unexpected event occurring, an agent would still know what he used to know
before such an event. In order to investigate this issue, let us look at some possible
revisions of Bob’s epistemic states that can be made at vertex w2 in modelM from
Figure 3.3 where such perfect recall is removed.
According to model M , at w1 in s3, Bob knows that Alice is substantively
rational, and if w2 was actually reached, then he would not know that Alice is
rational. Note that, as suggested by Stalnaker, Bob’s epistemic state at w2 in s3
should be evaluated in the “closest” strategy profile F (w2, s3) = s7.
M,w1, s3 |= [KBob]SRat2Alice
and
M,w2, s7 |= ¬[KBob]SRat1Alice
Such a plausible interpretation can easily be justified as follows: upon reaching
the unexpected vertex w2, Bob (who is assumed to be rational) then revises his
beliefs so that Alice may not be rational in the future because she was not rational
to previously play a1 at w1. In fact, it is straightforward to show that, for any
setting of the epistemic relations EBob and EAlice in some alternative model M ′,
Bob’s substantive rationality cannot be compatible with Bob’s knowledge of Alice’s
substantive rationality at w1 in s7.
M ′, w1, s7 6|= SRat2Bob ∧ [KBob]SRat2Alice
The main consequence of this revision of Bob’s epistemic states is that he can
then be rational to select a2 at w2 in s3, because he considers it possible that Alice
will play a3 at w3. However, one may wonder whether this is the best interpretation
Bob should follow. In fact, Bob may instead ask himself whether Alice could have
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acted rationally by selecting a1 at w1. In order to answer this question, let us now
look at strategy profile s1 in M .
According to model M , at w2 in s1, Bob still knows that Alice is substantively
rational, and he would maintain this knowledge if w2 was actually reached (i.e.,
in the “closest” strategy profile F (w2, s1) = s5). In this case, he would however
revise his beliefs about Alice’s epistemic state as follows:
M,w1, s1 |= [KBob](SRat2Alice ∧ [KAlice]SRat2Bob ∧ [KAlice][KBob]SRat2Alice)
and
M,w2, s5 |= [KBob](SRat1Alice ∧ [KAlice]SRat2Bob ∧ ¬[KAlice][KBob]SRat1Alice)
In other words, this interpretation simply means that, if vertex w2 is actually
reached, then Bob would simply learn that Alice has limited knowledge (e.g., she
may have limited cognitive abilities that prevent her from knowing that Bob knows
that she is rational). In fact, unlike strategy profile s7, it is easy to show that, at
w1 in s5, Bob’s rationality can be compatible with Bob’s knowledge that (1) Alice
is rational, and that (2) Alice also knows that he is rational.
M,w1, s5 |= SRat2Bob ∧ [KBob](SRat2Alice ∧ [KAlice]SRat2Bob)
However, for any setting of the epistemic relations EBob and EAlice in some
alternative model M ′′, in s7, Bob cannot be rational and simultaneously know
that (1) Alice is rational, that (2) Alice knows that he is rational, and that (3)
Alice knows that he knows that she is rational.
M ′′, w1, s5 6|= SRat2Bob ∧ [KBob](SRat2Alice ∧ [KAlice]SRat2Bob ∧ [KAlice][KBob]SRat2Alice)
As a result, it appears that the current interpretation of Bob’s epistemic state
does not conflict with the prediction of the backward induction: as a consequence
of the players’ epistemic states at w2 in s5 from M (see Figure 3.3(b)), Bob should
indeed select d2 at w2 as the unique best response to knowing that Alice’s only
rational move at w3 is d3.
Following this analysis, although both interpretations appear to be intuitive
and plausible, one might wonder how Bob should actually revise his beliefs at
vertex w2: should he believe that Alice was not rational to play a1 at w1 (as in
s3 from M)? Or should he instead believe that she is rational with some limited
cognitive abilities (as in s1 from M)? Clearly, giving up the belief that Alice is
rational would be very naive. It is indeed in Bob’s best interest to continue believ-
ing in Alice’s rationality at w2: by giving up his belief about Alice’s rationality,
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Bob would then expose himself to the risk of being exploited by Alice at w3 if he
appears to be wrong (i.e., if he plays a2 at w2 and Alice then plays d3 at w3, as in
s3).
More generally, while this analysis emphasizes the relevance of Stalnaker’s crit-
icism about Aumann’s concept of substantive rationality, it also indicates that, in
the context of perfect information games that are in the general position, revising
epistemic states at unexpected vertices should still lead to the backward induction
solution. In fact, although perfect recall clearly remains a strong assumption (cf.
Constraint C6), the unrealistic beliefs resulting from it do not appear to affect
the predicted solution in any way: in the above centipede game, whether Bob
maintains his belief about the fact that Alice believes that he believes in her ratio-
nality is irrelevant to determine Bob’s rational choice at w2 (either way, he should
rationally play d2 at w2, as a result of still believing that Alice is rational).
However, this analysis points out to the main actual criticism of Aumann’s
concept of substantive rationality in the context of perfect information games,








Figure 3.4: A variant of the centipede Game (Alice plays at w1 and w3; Bob plays
at w2)
The only difference between the game from Figure 3.4, and the previous game
from Figure 3.2 is that Alice gets to earn a payoff of 17 instead of 1 by playing d1 at
w1 (every other payoff remains unchanged). In this case, the backward induction
solution remains as in the game from Figure 3.2: Alice will play strategy (d1, d3)
while Bob will play (d2). However, the particular property of this new version
of the game is that, no matter what would actually happen in the subgame (at
w2 and w3), playing d1 at w1 is always better for Alice. As a consequence, while
playing d1 at w1 remains optimal for Alice, one may wonder whether the backward
induction prediction in the subgame is reasonable. Indeed, if vertex w2 were to
be actually reached, then Bob would learn that Alice did not act rationally at w1.
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In this case, Bob may reasonably infer that, since Alice was irrational once, it is
possible that she will be again irrational in the future (i.e., at w3). Therefore,
while it remains rational for Bob to play d2 at w2, it now also becomes rational for
him to play a2 (in response to his expectation that Alice may possibly play a3 at
w3). As a result, Aumann’s concept of substantive rationality (i.e., rationality that
holds at all vertices of the game) clearly appears to be counter-intuitive in such
games: rationality in vertices that cannot be reached rationally does indeed not
make any sense. On the other hand, note that Stalnaker’s more realistic definition
of substantive rationality (through the “closeness” function F , as shown above)
cannot be expressed in such a game. As a result, one can therefore claim that,
in order for Aumann’s concept of substantive rationality to make sense, it should
strictly be applied to extensive games where every vertex can be reached rationally
(which then rules out the game from Figure 3.4).
However, while both Aumann and Stalnaker’s models do not allow for the de-
tailed epistemic analysis of extensive games presented here because they do not
incorporate time in their definition of the epistemic relations, it is worth noting
that our logical framework can be seen as an alternative approach to other relevant
economic models such as Battigalli and Siniscalchi [1999, 2002]), which presents an
epistemic model that also explicitly captures the temporal dimension of extensive
games and allows to reason about counterfactuals. More generally, the above anal-
ysis demonstrates the importance of considering the temporal factor in extensive
games, which can only offer a more realistic interpretation of the reasoning process
followed by boundedly rational individuals.
3.6 Related work in logic
We are not the first to provide a logical analysis of extensive games. Several logical
systems have been proposed which support reasoning about this class of games.
We here discuss some of these systems and compare them with our logic ELEG.
In van Benthem [2002], van Benthem analyzes extensive games using different
modal languages such as propositional dynamic logic (PDL), PDL with converse,
and a modal forcing language which allows to express what a player can bring
about in a given extensive game, no matter what the other players do. Moreover,
he also studies a variety of notions of game equivalence based on the notion of
bisimulation. Although van Benthem shows how PDL extended with epistemic
operators can represent extensive games with imperfect information, he does not
consider the concept of rationality which is a fundamental element of Aumann’s
epistemic analysis of extensive games. It is worth noting that, differently from
our logic ELEG, standard PDL would fail to define such a concept, because it
can neither identify the current strategy that is going to be played nor express
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what will be true at every possible next vertex along the current strategy profile
(which is done through the operator AX in ELEG). Moreover, our logic ELEG
shows that defining strategy profiles explicitly in the object language — as done
in PDL — is not necessary to express interesting game-theoretic concepts such as
rationality and backward induction.
Related to van Benthem’s work is Ramanujan & Simon’s work (Ramanujam
and Simon [2008a,b]) who have recently proposed an elegant approach to exten-
sive games based on dynamic logic. However, Ramanujan & Simon do not deal
with epistemic aspects of extensive games, as their logic does not have operators
for representing epistemic states of players. The game logic presented in Parikh
[1985] also lacks epistemic operators, therefore preventing a formalization of the
concept of epistemic rationality and a logical analysis of Aumann’s theorem. Bo-
nanno’s logical account of extensive games (Bonanno [2001, 2002]) has the same
limitation. He proposes a variant of dynamic logic extended with temporal opera-
tors for (branching) future and (linear) past and shows how his logic can be used
to characterize the solution concept of backward induction.1 But, like Ramanujan
& Simon’s logic, Bonanno’s logic does not have epistemic operators which are re-
quired to represent Aumann’s notion of rationality and the statement of Aumann’s
theorem. The same remark also applies to some recent work (Surowik [2004]),
which presents a similar logical approach to extensive games without considering
the epistemic aspects.
ATL-based approaches to extensive games presented in Walther et al. [2007]
and van Der Hoek et al. [2005] come closer to our current approach. For instance,
in Walther et al. [2007] a variant of ATL (Alternating-time temporal logic) with
explicit strategies called ATLES (Alternating-time logic with explicit strategies) is
proposed which allows to define solution concepts such as backward induction.
The interesting aspect of ATLES, compared to ATL, is that one can explicitly
reason about strategies in the object language. However, like Ramanujan & Simon
and Bonanno, ATLES misses epistemic operators necessary to define Aumann’s
notion of rationality. Another important difference between ATLES and our logic
ELEG is that in ATLES formulas are interpreted with respect to states, whereas
in ELEG they are interpreted with respect to state/strategy profile pairs (in this
sense, ELEG semantics is bidimensional). The latter is an advantage because,
differently from ATLES, it is possible in ELEG to reason about what will be true
at every possible next vertex along the current strategy profile. We have shown
that this is fundamental for expressing in the object language Aumann’s notion of
rationality and the statement of Aumann’s theorem.
1Bonanno’s logic has four kinds of operators for past and future describing: (1) what is going
to be the case at every future vertex of the game tree, (2) what has always been the case at every
past vertex, (3) what is going to be the case at every predicted future vertex of the game tree,
and (4) what has always been the case at every past vertex at which today was predicted.
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In Vestergaard et al. [2006], the authors propose an alternative way of proving
Aumann’s theorem by using a purely proof-theoretic approach based on type the-
ory. Differently from Vestergaard et al.’s approach, our approach based on modal
logic has the advantage of combining a proof-theoretic analysis of extensive games
— which is what we have done in Section 3.3 — with a model-theoretic semantics.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced a logical framework that provides an alternative
way of representing extensive form games as compared to their usual specification
in economics.
We showed that our logic is sufficiently general for our purpose to reason about
dynamic epistemic games, as illustrated by the well known concepts of rationality
and backward induction. Although these concepts have been extensively studied in
economics, very few logical analyses have been proposed up to now. While several
related work discuss and present some logical approaches to epistemic reasoning in
such extensive games, none of these define a logic expressive enough to represent
syntactically both the epistemic concepts and the equilibrium solutions. By the
formal syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem, we demonstrate that our logic is
capable to fill this gap and provide further interesting information about those
concepts.
However, it is worth noting that, even though such an epistemic analysis pro-
vides a very intuitive justification for why individuals often deviate from the opti-
mal equilibrium solutions in social interactions, it does not always suffice. As an
example, various experimental studies of the well known trust game (as it is de-
picted in Figure 3.1 from Section 3.1.2) have indicated that people often cooperate
with one another in this situation (i.e., they reach the (3, 3) outcome in Figure
3.1). Yet, performing an epistemic analysis of this game suggests that the second
player can never be rational to cooperate, no matter his belief state. Therefore,
instead of considering such a behavior as irrational, we will argue, through the
next chapters, that one’s rationality needs to be revised by taking into account
important social factors such as one’s social connections with other individuals
involved in the interaction.
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Chapter 4
Social Ties and Strategic
Coordination
“We do not succeed in changing things according to our
desire, but gradually our desire changes.”
— Marcel Proust
The Sweet Cheat Gone (1925)
“The primal scene of morality... is not one in which I
do something to you or you do something to me, but
one in which we do something together.”
— Christine Korsgaard
The Reasons We Can Share (1993)
In classical economic theories, most models assume that agents are self-regarding
and maximize their own material payoffs. However, as already mentioned in Chap-
ter 2, important experimental evidence from economics and psychology have shown
some persistent deviation from such individualistic behavior in many strategic sit-
uations. These results suggest the need to incorporate social preferences into
game theoretic models. Such preferences describe the fact that a given player not
only considers his own material payoffs but also those of other players (Margolis
[1982]). The various social norms created by the cultural environment in which
human beings live give some ideas of how such experimental data could be inter-
preted: fairness, inequity aversion, reciprocity and social welfare maximization are
concepts that behavioral economists are familiar with, and which have been shown
to play an important role in interactive decision making (e.g., see Charness and
Rabin [2002]; Fehr and Schmidt [1999]; Rabin [1993a]).
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In fact, various simple economic games, such as the trust game (Berg et al.
[1995]) and the ultimatum game (Güth et al. [1982]), have been extensively stud-
ied in the past years because they illustrate well the weakness of traditional game
theory and its assumption of individualistic rationality. Moreover, given the little
complexity carried out in such games, the bounded rationality argument (Gigeren-
zer and Selten [2001]) does not seem sufficient to justify observed behavior. Social
preferences appear as a more realistic option because they allow to explain the
resulting behaviors while still considering rational agents.
However, although many economic experimental studies (e.g., Berg et al. [1995];
Güth et al. [1982]) have shown that people genuinely exhibit other-regarding pref-
erences when interacting with perfect strangers, one may wonder to what extent
the existence of some social relationships between individuals may influence be-
havior. Throughout this dissertation, we refer to such social relationships as ‘social
ties’. Indeed the dynamic aspect of social preferences seems closely related to that
of social ties: one may cooperate more with a friend than with a stranger, and
doing so may eventually enforce the level of friendship.
Our attempt, through this chapter, is to study the possible effects that positive
social ties can have on human cooperation and coordination. Our main hypothesis
is that such relationships can influence a player’s choice by modifying his prefer-
ences: an agent may choose to be fair conditionally on the relative closeness to his
partner(s). In order to investigate these questions, we propose a theoretical analy-
sis of a new kind of two player game that allows us to disentangle predictions from
theories based on self-interest, social preferences, and social ties. Furthermore, we
demonstrate the need to introduce an alternative model to capture the concept of
social ties as continuous variables. Indeed, while we claim that social ties strongly
rely on group identification, we show that considering the concept of team reason-
ing is too limited to fill this purpose as it is built upon a binary interpretation of
group identification (i.e., either one identifies with a group or not).
4.1 A definition of social ties
No formal definition of a social tie is provided either in the literature on social
psychology or in the experimental economics literature focused on social prefer-
ences. Thus, given the vagueness and the ambiguity that the term may suggest,
we begin by clarifying the concept that we consider.
First, we choose to restrict our study only to those ties that can be judged to
be positive: examples include relationships between close friends, married couples,
family relatives, classmates, etc. In contrast, negative ties may include relation-
ships between people with different tastes, from different political orientations,
with different religious beliefs, etc.
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In order to specify the foundations of such social ties and the possible reasons
for their emergence, let us consider the well-known concept of social identity from
social psychology. According to social identity theory (Hogg [2002]; Tajfel and
Turner [1979]), an individual’s social identity is built upon a set of social features,
each of which may refer to any type of salient characteristics that can be shared
by individuals in a particular context. For example, a person may identify himself
as a student of the university of Toulouse, a supporter of Barcelona’s soccer team,
a Democrat, a Catholic, etc.
According to various theories in social psychology (see, e.g., Abrams and Hogg
[2006]; Hogg [2000]), the construction of an individual’s social identity is deter-
mined by two complementary motivations. The first motivation is self-enhancement,
which is underpinned by one’s individual need to promote self-esteem (as pointed
out by Luhtanen and Crocker (Luhtanen and Crocker [1992]), “Being a member
of a social group is an important reflection of who I am”). Reduction of subjec-
tive uncertainty about one’s perceptions, attitudes, feelings, behavior, and one’s
self-concept and place within the social world is the second motivation.
It can be reasonably assumed that people can give different degrees of im-
portance to those social features defining their social identity, depending on the
context: for example, while one’s identification as a soccer player is more impor-
tant than one’s identification as a student during a soccer game, the reverse may
hold for the same individual during a math exam at the university.
Following this interpretation, our claim is that:
Statement 4.1.0.1 A social tie between two individuals exists if and only if
they share the same social features defining their social identities, and this is com-
mon belief among them.
Note that the previous claim implies that a social tie is necessarily bilateral in
the sense that, if an individual i is tied with another individual j, then j is also
tied with i. For example, an individual who believes to share the same political
convictions with a given politician cannot induce a social tie as long as the latter
does not also believe so (one could speak of the existence of a unilateral tie in this
case, though it is not “social” according to the above statement).
Moreover, the previous statement simply characterizes the minimal condition
for the existence of a social tie. As an illustration, one can consider the well
known Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP) from Tajfel [1970], which corresponds to
an experimental methodology from social psychology that investigates the mini-
mal conditions required for discrimination to occur between groups. Experiments
using this approach (Tajfel et al. [1971]) have revealed that arbitrary and virtually
meaningless distinctions between groups (e.g., the colour of their shirts) can trig-
ger a tendency to cooperate more with individuals within one’s own group than
with others. In this case, one should note that such meaningless social features
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satisfy the minimal condition for being considered as a social tie from the previous
statement. However, in principle such social tie should be quite weak.
In this respect, it is worth mentioning that an important property of social ties
lies in its quantitative aspect, that is, two individuals can be more or less socially
tied with each other. To be more precise, we assume that a social tie between
two individuals can be measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 and 1
respectively stand for the minimum and maximum strength for the tie.
This interpretation therefore suggests that the strength of a social tie can be
determined by the quantity and importance of shared social features. One
can indeed assume that sharing a high number of social features (defining one’s
social identity) with high importance leads to a high social tie value. On the other
hand, having conflicting social characteristics, or sharing a low number of features
with high importance, or sharing a high number of features with low importance
can lead to a lower tie value.
Moreover, another aspect that, we believe, influences the strength of a social
tie between two individuals is the quantity and quality of past interactions
between them. More precisely, given two individuals sharing a certain number
of social features with a given importance, the strength of the tie between them
is higher in the situation in which the two individuals had frequent meaningful
interactions in the past than in the situation in which there were no previous
meaningful interactions1.
As a concrete example to illustrate the previous interpretation, one may con-
sider the case of online dating systems on the internet. Those systems, which are
clearly meant to build social ties between individuals (assuming an affective tie is
a special case of a social tie), are based on the matching of social features that
define their social identities. However, while one cannot deny the effectiveness
of such systems (Hitsch et al. [2010]), it is suggested in Frost et al. [2008] that
some interaction between two individuals is also important as it can allow them
to know each other more accurately. Indeed, by providing a way to obtain reli-
able information about one another, social interactions happen to be a relevant
tool against possibly inaccurate stereotypes, which can often be considered as an
unfortunate consequence of categorizing individuals into social groups, as implied
by social identity theory.
The following points summarize our interpretation of social ties:
• The minimal criterion for the existence of a social tie between two individuals
is for them to commonly believe that they share the same social features that
define their social identities.
1With the term “meaningful" we mean that during past interactions, the two individuals had
the occasion to know each other by exchanging ideas, opinions, sharing positive emotions (e.g.,
they mutually enjoyed playing tennis together), etc.
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• A social tie between two individuals has a quantitative dimension which
depends on the following variables:
1. The quantity and importance of shared social features that define both
individuals’ social identities.
2. The quantity and quality of past interactions between both individuals.
Following our interpretation, one might then argue that the situation described
by the minimal group paradigm (MGT) satisfies the minimal condition for the exis-
tence of a social tie, even though this tie has a relatively low degree of strength (the
number of shared social features is one) and its importance might be considered
to be reasonably low.
4.2 A theory of how to model social ties
In this section, we introduce a novel model that characterizes the agents’ behavior
in the presence of social ties. Our model of social ties shares features with both
team reasoning and social preferences theories.
Similarly to team reasoning theories, our model is built on the concept of group
identification, which is of high relevance when considering social ties. In fact,
individuals that are socially connected may be expected to identify themselves
with the same group, which may consequently lead them to choose actions as a
member of this group. In section 4.7 we discuss various theories of team reasoning,
at the same time indicating which properties are in common with our approach to
social ties. In section 4.8 we underline the inadequacy of such theories to interpret
in full the effects of social ties, thereby claiming for a novel approach – the one
introduced in this section – able to capture specific key features of social ties left
aside by team reasoning.
Similarly to theories of social preferences, our starting assumption is that a
social tie between two individuals induces them to behave according to some ag-
gregation of their individual preferences. In section 4.5 we consider two leading
theories of social preferences (inequity aversion and fairness) that are easily com-
parable to our approach in the specific interactive strategic situation where the
behavioral effects of social ties are evaluated.
More precisely, our current approach is inspired by the existing concept of
empathetic preferences as presented by Binmore in Binmore [2005]: an agent’s
empathetic preferences consist in combining his actual own preferences with his
preferences when imagining himself in the other agent’s position. In other words,
an empathetic agent does not take into account the other’s actual decision, he
instead only reasons about his own decision in the other’s position (taking into
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account the other’s preferences). This concept also refers to the existence of a
“veil of ignorance”, as introduced by Rawls in Rawls [1971], behind which agents
make their decision without knowing in which player’s position they will actually
act. As a consequence, such an empathetic behavior can be reduced to simply
choosing the corresponding action from the strategy profile that maximizes the
group utility.
One should note that our model is also related with Alger and Weibull’s model
of Homo Moralis (Alger and Weibull [2012]). The difference is that their model re-
quires the game to be symmetric1, whereas our model does not have any restriction
and can apply to all sorts of games.
Formally, let us consider two players i and j. Moreover, let Si and Sj respec-
tively denote the set of i’s strategies and the set of j’s strategies, and pii(si, sj)
the material payoff function for player i when both i and j respectively play their
strategy si and sj. For every si ∈ Si and sj ∈ Sj, the Social Ties utility function
of player i is given by:
USTi (si, sj) = (1− kij) · pii(si, sj) + kij ·max
s′j∈Sj
U(si, s′j)
where kij ∈ [0, 1].
The function U(si, sj) stands for the group utility function, which may be
characterized by one of the following two well-known principles.
Let us first define a group utility function Um(si, sj) that satisfies Rawls’ max-
imin criterion (Rawls [1971]).
Um(si, sj) = min{pii(si, sj), pij(si, sj)}
This criterion corresponds to giving infinitely greater weight to the benefits of the
worse-off person.
As an alternative, one may also consider a function of social welfare Us(si, sj)
that satisfies classical utilitarianism (i.e., by maximizing the total combined payoff
of all players).
Us(si, sj) = pii(si, sj) + pij(si, sj)
Parameter kij in the Social Ties utility function measures agent i’s subjective
social tie towards agent j. Setting kij to 0 corresponds to a non-existing tie (e.g.,
j is a perfect stranger to i) whereas setting kij to 1 means that i feels socially very
close to j (e.g., j is i’s best friend). In the latter case, one should note that, in
the presence of a strong tie with agent j, agent i does not face a strategic problem
anymore: indeed, j’s strategy sj becomes irrelevant to the calculation of i’s utility.
1A game is symmetric when all players can switch roles without changing their strategies
and the associated payoff.
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Thus, agent i only needs to solve a classical problem of individual decision making
by selecting the action from the strategy profile which maximizes the group utility.
As a result, i’s action may then be interpreted as “doing the right thing for the
group assuming that all other players also do the right thing for the group”.
In order to make our approach operational, through the next section we pro-
pose a concrete scenario involving strategic interaction among players. The spe-
cific game that we consider leads to theoretical predictions under our social ties
model that differ both from those obtained under the traditional assumption of
self-interested players and by those provided by well-known theories of social pref-
erences. Hence, we think that this example is appropriate to show how our novel
approach can explain players’ behaviors not captured by leading approaches re-
spectively in traditional and behavioral game theory.
4.3 A coordination game with outside option
Having previously analysed the main characteristics of social ties, we now propose
the following game that appears to be well suited to study their behavioral effects.
Two colleagues, Alice and Bob, have agreed to cook together and eat in Alice’s
place, though Bob likes cooking less than Alice. Half an hour before the dinner,
Alice makes a phone call to Bob so as to express her interest to go out to her favorite
Japanese restaurant, whereas Bob instead suggests to go to a nice Italian restaurant
that he recently heard about, with the two restaurants located on opposite sides of
the city. Alice then makes it clear that she prefers them cooking rather than Italian
food. On the other hand, Bob indicates that, even though he does not particularly
enjoy cooking, he still prefers it to the Japanese cuisine. Moreover, Bob reminds
Alice of his seafood allergy, which makes eating Japanese more costly for him than
eating Italian is costly for Alice. Both individuals also commonly realize that,
as the restaurants in question are very popular, they are always overcrowded,
which makes it impossible for a person alone to get a table there. Finally, Alice
notifies Bob of her intention to go eat outside before the phone call suddenly gets
interrupted.
In this scenario, the main questions that arise are the following: assuming Alice
and Bob barely know each other, will they manage to meet and eat at the same
restaurant that evening? Would they behave differently if they were very close
friends instead?
For example, the fact itself that Alice would notify Bob her intention to go eat
outside may depend on their social tie. And even the sign of this dependence can-
not be easily disclosed through intuition alone. Indeed, on the one hand, a close
relationship with Bob should lead Alice to take the “risk" of leaving her place so as
to possibly meet him in his preferred restaurant, thereby maximizing their group
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utility function. On the other hand, the social tie might lead Alice to confirm that
they will both eat at her place before the unexpected interruption of the phone
call: if she knows that Bob, because of their social tie, is “uncertain" between max-
imizing the group utility function (going to his preferred restaurant) and behaving
in a fully rational way (going to her preferred restaurant), then she should safely
reaffirm that they eat at her place, in order to prevent miscoordination.
In order to formally analyze the dilemma provided by this situation, let us
define the corresponding abstract representation, as shown in Figure 4.1, which
we will call the Entrance game. This Entrance game defines a two player game
organized in two stages. Throughout this chapter, we denote Player a as Alice and
Player b as Bob. During the first stage, only Alice is active, and she has to choose
between In or Out (i.e., whether to go eating outside or stay at Alice’s place). In
the latter case, the outcome is more beneficial to Alice who gets 20 (Bob only gets
10 as it is more costly for him to cook than it is for Alice). On the other hand,
if Alice chooses to go eat outside (i.e., In), both players enter the second stage of
the game that corresponds to a basic coordination game. A defines either Alice
or Bob’s choice to go to the Japanese restaurant. Similarly, B defines either Alice
or Bob’s choice to go to the Italian restaurant. If both coordinate on the (A,A)
solution, then Alice and Bob get 35 and 5, respectively, and if both coordinate on
the (B,B) solution, then they get 15 (Alice) and 35 (Bob). In any other case (i.e.,
where they choose different restaurants and are therefore unable to get a table),
both players win nothing (0).
As we will detail in the next sections, this game provides an ideal environment
to discriminate between different theories of how two socially tied people should
act.
One may note that our Entrance game corresponds to a variant of the Battle
of the Sexes (BoS) game with outside option (see Cooper et al. [1993]). Indeed,
as shown in Figure 4.2(a), the only difference lies on the symmetrical property
within the coordination subgame that we voluntarily removed here: unlike in the
BoS game, the lowest payoff is different in the two coordination outcomes (eating
Japanese is more costly to Bob than eating Italian is for Alice: 5 6= 15). The main
motivation to introduce this type of asymmetry is to create some incentives for
players to favour the group as a whole (in fact, there is no unique best outcome
for the group in a BoS-like subgame). However, one may note that the dilemma
introduced by the Entrance subgame does only concern Alice’s preferences: if
Alice is self-interested, she will aim at reaching the (A,A) outcome, whereas if
she considers the social welfare of the group, she might wish to reach the (B,B)
outcome. On the other hand, Bob’s preference orderings in this subgame are







































Figure 4.2: Existing coordination games
Similarly, considering a Hi-Lo-like subgame would not match our current study
as it does not offer any dilemma between satisfying self-interest and maximizing
the social welfare: in fact, in the Hi-Lo matching game (see Figure 4.2(b)), both
players always obtain the same payoff no matter the outcome, which explains
the high rate of coordination on the most profitable outcome for both players,
independently of whether there exists a tie between them.
One may also notice the similarity of our Entrance game with the Dalek game
presented in Binmore and Samuelson [1999] (a corresponding subgame is depicted
in Figure 4.2(c)). The main difference is that one solution of the coordination
subgame ensures perfect equity in the Dalek game. Indeed, as in our case, the
Dalek game also introduces some dilemma between maximizing one’s self-interest
and playing the fairest outcome. However, unlike in our Entrance game, it does not
introduce any dilemma between satisfying self-interest and maximizing the social
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welfare (i.e., the combined payoffs of every player). Although this game would be
interesting to investigate, focusing on it may also make it more difficult to observe
the actual effects of social ties on behavior: as a consequence, the absence of any
clear incentive to play the fairest solution in the Dalek game may eventually lead
to a higher rate of miscoordination, independently of the presence of such ties. On
the other hand, the signal of perfect equity in the Dalek game may also appear
so strong that it could reinforce the stability of coordinating on the corresponding
solution (i.e., (B,B)), even when no ties are involved.
4.4 Equilibrium predictions with self-regarding
players
Through this section, we wish to provide a full theoretical analysis of the above
Entrance game that is exclusively based on traditional game theory (i.e., assuming
agents are self-interested maximizers). Through the rest of this dissertation, we
note A and B to respectively stand for sub-strategies “A if In” and “B if In” in
the context of the Entrance game.
4.4.1 Nash equilibria
First consider the coordination subgame alone (i.e., the second stage of the full
Entrance game). In such a game, both (A,A) and (B,B) are the only pure Nash
equilibria, which also appear to be the only Pareto optimal solutions. There also
exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy, which consists in playing A with
probability 7/8 for Alice, and playing B with probability 7/10 for Bob (in this
case, the respective expected payoffs are 10.5 for Alice, and 4.375 for Bob).
The main features of this game lie on defining the role played by the group’s
preferences in the players’ behavior. As in the BoS game, being self-interested
is not sufficient to guarantee any coordination success: every action is indeed
compatible with some common belief in the players’ rationality. However, in the
coordination game, one can notice the existence of a focal point for the group
that is not present in the classical BoS game: out of the two Nash equilibria, the
outcome (B,B) is always better for the group. In fact, no matter whether one
considers the sum, the average, the difference, or the minimum value among the
individual payoffs as a measure of the group’s utility, this unique outcome always
outperforms every other solution. In fact, the asymmetry in the players’ payoffs
creates some incentives for them to favor the group as a whole, which can also
allow them to eventually maximize their self-interest (any coordination is always
better than miscoordination). Both players may then consider this solution as a
focal point that can be used to reach coordination. However, one should note that,
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as the corresponding solution (B,B) favours Bob more than it favors Alice (what
is best for the group is also best for him), the players may still choose to deviate
from it. Is Alice likely to detect and follow this focal point (B,B), which clearly
conflicts with her best outcome (i.e., (A,A))? What can weaken/strengthen the
revealing of this focal point to the players? These are the questions we wish to
answer through the experimental study.
Let us now consider the full Entrance game, which consists of the previous
coordination game extended with some outside option (at the first stage of the












Figure 4.3: Social Tie game in normal form
This game contains three Nash equilibria in pure strategies, which are the
following:
(In,A;A), (Out,A;B), (Out,B;B)
These equilibria should simply be understood as follows: as long as Bob does
play B, then Out remains the best option for Alice (no matter what Alice would
have chosen between A and B). In any other cases, strategy (In,A) becomes the
only rational move for Alice.
Moreover, the Entrance game also has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy,
which consists in Alice always playing Out (i.e., with probability 1) and Bob
playing B with probability 3/7. This solution however has to be distinguished from
another Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategy, which consists in Alice always
playing Out first (i.e., with probability 1) and playing B with probability 1/8
in the subgame while Bob then plays B with probability 7/10 (Note that this
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy in the subgame). However,
one should note that all Nash equilibria in mixed or behavioral strategies are simply
irrelevant to the Entrance game: if Alice is willing to randomize in the subgame
or believes that Bob will, then she is always better off by playing Out in the first
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place. In this case, the respective expected payoffs are 20 for Alice, and 10 for
Bob.
4.4.2 Subgame perfect Nash equilibria
The subgame perfect equilibria, which can be computed through the backward
induction method, represent a restriction on the previous set of Nash equilibria.
In fact, this solution concept allows to rule out incredible solutions that may be
predicted as Nash equilibria. In our game, (Out,A;B) represents such a solution.
Indeed, although the prediction to play Out is perfectly rational for Alice, it here
relies on the fact that she would not be rational if she had played In in the first
place: given that Bob plays B in the coordination subgame, Alice’s only rational
move would be to play B instead of A (which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium
in the subgame).
Moreover, one should note that the backward induction principle also discards
the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies from the previous section. On the other
hand, the Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies remains.
As a consequence, the set of all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strate-
gies reduces to the following:
(In,A;A), (Out,B;B)
4.4.3 Forward induction
Similarly the forward induction principle restricts the previous set of subgame
perfect Nash equilibria to those solutions, which resist the iteration of weak dom-
inance. In the context of our Entrance game (see Figure 4.3), this leads to the
following solution: first Alice’s strategy (In,B) is weakly (and strictly) dominated
by any strategy involving Out. Then Bob’s strategy B becomes weakly dominated
byA. Thus Alice’s strategies (Out,A) and (Out,B) are both weakly (and strictly)
dominated by (In,A;A). Therefore, the unique forward induction solution, which
resist iterated weak dominance, is as follows:
(In,A;A)
Indeed, this solution can be interpreted as follows: while playing In, Alice
signals Bob that she intends to play A (if she intended to play B, she would have
played Out in the first place). Therefore Bob’s unique rational move is to play A.
However, while this interpretation justifies the existence of the above solution, it
does not explain why the other backward induction solution is not rational. To
continue the argument, let us then consider the solution (Out,B;B), which can be
interpreted as follows: Alice plays Out because she expects Bob to play B in case
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she had played In. This chain of reasoning is clearly erroneous because Alice’s
conditional expectation does not match what she would really expect if she had
actually chosen to perform In. Indeed, as shown before, if Alice performs In,
Bob’s unique rational move is to play A, thus no matter what Alice does during
the first stage, she cannot expect anything else than Bob playingA. Consequently,
her unique rational move is to play (In,A), and Bob’s best response is to play A.
The interesting characteristics that this analysis brings about is that the valid-
ity of this forward induction argument is independent of Bob’s preferences. This
therefore suggests that such a game introduces some “first mover” advantage, as-
suming that it is common knowledge among them that they both are self interested
agents. One should note that no equilibrium in mixed or behavioral strategies re-
sists this principle.
Many studies in the experimental economic literature have provided support
to this forward induction argument, see, e.g., Balkenborg [1994]; Brandts and Holt
[1989, 1995]; Cachon and Camerer [1996]; Cooper et al. [1992, 1993]; Shahriar
[2009]; Van Huyck John et al. [1993].
One of the first papers in this direction is Brandts and Holt [1989]. Cooper
et al. [1992] investigates a coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria and
report that a payoff-relevant outside option changes play in the direction predicted
by forward induction. Van Huyck John et al. [1993] reports the success of forward
induction in a setup in which the right to participate in a coordination game is
auctioned off prior to play. Cachon and Camerer [1996] investigates a setup in
which subjects may pay a fee to participate in a coordination game with Pareto-
ranked equilibria. They report that play is consistent with forward induction.
While many experiments support the fact that people’s strategic behavior re-
lies on the forward induction argument (see, e.g., Cooper et al. [1992, 1993]; Van
Huyck John et al. [1993], there is also contrary evidence. In Cooper et al. [1993],
Cooper et al. obtain the forward induction solution when it coincides with a domi-
nance argument but the same outcome is predicted when forward induction makes
no prediction. Brandts and Holt [1995] also shows that the forward induction is a
good prediction only if it coincides with a simple dominance argument. In Brandts
et al. [2003], the author find evidence against forward induction in an industrial
organization game.
Other work have shown that the temporal factor of the game is relevant to
forward induction reasoning. In Cooper et al. [1993] and Huck and Muller [2005],
the forward induction solution predicts well subjects’ behavior in an experimental
game in extensive form, but does poorly when subjects are presented with the
normal form game. A similar problem seems to arise in Caminati et al. [2006] who
analyse games similar to ours but who work essentially with the normal form.
However, all these works consider games that are slightly different from the
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interactive strategic situation on which we focus in this chapter. One may then
wonder whether the asymmetry introduced in our Entrance game does alter the
game theoretic prediction.
4.5 Equilibrium predictions under models of so-
cial preferences
In this section, we reinterpret our Entrance game through the use of well-known
economic theories of social preferences and analyze players’ equilibrium behavior
under these theories. In fact, these models allow one to consider not only the
self-interested motivations of the players, but also their social motivations, which
may then be particularly important in the context of social ties. In other words, a
player’s utility is not characterized by his own material payoff only, but also those
of the other players. We choose to focus on the concepts of inequity aversion and
fairness, which seem to be the most relevant to our Entrance game. Other models
of intentions-based fairness and reciprocity (see, e.g., Rabin [1993a]) do not appear
to be suitable to such a coordination game. Apart from the problem of multiple
equilibria in beliefs that characterizes such belief-dependent approaches, it would
be difficult to unambiguously define what is “kind" and what is “unkind" in the
players’ strategy set, by using only first and second order beliefs.
4.5.1 Theory of inequity aversion
In the models proposed in Fehr and Schmidt [1999] and Bolton and Ockenfels
[2000], players are assumed to be intrinsically motivated to distribute payoffs in
an equitable way: a player dislikes being either better off or worse off than an-
other player. In other terms, utilities are calculated in such a way that equitable
allocations of payoffs are preferred.
Formally, consider two players i and j and let x = {xi, xj} denote the vector
of monetary payoffs. According to Fehr & Schmidt’s inequity aversion model, the
utility function of player i is given by:
U IAi (x) = xi − αi ·max{xj − xi, 0} − βi ·max{xi − xj, 0}
where it is assumed that i 6= j, βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi < 1.
The two parameters can be interpreted as follows: αi parametrizes the distaste
of person i for disadvantageous inequality while βi parametrizes the distaste of
person i for advantageous inequality. One should note that setting these param-
eters to zero defines some purely self-interested agent. The constraints imposed
on the parameters are meant to ensure that players cannot distaste advantageous
inequality more than disadvantageous inequality in order to be realistic.
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Clearly, applying such a model to our current Entrance game can literally
transform its whole structure, depending on the values assigned to parameters αi
and βi. Let us then perform a game theoretic analysis that involves such inequity
aversion parameters.
The main observation that can be made is about the effects of Alice’s preference
ordering on her behavior. In fact, assuming that βa ≤ αa, then Alice will never
play the strategy (In,B), no matter how inequity averse she is:
• if βa < 3/4 and αb < 1/6, then Alice and Bob’s optimal behavior remains as
if they were self-interested (i.e., the forward induction argument still holds).
Thus Alice’s unique rational strategy is to play (In,A) while Bob will ratio-
nally play A.
• if βa < 3/4 and αb ≥ 1/6, then Alice is always better off by playing (Out, ·):
the coordination subgame yields a unique Nash equilibrium (i.e. (B,B)),
which is strictly dominated by strategy (Out, ·).
• if βa ≥ 3/4, then Alice is always better off by playing (Out, ·): for any
αa ≥ βa, any outcome from the coordination subgame is strictly dominated















Figure 4.4: Transformed Entrance game with extremely inequity averse players
(αa = βa = αb = βb = 1)
The main result of this analysis is that the value of αa and βb are irrelevant to
defining Alice and Bob’s optimal behavior. In other words, only Alice’s distaste
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NE SPE
(Out,A;A) (Out,A;A) if αb < 1/6(Out,B;B) (Out,B;B) if βa < 3/4(Out,A;B) (Out,A;B) if αb ≥ 1/6 and βa ≥ 3/4(Out,B;A)
Table 4.1: Equilibrium solution concepts for inequity averse agent(s) (βa ≥ 3/4 or
αb ≥ 1/6)
about advantageous inequality can affect her preference ordering in the Entrance
game. Similarly, only Bob’s distaste about disadvantageous inequality can affect
his decision. One should also note that inequity aversion does not keep the “first
mover” advantage mentioned in the previous section: Alice’s first move does signal
Bob not only about her low level of inequity aversion, but also about her expec-
tation of Bob’s low level of inequity aversion. That means that if she plays In,
then the resulting outcome is entirely depending on Bob’s level of inequity aversion
(either (In,A;A) or (In,A;B) will be played).
The sets of Nash Equilibria (NE) and of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
(SPE), in the context of the Entrance game played with inequity aversion, are
summarized in Table 4.1 (note that forward induction is irrelevant in this case
because the SPE is unique for every vector (αi, βi), with i ∈ {a, b} and αi, βi ∈
[0, 1]).
4.5.2 Theory of fairness
Let us now consider another type of social preferences model, that in turn relies on
the notion of fairness. In Charness and Rabin [2002], Charness & Rabin propose
a specific form of social preference they call quasi-maximin preferences. In their
model, group payoff is computed by means of a social welfare function which is
a weighted combination of Rawls’ maximin and of the utilitarian welfare function
(i.e., summation of individual payoffs) (see [Charness and Rabin, 2002, p. 851]).
Formally, consider two players i and j and let x = {xi, xj} denote the vector
of monetary payoffs. According to Charness & Rabin’s fairness model, the utility
function of player i is given by:
UFi (x) = (1− λ) · xi + λ · [δ ·min{xi, xj}+ (1− δ) · (xi + xj)]
where δ, λ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, the two parameters can be interpreted as fol-
lows: δ measures the degree of concern for helping the worst-off person versus
maximizing the total social surplus. Setting δ = 1 corresponds to a pure “max-
imin” (or “Rawlsian” criterion), while setting δ = 0 corresponds to total-surplus
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maximization. Parameter λ measures how much player i cares about pursuing the
social welfare versus his own self-interest. Setting λ = 1 corresponds to purely
“disinterested” preferences, with player i caring no more (or less) about her own
payoffs than others’, while setting λ = 0 corresponds to pure self-interest.
As for the previous model, the parameters δ and λ can considerably change the
structure of the Entrance game, which is why we propose a new game theoretic
analysis involving such fair agents.
The first observation is that while fairness may slightly alter Bob’s preferences,
the (In,B;B) outcome always remains the best option: the only difference with
the classical model is that he may come to prefer the (In,A;A) outcome to the
(Out, ·) outcome when δ < 2/3 and λ > 1/3.
Similarly, Alice’s preferences also get affected by such notion of fairness. The
main result is that a new forward induction solution may emerge through such a
social preferences model. In particular:
• if λ < 1/2, then Alice may still play the forward induction solution strategy
as predicted by traditional game theory (i.e., (In,A)), depending on the
value of δ.
• if 1/2 ≤ λ ≤ 3/4, then no prediction can be made without considering
probabilistic beliefs: both Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the subgame
are always at least as good for Alice as playing (Out, ·).
• if λ > 3/4 and δ > 2/3, then Alice may play a forward induction solution
strategy (i.e., (In,B)) that mainly relies on her other regarding preferences
(see Table 4.2): solution (In,B;B) indeed becomes preferred to playing
(Out, ·), which is preferred to solution (In,A;A) (see Figure 4.5 for an ex-
ample).
Moreover, one should note that, as for the original version of the game (see
section 4.4), the Out option for Alice always dominates the Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies from the coordination subgame, no matter what the values of λ
and δ are.
The above analysis suggests that the Entrance game may in fact contain two
distinct focal points for the players, which can be identified by the two possible
forward induction solutions. Therefore, one can state that the current Entrance
game yields a unique social-welfare equilibrium1 if and only if players have either
some strong self-interested preferences (λ << 1/5) or some strong other-regarding
preferences (λ >> 3/4 and δ >> 2/3). In the latter case, one should note that
1The social welfare equilibrium introduced by Charness & Rabin ([Charness and Rabin, 2002,















Figure 4.5: Transformed Entrance game for extremely fair agents (λ = δ = 1)
the players’ sensibility to the maximin principle needs to “dominate” that of the
utilitarian welfare function.
The sets of Nash Equilibria (NE), of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPE),
and of Forward Induction solutions (FI), in the context of the Entrance game
played by fair agents, are shown in Table 4.2.
4.6 Equilibrium predictions under our model of
social ties
Similarly to the theories of social preferences considered in the previous section, our
main claim is that the strength of the social tie existing between two players has
some important effects on their preferences (and consequently on their expected
behavior), as suggested in Section 4.2. However, as we believe that the type of
payoff transformation used in our model is more appropriate to the context of
NE SPE FI
(In,B;B) (In,B;B) (In,B;B)(Out,A;A) (Out,A;A)(Out,B;A)
Table 4.2: Equilibrium solution concepts for fair agents (λ >> 3/4 and δ >> 2/3)
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social ties, we illustrate through this section how it can disagree with the previous
concepts from Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 in terms of equilibrium predictions. More
specifically, let us apply our model of social ties to the above Entrance game.
Given the subjective social ties values kab and kba, and the constant values
k1, k2, k3 ∈ [0, 1] such that k1 ≤ k2 ≤ k3, we have:
• if kab > k3, then the unique rational play for Alice and Bob is to coordinate
on (In,B;B), independently of kba.
• if kab > k1 and kba > k2, then, as in the previous case, the unique Nash
equilibrium is again for both players to coordinate on the (In,B;B) outcome
(see Figure 4.6 for an example).
• if kab ≤ k1 and kba > k2, then Alice should play (Out, ·), in response to Bob
playing B in the subgame.
• if kab ≤ k1 and kba ≤ k2, then Alice and Bob should follow forward induction
reasoning and play (In,A;A). In this case, as the strategic structure of
the game remains as in its original version, the game-theoretic analysis from
Section 4.4 still applies.
• if k1 < kab ≤ k3 and kba ≤ k2, then both players are unable to coordinate on
a unique Nash equilibrium outcome in the subgame: both (A,A) and (B,B)
are Nash equilibria. As a result of such indecision in the subgame, Alice’s












Figure 4.6: Transformed Entrance game for socially tied agents (U = Um, kab =
kba = 1)
In the above analysis, the constant values for k1, k2, and k3 depend on whether
the players follow the maximin function (i.e., U = Um) or the utilitarianism prin-
ciple (i.e., U = Us). Table 4.3 provides the corresponding constant values for each
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of these types. Moreover, this analysis considers the most general case where ties
may be unilateral (i.e., where kab 6= kba): our current model therefore allows to
state that, for instance, Alice feels close to Bob while Bob does not feel close to
Alice.
One should note from this interpretation that Alice will always play her strat-
egy (In,B) whenever kab > k3, and similarly, Bob will always play his strategy
B whenever kba > k2. Such an observation, combined with the fact that k3 > k2,
indicates that Alice’s decision is more restrictive than Bob’s: if k2 < kab, kba < k3,
then Alice needs to take Bob’s decision into account in order to make her decision,
whereas Bob will play B independently of Alice’s action. As a consequence, intro-
ducing social ties in the context of this game may allow Bob’s threat of playing B
to become more credible to Alice’s eye. In other words, social ties may simply turn
Alice’s first mover advantage (as suggested in Huck and Muller [2005]) in Bob’s
favour.
One should also note the distinction between using utilitarianism or egalitar-
ianism in the tie utility function. As shown in Table 4.3, utilitarianism allows to
coordinate more easily on the (In,B;B) outcome than egalitarianism (i.e., k1, k2,
and k3 have lower values when U = Us). On the other hand, players following
egalitarianism are expected to coordinate in the subgame more often than in the
case of utilitarianism (i.e., when U = Um, Alice should play (Out, ·) if and only if
kab = k1 = k2 = 1/2).
However, one may state that the formulation of social ties from Section 4.2 is
too general with respect to the concept presented in Section 4.1. In fact, according
to Statement 4.1.0.1, we assume that a social tie is restricted to be bilateral, which
may not always be the case in the above analysis. In order to match this criterion,
one then needs to add the following constraint:
kab = kba
In this case, assuming k = kab = kba, coordination on the (In,B;B) outcome
is reached only when k > k2. Similarly, coordination on the (In,A;A) outcome is
reached only when k < k1. On the other hand, Alice will play (Out, ·) whenever
k1 ≤ k ≤ k2, as miscoordination would be expected in the subgame. As this
Constant Egalitarianism Utilitarianism




Table 4.3: Constant tie values for each type of player
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constraint simplifies decision making for both players in the Entrance game, one
should note that it also removes any opportunity for Bob to exploit Alice: whenever
k2 < kab, Alice will always play (In,B) independently of Bob’s decision.
More specifically, about determining Alice and Bob’s dinner plan, this analy-
sis leads to the following interpretation. On the one hand, if the existing social
relationship is sufficiently weak between Alice and Bob, then Bob should be in-
fluenced by Alice’s intention of going to her favourite Japanese restaurant and,
consequently, he should choose A in order to maximize her own payoff. On the
other hand, in the presence of a sufficiently strong social tie between them, Alice
should be influenced by Bob’s intention of doing what is best for the group and,
consequently, she should choose B in order to maximize the group payoff.
Furthermore, in the particular case of an intermediate measure of social ties
between Alice and Bob, each individual may then become uncertain about the
other’s choice of either acting fully rationally and go to Alice’s favourite restaurant,
or doing what is best for the group and go to Bob’s favourite restaurant. In
response to such a high risk of meeting at the wrong restaurant, Alice should then
reaffirm her intention to stay eat at her place with Bob.
However, one should note that the above constraint on both players’ subjective
social ties (i.e., kab = kba) suggests the existence of a common scale for measuring
such ties. In fact, in order for Alice to determine the actual social tie level between
Bob and herself, then she must first make sure that her notions of the weakest and
highest possible ties are the same as Bob’s (e.g., does “being best friends” have the
same meaning for both of them?). For example, it is fair to say that everybody
does not share the same level of tie with a complete stranger (some are genuinely
more cooperative than others). One may then argue that the non-easy task of
normalizing one’s social ties scale is already part of what defines the social tie
itself: indeed the higher the social tie value, the more the concerned individuals
are likely to share the same social ties scale (e.g., if I feel that we are best friends,
but I ignore what “being best friends” means to you, then I will not risk being
exploited by you, and my social tie with you will consequently remain weak). As
a result, this analysis follow our definition of social ties from Section 4.1 as it
suggests that social ties are intrinsic psychological factors that are influenced by
the agents’ epistemic states (the more I know about you, the more my measure of
our social tie is reliable).
4.7 Players as team-directed reasoners
Our proposed model of social ties from Section 4.2 appears to share some common
properties with another well-known concept that also relies on group identification:
team reasoning. We therefore provide, in this section, a detailed analysis of the
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Entrance game through the various theories of team reasoning as a means to
illustrate the common characteristics as well as the differences that exist with our
model of social ties.
One should note that, in the context of the Entrance game, considering col-
lective utility functions (see, e.g., the classical utilitarianism and the maximin
principle from Section 4.2) from the players’ individual viewpoint can lead to a
transformed game similar to that depicted in Figure 4.5 from Section 4.5.2. In this
case, the resulting subgame in Figure 4.5 has similar properties as the well known
Hi-Lo matching game: as both players have the same preferences over outcomes,
they indeed benefit if and only if they coordinate with each other in the subgame.
However, their subsequent payoffs depend on which action they do coordinate
on. The interesting property of this transformed subgame is that it introduces a
dilemma that even economic theory cannot solve. However, while game theory is
indeed unable to predict any particular outcome (i.e., both coordinated outcomes
of the subgame are Nash solutions), it is shown in Bacharach [2006] that people
would tend to coordinate on the action that leads to the most rewarding outcome
for both, i.e., (B,B).
In order to interpret such intuitive behavior, some theorists have proposed to
incorporate new modes of reasoning into game theory. For instance, starting from
the work of Gilbert (Gilbert [1989]) and Reagan (Regan [1980]), some economists
and logicians (e.g., Lorini [2011]) have studied team reasoning as an alternative
to the best-response reasoning assumed in traditional game theory (Bacharach
[1999]; Colman et al. [2008]; Sugden [2000, 2003]). Team-directed reasoning is
the kind of reasoning that people use when they perceive themselves as acting as
members of a group or team (Sugden [2000]). That is, when an agent i engages
in team reasoning, he identifies himself as a member of a group of agents S and
conceives S as a unit of agency acting as a single entity in pursuit of some collective
objective. A team reasoning player acts for the interest of his group by identifying
a strategy profile that maximizes the collective payoff of the group, and then, if
the maximizing strategy profile is unique, by choosing the action that forms a
component of this strategy profile.
Furthermore, as suggested in Hakli et al. [2010], the concept of team reason-
ing also refers to Tuomela’s I-mode / we-mode distinction from Tuomela [2010].
According to Tuomela, the I-mode consists in reasoning as a private person ac-
cording to two possible principles: an agent reasoning in plain I-mode will seek
to satisfy self-interest as suggested by classical economic theory (this corresponds
to the type of reasoning underlying the analysis from Section 4.4). On the other
hand, an agent reasoning in pro-group I-mode is concerned with promoting the
group’s interests, and as a result will make a decision with the individual intention















Figure 4.7: Entrance game from the group’s viewpoint (with U = Um)
called by Bacharach in Bacharach [1999]), one may consider the existing theories
of social preferences presented in Section 4.5 (e.g., the concept of social welfare
equilibrium presented in Charness and Rabin [2002] illustrates this type of think-
ing). It is clear however that even such pro-group I-mode thinking, which relies
on preference transformation, fails to predict some very intuitive behavior such as
in the well known Hi-Lo matching game, as shown in Bacharach [2006]; Colman
et al. [2008] (see Figure 4.5 for a similar example). The alternative concept of
we-mode reasoning instead relies on what Bacharach calls agency transformation,
which consists in conceiving the situation not as a decision making problem for
individual agents (cf. the I-mode), but as a decision making problem for the group
conceived as an agent.
Let us now perform a detailed analysis of team reasoning applied to the En-
trance game according to both Sugden and Bacharach’s different theories1. Figure
4.7 illustrates a representation of the Entrance game from the group’s viewpoint
when considering the maximin principle as the group utility function. In this case,
the transformed Entrance game considers a unique player, which corresponds to
the group {Alice, Bob}. We indicate with sasb any group’s strategy. One therefore
notes that the best strategy for the group is to always play (In,B;B).
First, according to Sugden’s theory (Gold and Sugden [2007]; Sugden [2003]),
a simple epistemic interpretation of team reasoning (from Alice’s viewpoint) in the
1A more detailed general comparison of Sugden and Bacharach’s theories of team reasoning
can be found in Gold [2012].
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current Entrance game can be the following (for U ∈ {Us, Um}):
Statement 4.7.0.1 If Alice believes that:
• She is a member of the group {Alice, Bob}.
• It is common knowledge among Alice and Bob that both identify with {Alice, Bob}.
• It is common knowledge among Alice and Bob that both want the value of U
to be maximized.
• It is common knowledge among Alice and Bob that (In,B;B) uniquely max-
imizes U .
Then she should choose her strategy (In,B).
Following Statement 4.7.0.1, it is then clear that if Alice shares her beliefs with
Bob, then the resulting outcome will be (In,B;B) (i.e., Bob will similarly choose
the corresponding option B). According to Sugden (Sugden [2003]), a player has
reason to act as a team member and to choose the action that forms a component
of the strategy profile maximizing collective payoff, conditional on assurance that
the other players also act as team members. That is, to act as a member of a
team, one must be confident that the other players act as members too. More
fundamentally, “[...] team reasoning does not generate reasons for choice unless
each member of a team has reason to believe that there is common reason to
believe that each member of the team endorses and acts on team reasoning [...].
This is a condition of assurance” ([Sugden, 2003, p. 176-177]). In other words,
the main characteristics of Sugden’s theory is that team reasoning relies on strong
epistemic foundations and is very restrictive in that matter: an agent will not take
the risk to team-reason and be “suckered” by other agents who do not.
Let us now consider Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning as an alternative
to Sugden’s previous interpretation, which, as shown in Hakli et al. [2010], yields
the same action recommendations as Tuomela’s we-mode reasoning in any game-
theoretic situation. In Bacharach [1999], Bacharach introduces the concept of
unreliable team interaction, which corresponds to a game structure in which there
is a probability that a given player identifies with a team and chooses the action
which maximizes the team benefit (i.e., the player plays in the we-mode), and
another probability that the player is a self-interested agent who tries to maximize
his own benefit (i.e., the player plays in the I-mode). In this sense, the interaction
is “unreliable” because there is no certainty that a player will reason and act as
a team member. A team member will then act according to his expected utility
based on what others will do (including players who do not team-reason). In such
an unreliable team interaction, Bacharach also introduces the notion of a team
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probability Protocol Equilibria
we-mode (for U ∈ {Um, Us})
ω = 0 (InA,A, XaXb)(Out,B, XaXb)
(InA,A, InA A) if U = Us
0 < ω ≤ 3/4 (InA,A, Out A) if U = Um
(Out,B, InB B)
3/4 < ω ≤ 8/9 (InA,A, InA A) if U = Us(Out,B, InB B)
8/9 < ω < 1 (Out,B , InB B)
ω = 1 (Xa, Xb, InB B)
Table 4.4: Protocol Equilibria (with Xa ∈ {Out, InA, InB} and Xb ∈ {A,B})
protocol, which consists in specifying a strategy for every player when identifying
with each team (or in each mode). As an example, the protocol (A,B,BA) specifies
that Alice and Bob will respectively play A and B if in I-mode, and will respectively
play B and A if in we-mode. Through this concept of team protocol, Bacharach
differentiates an agent’s behavior depending on whether he identifies with the
group or not. The players then reach a protocol equilibrium if and only if, given
the probability ω that each player reasons in we-mode, neither players nor the group
can increase its expected utility by individually deviating from it. In other words,
such a protocol equilibrium may simply be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium in
the extended game where the group {Alice, Bob} becomes an extra player. Such a
property illustrates a major difference between Bacharach’s theory and our model
of social ties. In fact, while an unreliable team interaction requires to consider
additional players in the game in order to perform strategic reasoning, each of
which corresponding to a combination of individual players (cf. the concept of
a team protocol), our model of ties instead only leads to a modification of each
individual’s utility, leaving the game structure in its original version (i.e., the sets
of players and strategies remain unchanged).
Table 4.4 describes the sets of Protocol Equilibria (PE) for each probability
value ω that each player reasons in we-mode in the Entrance game.
One can see from Table 4.4 that, when the agents reason in I-mode (i.e., w = 0),
the set of protocol equilibria matches that of Nash equilibria. Conversely, if both
agents play in we-mode (i.e., w = 1), then the only equilibrium is to play the
solution (In,B;B). Moreover, one can note that the maximin principle requires a
lower probability of we-mode reasoning (w > 3/4) than the utilitarianism principle
(w > 8/9) in order to converge to this unique solution. In other words, the
utilitarianism principle requires a stronger identification with the same group in
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order to achieve coordination. One should note that team reasoning agrees with
our model of social ties regarding the behavioral predictions in the context of the
Entrance game.
However, the main limitation of Bacharach’s theory is that it does not clarify
what the probabilistic distribution ω stands for in the definition of an unreliable
team interaction structure. In fact, while such probabilities may depend on some
intrinsic features of the game such as the payoff structure, they may also reasonably
be determined by some pre-existent social relationships between the players: two
strongly (resp. weakly) tied individuals may indeed each have a high probability
of being in we-mode (resp. I-mode) in situations like the above Entrance game.
To further the analysis, let us note that the concept of unreliable team inter-
action can be seen as a special type of incomplete information games1 where the
only uncertainty one can have is regarding the level to which other players identify
with different groups (e.g., agent i may identify with the group {i, j} with proba-
bility ω or with the group {i} with probability 1−ω). In other words, this theory
relies on the assumption that every agent identifies with a unique team at a given
time, which is a strong assumption. This observation therefore raises the issue of
the endogenous determination of the mode of reasoning (i.e., I-mode/we-mode).
In fact, a fundamental point in Bacharachï£¡s original theory, in contrast to Sug-
den’s theory, is that the determination of mode of reasoning is a psychological
matter, prior to any rational choice, and such a process is based on frames. A
frame, as first introduced in Bacharach and Bernasconi [1997] through the Vari-
able Frame Theory (VFT), can be defined as a set of concepts that an agent uses
when thinking about a decision problem: a person may then start to we/I-reason
only if he has ’we’/’I’ concepts in his frame, which leads him to answer the corre-
sponding question “What shall we/I do?”. While Bacharach’s theory assumes an
agent can only use one frame at once (i.e., an agent cannot reason in I-mode and
we-mode at the same time), it is suggested in Smerilli [2010] that some vacillation
between different frames may actually occur in one’s mind when facing a decision
problem. The corresponding model indeed defines the probability ω as a function
of the probability of vacillating from we-mode to I-mode and the probability of
vacillating from I-mode to we-mode.
Applying such a model to our current Entrance game leads to the following
interpretation: if Alice and Bob start by we-reasoning, there will be a unique we-
equilibrium (In,B;B), which is not a Nash equilibrium. So if Alice starts with
we-mode reasoning, she will not be happy with the result and move away from this
equilibrium (e.g., by playing (Out, ·)). If instead Alice starts with the I-mode, both
1Note that we do not refer to the usual Bayesian game as defined by Harsanyi here. It is
indeed shown in Hakli et al. [2010] that a Bayesian game generated from Bacharach’s unreliable
team interaction structure does not yield the same action recommendation.
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individuals shall not be happy (both (In,A;A) and (Out,B;B) are dominated
by the previous “we” solution (In,B;B)). In this case there can be a continuous
switching or vacillation from one frame to another. As shown in Smerilli [2010],
this interpretation is similar to that of the well known prisoner’s dilemma, which
therefore suggests that miscoordination should prevail in the Entrance subgame1.
Consequently, one could conjecture that reinforcing social ties between individuals
in the Entrance game decreases the probability p of vacillating between we-mode
and I-mode, while increasing the probability q of vacillating between I-mode and
we-mode.
4.8 Why team reasoning cannot express gradual
social ties
Following the previous analysis of team reasoning, one may however wonder whether
this interpretation, and more generally Sugden and Bacharach’s theories, are ac-
tually adequate to interpret the effects of social ties, as they clearly forbid the
possibility that an agent is reasoning in two different modes at the same time.
Indeed, in some unpublished work (Bacharach [1997]), Bacharach allows for the
existence of some “superordinate” frame where an agent can see the problem from
both the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ perspective, even though he states that those perspec-
tives cannot hold simultaneously. In order to better understand Bacharach’s view
regarding this matter, one may consider the analogy with Rubin’s vase, which is
illustrated in Figure 4.8 (as already suggested in Smerilli [2010]).
Figure 4.8: Rubin’s vase
When looking at the image in Figure 4.8, one can indeed see either a vase (in
1Experimental results in the Prisoner’s dilemma have shown that the cooperation rate varies
between 30-40% (see e.g., Shafir and Tversky [1992]).
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black color) or two faces (in white color). In this case, one can easily vacillate
between perceiving both forms, but one cannot see both concepts simultaneously.
In the same fashion, Bacharach reasonably assumes that an individual simulta-
neously cannot perceive a social situation from the “I” perspective and from the
“we” perspective.
However, this interpretation, which is assumed in Sugden and Bacharach’s
theories, does clearly not allow to capture the fact that one may identify with a
given group up to a certain degree. The need for such a gradual group identification
is justified by the various social features that may simultaneously define one’s
social identity, as suggested by our basic definition of social ties from Section 4.1.
For example, two individuals may consider political orientations (e.g., being a
Democrat) and religion (e.g., being a Catholic) as very important social features.
In this case, it is reasonable to state that the social tie between them if they share
both of these features (e.g., both are Democrat and Catholic) is stronger than if
they share only one of those (e.g., both are Democrat, but one is Catholic while
the other is Muslim), which is itself assumed to be stronger than sharing none
of them (e.g., one is Republican and Catholic while the other is is Democrat and
Muslim).
In order to illustrate more formally the differences existing between our model
of social ties from Section 4.2 and the concept of team reasoning from Section
4.7, let us consider a simple concrete two player game where player i can choose
between three options: A, B, and C. In such a scenario, each player’s payoff
is determined uniquely from these options according to Table 4.5 (for simplicity,
player j has no control over the outcome)1. Note that the pair’s payoff function can
then follow either utilitarianism (i.e., sum of individual payoffs) or the maximin
principle (i.e., minimum of individual payoffs).
Player (i)’s option PayoffsPlayer (i) Player (j) Sum Min
A 8 0 8 0
B 5 7 12 5
C 7 4 11 4
Table 4.5: Simple dictator game
Applying team reasoning to this particular situation leads to the following
predictions: player i will play A if reasoning in I-mode (player i is then self-
interested), and player i will play B if reasoning in we-mode (player i then identifies
with the group). As a consequence, according to both Bacharach and Sugden’s
1The game presented here is overly simplistic as a means to illustrate the above point, which
could of course also be found in more classical types of social interactions.
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theories of team reasoning (and independently of whether the group utility function
follow utilitarianism or themaximin principle), player i will never happen to choose
C. Indeed, while Sugden’s theory does clearly not allow for such gradual team
identification, Bacharach’s theory cannot provide an unreliable team interaction
structure with a probability ω of identifying with the group (0 ≤ ω ≤ 1) that
specifies this outcome to occur.
On the other hand, considering the same game through our model of social
ties from Section 4.2 leads to a different interpretation: in this case, player i
will select A if both players are extremely close to each other (e.g., kij = kji =
1), and player i will select B if they instead are perfect strangers (e.g., kij =
kji = 0). However, if both players are neither best friends nor perfect strangers
but, say, simple acquaintances (e.g., kij = kji = 0.5), then player i will choose
C (assuming either utilitarianism or the maximin principle as the group utility
function), as a compromise between being self-regarding and group-regarding (For
a more detailed comparative analysis of this particular game, see Section 6.3.3.1
from Chapter 8, and Appendix C.2). One can therefore observe that the concept
of team reasoning has limited expressive power in the context of social ties, as all
the theories presented Section 4.7 are unable to make such an intuitive prediction.
In fact, we claim that our model of social ties is more general than team
reasoning in the sense that it allows for a gradual measure of group identification,
which, we believe, is an important requirement to capture the actual ongoing
behavior under the effects of social ties, as suggested by Section 4.1: according to
our model, an agent may indeed partially identify with the group while remaining
partly self-interested. More generally, our model allows to represent the fact that
a person is socially tied with another individual up to a certain degree.
Furthermore, the characteristics of our model of social ties seem even more
suitable to realistically represent more flexible and heterogenous multi-player in-
teractions where different coalitions might be formed (depending on the way the
agents are socially tied with one another). Such complex games indeed justify the
need for a continuous measure of group identification: as social ties are defined as
independent values from an individual to another, an agent may then be similarly
tied with various individuals at the same time. Consider, for example, a scenario
where one faces the dilemma between cooperating with a close friend, and coop-
erating with a family member. In this case, assuming the friend and the family
member do not know each other, it does clearly not make sense for one to reason
as a unique team including all individuals. As a result of identifying with either
of the sub-groups (i.e., either the one including the friend or the one including the
family member), the theories of team reasoning would then predict that one will
choose over these two options, even though a more egalitarian solution might exist
that would satisfy more equally all players. Under the same condition, our model
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of social ties would instead suggest to select the latter solution. We however post-
pone the study of such complex situations to Chapter 8, which will provide a more
detailed comparative analysis between our theory of social ties and Bacharach’s
theory of team reasoning.
4.9 Further hypotheses
As previously mentioned, the main goal of our Entrance game is to investigate
whether social ties affect social preferences. According to our model of social ties
presented in Section 4.2, our first hypothesis is that social ties do not correlate
with inequity aversion. Indeed, while our model of ties supports coordination on
the (In,B;B) outcome in the presence of a social tie, inequity aversion instead
predicts that Alice will play (Out, ·), no matter whether she is and/or expects Bob
to be inequity averse. However, our model of ties cannot be easily distinguished
from the model of fairness presented in Section 4.5.2: both theories may indeed
predict the same outcome ((In,B;B) can appear to be a unique social welfare
equilibrium). In order to discriminate between those models, one may then con-
sider a version of the Entrance game where the outside option is removed (that is,
without the possibility for Alice to choose between In and Out before the coor-
dination game): this simply corresponds to playing the coordination game alone.
Figure 4.9 illustrates it through examples of the corresponding transformed payoff






















(c) Social tie model
Figure 4.9: Transformed coordination games without outside option
According to Figure 4.9(a), both Alice and Bob are extremely inequity averse
agents (i.e., αa = αb = βa = βb = 1), which leads them to miscoordinate by playing
the (A,B) solution. Similarly, considering extremely fair agents (i.e., λ = δ = 1
for Alice and Bob) as in Figure 4.9(b) shows that both players cannot be expected
to always coordinate: as the resulting game (which thus corresponds to a version
of the Hi-Lo matching game) yields two different social welfare equilibria, both
strategies can become rational for both players. However, considering our model
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of social ties (with kab = kba = 1), as in Figure 4.9(c), shows that both players
should still coordinate on the (B,B) outcome, which corresponds to the unique
Nash equilibrium of the resulting game. As the main result of this analysis, our
model of ties clearly predicts that the outside option is irrelevant in the presence
of a social tie between Alice and Bob. The players’ behavior remains the same
independently of the presence of this outside option. In addition to the stability
in the agents’ behavior it allows for, our model of ties appears to be more realistic
than Charness & Rabin’s theory of Fairness. In fact, as shown through Section
4.5.2, convergence towards a unique social welfare equilibrium requires a high
level of fairness, along with some forward induction reasoning, and a propensity
to help the worst-off person over maximizing the group payoff. Assuming that
human beings have bounded computational resources, our model of social ties,
which clearly relies on some low level of strategic reasoning, seems definitely more
adequate to solve the sort of dilemma introduced by the Entrance game.
Furthermore, one should note that both our model of social ties and the concept
of team reasoning happen to make the same predictions in the context of the
Entrance game, no matter whether the outside option is present or not. Such
an observation therefore suggests the need for investigating other relevant game
theoretic situations in future work, as a means to disentangle predictions from
those theories (see, e.g., the game in Table 4.5 from Section 4.2).
4.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a game that appears to have very nice properties
to investigate the behavioral effects of social ties. Indeed it creates a dilemma
between maximizing self-interest and maximizing social welfare. It differs however
from existing economic games from the experimental economic literature that elicit
similar properties, such as the trust game, the ultimatum game, and the dictator
game. Those games indeed provide situations where people’s decision may be
influenced by some psychological factors such as disappointment, regret, and guilt
(Geanakoplos et al. [1989]). While investigating the impact of social ties on social
emotions clearly represents an interesting research orientation for future work, it is
not the motivation here: the strategic structure of the Entrance game introduced
in Section 6.3 does not seem to be adequate for eliciting such emotional reasoning.
Moreover, a clear advantage of the Entrance game is that it is well suited to
evaluate the very plausible theory of team reasoning in the context of social ties:
the stronger the tie between individuals, the more they may act as members of the
same group.
However, as this work is purely theoretical, it clearly requires some further
experimental analysis. The next stage of this study therefore consists in testing
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and evaluating the main hypotheses made in the previous section. We therefore
present such a study in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
The Behavioral Effects of Social
Ties
“True happiness consists not in the multitude of
friends, but in the worth and choice.”
— Ben Jonson
Cynthia’s Revels (1600)
“A true friend is one soul in two bodies.”
— Aristotle
Measuring the effects of social relationships on human behavior is not new to
the areas of economics and social psychology. In the past years, many experimen-
tal studies have indeed shown that people tend to cooperate more with individuals
that belong to the same group than with individuals that do not (see, e.g., Brewer
[1979, 1999]; Chen and Li [2009]; Tajfel and Turner [1979]; Tajfel et al. [1971]).
These observations led to distinguish between the concepts of an in-group, which
constitutes a social group to which an individual psychologically identifies as one of
its members, and an out-group, which, by contrast, represents a group to which an
individual does not identify as a member. While such in-group behavior can rea-
sonably be induced by a wide variety of phenomena such as culture, religion, gender
and race, the well known minimal group paradigm (Tajfel [1970]) suggests that
even meaningless characteristics can suffice to trigger some group identification.
However, despite the empirical evidence for some in-group favoritism (i.e., favor-
ing members of one’s in-group over out-group members), one may wonder about
what determines an in-group in the first place. In fact, one can easily imagine
that many different levels of in-group exist, as suggested in the previous chapter:
for example, an individual might, at the same time, identify as an economist, a
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computer scientist, and a member of one’s favourite sport club. It is our attempt,
through this chapter, to investigate the impact that varying the strength of such
in-group connectedness can have on human behavior: does an individual behave
similarly when interacting with a close friend, a simple acquaintance, or a perfect
stranger?
For this purpose, we propose an experiment that involves two versions of the
asymmetric coordination game presented in the previous chapter (i.e., with and
without the outside option). In this context, we vary the strength of social ties by
making players interact with partners from different in-groups (i.e., fellow mem-
bers of their own sports team, members of their sports club, students of their
university). The general aim of this experimental study is to verify the validity of
the social ties model presented in the previous chapter.
Furthermore, we use direct questionnaires to measure more precisely social
connections between each individual and his/her own sports team. In this case,
we distinguish between two different types of social ties: a subjective tie mea-
sures the level with which a particular individual feels about the connectedness of
his/her own team (through the individual’s own ratings about other team mem-
bers), whereas an objective tie measures the level with which a team is actually
close to a particular member (through the ratings of other team members about
the individual). After comparing the two types of social ties (subjective and objec-
tive) with one another, we then investigate the role that each plays in determining
individual behavior.
5.1 Experimental Design
Throughout this section, we present the detailed setting of our experiment that
aims at measuring the effects of social ties on human behavior. More specifically, in
Section 5.1.1, we specify two particular types of asymmetric coordination games
that we wish to test: the Baseline game, and the Entrance game. We further
introduce, in Section 5.1.2, the problem of anonymity while studying social ties,
along with our proposed solution. Section 5.1.3 then presents the methodology
that is followed to measure social ties within a group.
5.1.1 The coordination games
As suggested in the previous chapter (see Section 4.9), we consider two coordina-
tion games that involve two players in our experiment. The first game consists of
the Baseline game, which corresponds to an asymmetric version of the well-known
Battle of the Sexes game. Such a game is depicted in Figure 5.1. The asymmetric
property of this game lies in the players’ payoffs: the worst outcome for Player
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(1) is different from the worst outcome for Player (2). As shown in the previous
chapter (see Section 6.3), this asymmetry characterizes the only distinction that









Figure 5.1: Baseline game
The second game of this experimental study simply consists of an extension
of the previous Baseline game with an outside option. The corresponding game,
which was already introduced in the previous chapter, defines the Entrance game















Figure 5.2: Entrance game
According to the Entrance game in Figure 5.2, Player (1) has the possibility
not to actually play the Baseline game by choosing Out.
Throughout this experiment, in order to incentivize subjects to play both of
the above games, we consider real monetary payoffs. In this case, the currency of
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the payoffs from Figures 5.1 and 5.2 is the euro: for example, if both players select
A in the Baseline game, then Player (1) will get 35e whereas Player (2) will get
5e.
Moreover, one should note that a detailed game theoretic analysis of both of
the above games was introduced in Section 4.4 from Chapter 4.
5.1.2 Preserving anonymity
The issue raised here comes from the simple property that both games that are
defined in the previous section involve only two players. In fact, our aim through
this work is to investigate the influence of social ties on the subjects’ behavior
in the context of these simple games. However, considering social ties clearly
requires knowing the identity of the individual one is tied with: how could one
estimate his social relationship with someone without knowing anything about
the identity of that individual? On the other hand, allowing perfect information
about the identity of the subjects’ partners while playing the above games becomes
problematic as it allows the possibility for some reputation effect: e.g., assuming
two interacting subjects who are strongly tied with one another, each may then
consider the possibility of future punishment or sharing outcomes afterwards (i.e.,
outside of the experiment). In order to prevent such biases, all the subjects of
our experiment are therefore divided into groups such that, instead of knowing
the exact identity of the partner one is matched with, one is only provided the
information of which group the partner actually belongs to. For example, one may
consider a group of friends, where all members are (somewhat similarly) strongly
tied with one another (one may similarly consider a group of strangers). In the case
of two interacting members of this group, revealing the identity of the subjects’s
partner simply becomes unnecessary as both appear to be strongly tied with the
group itself. This way, one can elicit social ties between interacting individuals
while maintaining anonymity.
5.1.3 Measuring Social Ties
Our goal here is to measure the subjects’ social relationships with the group they
belong to. In order to quantify such social ties, each subject is first required to
rate his/her connection with every member of his/her group. More specifically,
the question used to fill this purpose is to ask the subjects to indicate their beliefs
about how they are appreciated by each other group member, based on their
picture, as shown in Figure 5.3. Note that the reciprocal property implied by this
question satisfies Constraint 4.1.0.1 from Section 4.1 in Chapter 4 that restricts a
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social tie to be bilateral1.
Please indicate how you think the person displayed in the photo below feels about you:
b b




[Select only one answer]
Figure 5.3: An individual’s expected tie with a group member
In the context of this question, we use the four available options to define the
scale of a tie according to Figure 5.4: given a group member, the strongest tie is
considered whenever the subject “likes a lot” that person, whereas the weakest tie
is considered whenever the subject “dislikes” that person.
like a lotlikedislike indifferent
intensity of the tie
Figure 5.4: Individual tie measure
Although the above question can reveal what one may call the social value of
a certain subject within a certain group (e.g., the more one believes to be liked by
others, the more one’s social value is important), we claim that it is not sufficient
to meet our definition of a social tie with a group. Indeed, let us recall that
subjects are expected to interact anonymously so that they know who they may
be interacting with (i.e., a member of their group), without knowing who exactly
they actually interact with. This means that a subject’s tie with an unknown group
member can be reasonably interpreted as the tie with the group itself. However,
as indicated in Section 4.1 from Chapter 4, a social tie is assumed to be bilateral,
which therefore implies that the intensity of the relationship with a group one
belongs to must be the same for every member of that group. In order to illustrate
this interpretation, let us consider the following scenario: suppose that Alice is
1The subjects were also asked to answer a similar question to that in Figure 5.3, where they
were required to indicate their direct feeling about each other group member in the same fashion.
As we observed that answers to both questions are strongly correlated, we chose to focus on the
most restrictive case, which is depicted in Figure 5.3.
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socially very close to Bob, Carol, and Daniel, while, at the same time, these three
characters dislike each other (i.e., they are all extremely weakly tied with one
another). Let us also suppose that Alice actually interacts with Bob. In this case,
although Alice is indifferent between interacting with either character, Bob is not.
Indeed, Bob is more likely to actually interact with someone he dislikes, and so
Alice should take this information into account in order to make her choice. One’s
tie with a group should then not only rely on one’s individual ties with other
members, but it should also take into account the ties existing between every pair
of members from the group. This is why we ask all subjects in our experiment to
give their estimate about which member is socially tied to whom within the group
they belong to. As shown through Figure 5.5, a subject is required to draw lines
between members they believe are actual “friends”.
Please draw connections between the photos below whenever you
b b





think the corresponding persons are “friends” with each other:
Figure 5.5: An individual’s subjective estimate of others’ ties
In this case, the presence of a connection between two members is interpreted
as the existence of a tie between them according to the subject who answered.
Conversely, an absence of connection between two members is interpreted as a
non existent tie between them according the same subject. To illustrate this with
the particular example depicted in Figure 5.5, where four individuals A,B,C, and
D are considered, the subject X (who answers the question) indicates his beliefs
that B is only tied with D, C is only tied with A, and A is also tied with D (in
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addition to being tied with C). Such binary measures of ties are used in order to
keep the question as simple as possible to the subjects, without removing too much
valuable information (as subjects are asked about others’ ties, the imperfection of
such an information may indeed lead to introduce unnecessary noise through more
detailed questions).
5.2 Experimental Procedure
In our experiments, students from Toulouse 1 University Capitole who are also
members of the main university volleyball club were recruited as participants. As
a preliminary phase during training sessions, every active member of this club
was proposed to participate to our study. Upon acceptance, every subject was
then photographed for the purpose of later measuring social ties with their own
teammates (see Section 5.1.3).
The experiment itself was run in November 2011 during two training sessions.
In total, 70 subjects participated, including 37 men and 33 women. As active
volleyball players within the club, all subjects were divided into 9 single-sex teams:
5 teams were exclusively made of men, and 4 teams were exclusively made of
women. The minimum (resp. maximum) number of subjects in a given group was
7 (resp. 9). Both training sessions can be defined as follows:
• Session A: 31 subjects divided into 3 male teams and 1 female team.
• Session B: 39 subjects divided into 2 male teams and 3 female teams.
All (male and female) teams were ranked based on their performance according
to the official volleyball coach of the club. The best (i.e., most efficient, top ranked)
male/female teams all belong to Session B.
It is assumed from this population of subjects that members of the same team
do naturally share some social ties with one another. In fact, considering our
definition of social ties from Section 4.1 in Chapter 4, these players do share some
common social feature that define their social identity (e.g., they are all students at
the same university, they all like sport, and particularly enjoy playing volleyball)
while also having regular meaningful interactions with one another (they at least
all play volleyball together for 2 hours every week).
The paper and pencil method was used all along in our experiment. At
the beginning of both sessions, all subjects were asked to fill a questionnaire,
which includes rather personal questions (e.g., about their hobbies, study, reli-
gious/political beliefs), as well as questions related to measuring their social tie
with their own team (see Section 5.1.3 for details).
The purpose of answering this questionnaire prior to playing both games is
simply to prevent the subjects’ behavior in both games to influence their ratings
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of social ties. Indeed, our goal is to measure genuine ties, which are independent of
any social context. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that eliciting social
ties before playing the games is not a problem. In fact, it is likely that answering
the related questions may influence the subjects’ behavior in both games, which
is precisely the purpose of our experiment. Moreover, one should note that, while
measuring a social tie with an individual seems quite straightforward (either one
likes/dislikes someone or is indifferent), measuring a social tie with a group seems
rather more ambiguous. It can therefore be assumed that letting the subjects
answer these questions beforehand may lead them to become more “aware” of the
actual level with which they are close to their group.
Every subject was then asked to play both of the above Baseline and Entrance
games, according to three different types of matching processes. The detailed in-
structions of both games are described in Sections B.2 and B.3 of the Appendix.
The use of such a within-subject design is clearly justified by the reasonable as-
sumption that social ties are individual intrinsic characteristics. The purpose of
this experiment is indeed to study any possible change of behavior that may be
induced by different levels of social ties.
The three different matching processes can therefore be described as follows:
• The “university” scenario: the interaction involves a member of the volley-
ball club (i.e., a participant of this experiment) and some randomly selected
student from Toulouse 1 University Capitole who does not belong to the
volleyball club1. This situation defines our control treatment, as very little
information is made available about the co-player. In this case, we assume
the existence of a very weak tie (if not absent) between the players.
• The “club” scenario: the interaction is made between two randomly selected
volleyball club members (i.e., participants of this experiment) who do not
belong to the same volleyball team. This situation illustrates the existence
of some social tie of intermediate strength between the players that mainly
relies on the limited sharing of some common social feature (e.g., enjoying
playing volleyball) and some possible few past interactions (during a usual
training session, students are indeed subjects to occasional interactions with
students that do not belong to their own team).
• The “team” scenario: the interaction is made between two randomly se-
lected members of the same volleyball team. This situation characterizes the
case with the strongest social tie existing between two subjects in this exper-
1Furthermore, this particular scenario was also independently replicated between economics
students from the Toulouse School of Economics and randomly selected students from Toulouse
1 University Capitole who are not economics students.
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iment. As said earlier, such a scenario indeed illustrates well our definition
of social ties from Section 4.1 in Chapter 4.
In each of these cases, one should note that information imperfection is sym-
metric, that is, the type of scenario is made common knowledge among both of
the players involved.
It is clear from the definitions of the above matching processes that each sce-
nario characterizes a different level of social tie between partners, as shown through
Figure 5.6.
“team”“university” “club”
intensity of the tie
Figure 5.6: Quantifying social ties based on the matching process
These three scenarios are then played in sequence by every subject in the con-
text of both games, using the following meta-strategy method: for each scenario,
all subjects had to indicate their decision if assigned the role of player (1), as well
as their decision if assigned the role of player (2) (see Sections B.2.1 and B.3.1 in
the Appendix for the detailed instructions).
Furthermore, in order to detect any possible influence the order of playing
these scenarios may have on the subjects’ behavior, we distinguish two different
experimental sequences in both sessions:
• In Session A: subjects first played the Entrance game before playing the
Baseline game, and in each case, they considered scenarios in decreasing
order of the level of social ties (i.e., starting with the “team” scenario).
• In Session B: subjects first played the Baseline game before playing the
Entrance game, and in each case, they considered scenarios in increasing
order of the level of social ties (i.e., starting with the “university” scenario).
It is also worth pointing out that, although each game was played repeatedly
(i.e., once for every situation), each case remains a one-shot game as it is guar-
anteed that a subject cannot interact more than once with the same co-player
in the same situation. However, note that the probability p of interacting with
the same individual in both games (i.e., the Baseline and Entrance games) is
p < 1/18000 in the “university” scenario, 1/63 < p < 1/61 in the “club” scenario,
and 1/8 < p < 1/6 in the “team” scenario1.
Moreover, in order to elicit their beliefs about what characterizes their expected
behavior in the context of both the Baseline and Entrance games played in the
1The actual value of p in the “team” and “club” scenarios depends on the team the corre-
sponding subject belongs to.
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“university” scenario, all subjects were asked to indicate their expectations of what
decision a randomly selected student from the university would make in both roles
(i.e., both as player (1) and as player (2)). As shown in the instructions provided
in Section B.4 from the Appendix, subjects were also incentivized to answer care-
fully to these questions (i.e., they were offered a monetary prize whenever their
guess was accurate). The obvious purpose of these complementary questions is to
provide some extra information regarding the subjects’ way of reasoning and ratio-
nality (e.g., do people play the best response to their belief about their co-player’s
choice?).
The whole experiment lasted approximately one hour in both sessions. The
participants’ payments were distributed during the following training sessions in
December 2011. The payment method, which was clarified to all subjects be-
forehand (see Section B.1 from the Appendix for details), did then consist in
randomly drawing one role (i.e., player (1) or player (2)), one game (i.e., Baseline
game or Entrance game), one scenario (i.e., “university”, “club”, or “team”), and
one co-player (depending on the scenario). A subject’s payoff was therefore de-
fined according to his choice made as the selected player in the selected situation
(which corresponds to the selected scenario in the selected game), and the selected
co-player’s choice in the same situation. Each effective payment was made individ-
ually and anonymously through random draws that were performed in front of the
subject1. All participants received the total sum of their actual earnings, which
includes a 5e show-up fee. The mean of total payments was 19.03e (standard
deviation of 12.21e, with a maximum of 40e and a minimum of 5e).
5.3 Results
This section presents descriptive statistics reporting the various elicited behavior
throughout our experiment. First, in Section 5.3.1, we describe the players’ ob-
served behavior in both the Baseline game and the Entrance game, for various
levels of social ties. One should note that, in this case, the strength of a social
tie is artificially controlled by changing the type of a subject’s game partner. We
will therefore consider three distinct levels of such social ties corresponding to the
three scenarios defined in Section 5.2 (i.e., “team”, “club”, or “university”). Then
in Section 5.3.2, we propose to refine this analysis by considering subjective and
objective measures of each participant’s social tie with his/her respective team: in
a particular group (e.g., a volleyball team), the members may indeed be more or
less tied with each other (e.g., some members may be friends while others are not).
1The random selection of the co-player was made through some code name in order to preserve
anonymity between subjects.
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We therefore investigate the effects of these two different types of ties on behavior
in the context of the above games.
5.3.1 General observations
Prior to analysing the observed behavior in both the Baseline game and the En-
trance game, it is worth indicating that we observe no effect regarding the order of
playing either game: behavior of subjects from Session A can indeed not be dis-
tinguished from that of subjects from Session B (see Section 5.2 for details about
the experimental design).
5.3.1.1 Behavior in the Baseline game
Table 5.1 represents the players’ resulting behavior in the Baseline game, depend-
ing on whether the corresponding co-player is a teammate, a club member, or a
university student. Table 5.1 also includes the p values related to the Wilcoxon
signed rank tests for similarity of the subjects’ behavior in various scenarios. Note
that, in all following tables in this chapter, only p values lower than 0.2 are dis-
played. p values larger than 0.2 are classified as not significant (n.s.). The first
observation one can make from Table 5.1 is that the subjects are torn between
choosing A and B when assigned the role of Player (1) in the presence of some
weak tie with Player (2) (i.e., in the “university” scenario). This randomizing
behavior may simply be the direct consequence of the conflict existing between
Player (1)’s own preferences, and the group’s welfare: Player (1) indeed prefers
the (A,A) outcome while (B,B) is clearly better for the group (and for Player
(2)). Moreover, note that the elicited behavior, which largely differs from the op-
timal mixed strategy (i.e., play A with probability 7/8), suggests that the subjects
are well aware of this conflict, and can therefore hardly choose between satisfying
their self-interest and satisfying the welfare of the group.
Players
Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test(p values)
team club university team vs. team vs. club vs.university club university
1 (70 obs.) 67% 57% 49% 0.002 0.089 0.108
2 (70 obs.) 75% 76% 73% n.s. n.s. n.s.
Table 5.1: Choosing B in the Baseline game for each player in each type of match-
ing
One can also observe that subjects tend to favor option B significantly more
often whenever the social tie with Player (2) increases. We can indeed reject
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the null hypothesis that Player (1)’s behavior when interacting with a university
student is the same as Player (1)’s behavior when interacting with a teammate
(p < 0.003). This means that, as Player (1), increasing one’s social tie with Player
(2) allows to accept giving up some of one’s own payoff in order to favor the group
made of both players. In other words, the existence of a (strong) social tie between
the players simply allows to reveal the existence of a focal point to Player (1), which
corresponds to the unique best outcome for the group. Furthermore, note that the
elicited behavior then goes further apart from the optimal mixed strategy as the
tie increases, which indicates the presence of some sufficiently strong incentive to
satisfy the welfare of the group1.
Similarly, when assigned the role of Player (2), the subjects clearly favor playing
B in all types of interactions, which is a major difference with Player (1)’s behavior
from Table 5.1. In this case, Player (2)’s observed behavior is close to the optimal
mixed strategy (i.e., playing B with probability 7/10), which may support the
subjects’ intention to satisfy their self-interest. This result is however not very
surprising because, unlike Player (1), Player (2)’s preferences perfectly match that
of the group (i.e., there is no conflict between Player (2)’s individual preferences
and the group’s welfare). As a consequence of facing no dilemma, the subjects
need not care about the welfare of the group when assigned the role of Player
(2). However, one should note that Player (2)’s choice does not vary significantly
with an increase of the social tie’s strength. This clearly indicates that Player (2)
does not even take into consideration his/her corresponding tie with Player (1) in
order to make a choice. This result is rather surprising because, by anticipating
Player (1) to choose B more often in the presence of a stronger tie, a purely self-
regarding rational Player (2) would also choose B more often. Therefore, Player
(2)’s unchanging behavior suggests that the subjects may actually not be so purely
self-regarding after all.
5.3.1.2 Behavior in the Entrance game
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 represent the players’ resulting behavior in both stages of the
Entrance game, depending on whether the co-player is a teammate, a club member,
or a university student. More specifically, Table 5.2 depicts Player (1)’s choice
between In and Out during the first stage of the game. Table 5.3 similarly depicts
both players’ behavior in the second stage of the game (i.e., the Entrance subgame),
in the hypothetical case that the second stage were reached (through Player (1)
playing In in the first stage)2. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 also include the p values related to
1Also note from Table 5.1 that an intermediate level of social ties (i.e., through the “club”
scenario) induces some existing but less significant change in behavior.
2Table 5.3 therefore includes Player (1)’s counterfactual choice in the second stage: if choos-
ing Out in the first stage, what would Player (1) have played in the subgame had he chosen In
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the Wilcoxon signed rank tests for similarity of the subjects’ behavior in various
scenarios. However, as such statistical tests cannot be performed over Player
(1)’s whole strategy space in the Entrance game (i.e., Player (1) has four discrete
choices: (In,A), (In,B), (Out,A), and (Out,B)), we simply provide the observed
behavior in details through Figure 5.7, which can be read as follows: according to
Figure 5.7(c), among the 42% of subjects who chose In in the first stage of the
game, 52% then played A in the subgame. However, in the same context, 43% of
the subjects who chose Out first would have played A in the subgame had they
chosen In first.
Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test(p values)
team club university team vs. team vs. club vs.university club university
62% 53% 42% 0.004 0.083 0.059
Table 5.2: Player (1) choosing In in the first stage of the Entrance game (70 obs.)
Concerning Player (1)’s elicited behavior in the presence of some weak tie
with Player (2) (i.e., in the “university” scenario), the first observation one can
make from Table 5.2 is that the subjects play Out more often (58%). Moreover,
Table 5.3 shows that in this context, the subjects are then torn between choosing
either strategy A or B in the subgame. More precisely, Figure 5.7(c) indicates
that this observation is particularly true among the subjects who played In in the
first stage. Such a result is rather surprising as it does not suggest any strong
common belief in each other’s rationality. Indeed, as shown in the analysis of the
Entrance game from Chapter 4 (see Section 4.4), if Player (1) believes in Player
(2)’s rationality and that Player (2) believes in Player (1)’s rationality, then Player
(1)’s only rational move is to play (In,A), which corresponds to the forward
induction reasoning. Moreover, it appears that considering the weaker assumption
of bounded rationality does also not suffice to explain all this elicited behavior: no
matter what Player (1) believes about Player (2)’s future move, playing (In,B)
can never be selected as a rational self-regarding move. Yet, Figure 5.7(c) shows
that 20% of the subjects actually selected strategy (In,B) in this context. As
a means to provide a realistic interpretation of this observation, one can observe
that the outside option in the first stage of the Entrance game is not relevant to
the subjects’ decision as Player (1) in the subgame. One can indeed not reject
the null hypothesis that, in the context of the “university” scenario, Player (1)’s
choice in the Entrance subgame (i.e., after choosing first In) is the same as Player
(1)’s choice in the Baseline game. This result therefore suggests that, right after
instead?
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playing In, Player (1) tends to consider the subgame as a new independent game
(i.e., Player (1) then forgets about the previous outside option).
Players
Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test(p values)
team club university team vs. team vs. club vs.university club university
1 (70 obs.) 63% 55% 53% 0.032 0.133 n.s.
2 (70 obs.) 77% 67% 64% 0.049 0.108 n.s.
Table 5.3: Choosing B in the second stage of the Entrance subgame
Considering Player (2)’s choice in the context of weak ties (i.e., in the “uni-
versity” scenario), Table 5.3 similarly suggests that the subjects tend to play the
optimal mixed strategy in the subgame (i.e., playing B with probability 7/10). Fol-
lowing this interpretation, Player (2) may act rationally in response of believing
that Player (1) also acts rationally in the subgame only (i.e., without considering
the outside option). It is also worth noting that Player (2)’s observed behavior
from Table 5.3 does largely differ from the mixed strategy equilibrium in the entire
Entrance game (i.e., playing B with probability 3/7 as shown in Section 4.4 from
Chapter 4). However, it appears that, unlike Player (1), Player (2)’s behavior is
somewhat affected by Player (1)’s outside option. One can indeed reject the null
hypothesis that, in the context of the “university” scenario, Player (2)’s choice
is the same in the Entrance subgame and in the Baseline game (p < 0.008). As
a result, the fact that Player (2) chooses A significantly more often in the En-
trance game than in the Baseline game suggests that Player (2) is sensible to
some forward induction reasoning (see Section 4.4 from Chapter 4).
Consequently, both players’ elicited behavior in the “university” scenario clearly
illustrates the failure of the principle of individual rationality. Furthermore, this
analysis suggests the existence of some group-oriented behavior: the design of the
Entrance game indeed allows for the dominant outcome (In,B;B) to be the best
outcome for the group made of both Player (1) and Player (2).
Moreover, focusing on other scenarios that consider the presence of stronger
social ties between the players allows to reinforce this hypothesis: one can indeed
observe from Figure 5.7 that subjects (as Player (1)) tend to favor option (In,B)
more often whenever the social tie level between players increases. According
to Table 5.2, we can indeed reject the null hypothesis that Player (1)’s initial
choice between In and Out is the same when interacting with a university student
as when interacting with a teammate (p < 0.005). Similarly, Table 5.3 allows to
reject the null hypothesis that Player (1)’s behavior in the subgame (independently


































Figure 5.7: Elicited behavior for Player (1) in the Entrance game (70 obs.)
“university” scenario (p < 0.04). Thus, this result indicates that stronger social
ties induce Player (1) to play B significantly more often than A in the subgame.
Figures 5.7(a) and 5.7(c) further indicate that Player (1)’s changing behavior in
the subgame (through choosing B more often than A) generally follows a change
in the initial move (through choosing In more often than Out). In other words,
Player (1) generally plays strategy (In,B) significantly more often when a stronger
social tie is involved with Player (2).
Focusing on the effect of social ties on Player (2)’s behavior in the Entrance
game, Table 5.3 also reveals some significant difference: Player (2) is more likely
to play B in the presence of a stronger tie with Player (1). One can reject the
null hypothesis that Player (2)’s behavior is the same when interacting with a
university student as when interacting with a teammate (p < 0.05). Note however
that, although Player (1) cannot be rational to play strategy (In,B), both actions
for Player (2) (i.e., A and B) are rationalizable: Player (2) should rationally select
B (resp. A) as a best response of believing that Player (1) will also play B (resp.
A). In other words, this means that Player 2 ’s observed behavior can always be
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justified by some rationality assumption.
Let us now continue the previous analysis regarding the influence of the out-
side option on both players’ behavior. In the presence of strong social ties (i.e.,
in the “team” scenario), Player (1)’s behavior in the Entrance subgame (after
choosing first In) is not significantly different from Player (1)’s behavior in the
Baseline game alone. Similarly, in the same context, Player (2)’s behavior is also
not significantly different in the Entrance game as compared to the Baseline game.
These results therefore indicate that, although Player (1)’s behavior in the En-
trance subgame is independent of the outside option (i.e., no matter the strength
of the tie with Player (2)), the strategic effect of the outside option on Player (2)’s
behavior (in the “university scenario”, as shown earlier) is removed through the
introduction of some stronger social tie with Player (1). In other words, in the
presence of some sufficiently important social tie, Player (2) tends to ignore the
outside option and simply reach the most profitable outcome for the group.
5.3.2 Refining social ties
5.3.2.1 Behavioral effects of subjective social ties
As shown through the previous sections, every subject in our experiment was
asked to provide subjective information about how tied they were with each of
their teammate. Our aim in this section, is to aggregate these answers in a way
that best characterizes all subjects’ closeness to their team. We therefore choose
to define social ties as subjective values, such that a subject’s relationship with
a team depends exclusively on that subject’s own beliefs. Let us also recall from
Section 5.1.3 that one’s tie with a group not only depends on one’s closeness to
every other member, but it also depends on every other member’s closeness to each
other. In other words, assuming all uncertainty was removed, every member of the
same team should then be similarly tied with that team. Therefore, one advantage
of this method is that it allows to later compare every teammate’s subjective tie
with each other, as an indication of how well the team members actually know
each other. In order to measure such social ties, let us first focus on the level of
individual ties each subject can have about some teammate.
Based on our experimental data, and as a matter of simplicity, we choose to
strictly consider boolean ties one suspects to exist between two individuals (i.e.,
whether two teammates are socially tied with each other or not). For this purpose,
let us first translate one’s belief about one’s own social ties with every other team
member (see Figure 5.3 in Section 5.1.3) into boolean values. To do so, we consider
the following interpretation, which appears to be the most restrictive:
• if an individual A believes that a teammate B “likes a lot” A, then A is
considered to be socially tied with B;
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• if an individual A believes that a teammate B either “likes”, “dislikes”, or is
“indifferent” towards A, then A is considered to be not socially tied with B;
Given a group of individuals G, let us then denote Ni the number of such indi-
vidual ties that some individual i (such that i ∈ G) has within group G (according
to i).
In addition to these individual ties with others, we also consider each individ-
ual’s subjective estimate of others’ ties, as shown in Figure 5.4 from Section 5.1.3.
Let us then similarly define N−i to represent the estimated number of individual
ties within group G (according to i’s beliefs) that do not involve i. For example,
assuming individual B provides the information depicted in Figure 5.4, B then
believes that there are two individual ties within the team that do not involve B,
so in this case: N−B = 2.
We then simply describe one’s level of social tie with a group G as one’s ex-
pected belief that any two members from G can be tied with one another. Let
us define an individual i’s subjective social tie ksi with a group G (assuming that
i ∈ G) as the level with which i believes to be closely connected to G. Formally,




where N corresponds to the maximum number of individual ties in G:
N = |G| × (|G| − 1)2
Applying this measure to our population of volleyball players, the distribution
of subjective social tie values is depicted in Figure 5.8. One can observe from this
graph that most participants do not feel strongly tied with their own team (e.g.,
67% of the subjects have social tie value lower than or equal to 0.4).
We find an average social tie value of 0.35 with a standard deviation of 0.23.
However, one can also note that the entire range of social tie values is covered: the
minimum and maximum tie values are respectively 0.035 and 1 in this population.
Following the previous analysis from Section 5.3.1.1 that relied on a measure
of social ties controlled artificially through varying the type of game partner, we
here refine this study by considering the effects of the individuals’ subjective social
ties on some fixed group. For this purpose, we propose to split the entire set of
subjects from our experiment into two equally sized sets (Highs and Lows) based
on their subjective social tie values ksi : each dataset represents the subpopulation
consisting of the 35 subjects with the highest/lowest social tie values ksi . The
resulting behavior in the Baseline game based on this distribution is shown in
Table 5.4. In this case, note that Table 5.4 also includes the p values related to the
120
Figure 5.8: Distribution of subjective social tie values
Mann-Whitney tests for similarity of behavior between these two populations of
subjects (i.e., Highs vs. Lows). One can then observe from the “team” matching
that the subjective tie value with one’s team seems to affect Player (1)’s behavior.
Such a result is confirmed by performing a logistic regression, which shows that
the higher the players’ subjective social tie, the more likely they are to play B
when assigned the role of Player (1) in the “team” scenario (p < 0.005, no. of
obs. = 70). However, running a similar regression regarding behavior as Player




Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test
ties (p values)
ksi team club university
team vs. team vs. club vs.
university club university
Highs 1 82% 71% 57% 0.008 0.102 0.045
(35 obs.) 2 76% 83% 80% n.s. 0.179 n.s.
Lows 1 51% 43% 40% 0.095 n.s. n.s.
(35 obs.) 2 74% 69% 66% n.s. n.s. n.s.
Highs vs. Lows 0.017 0.016 0.057(p values - Player 1)
Highs vs. Lows n.s. 0.166 0.182(p values - Player 2)
Table 5.4: Choosing B in the Baseline game based on subjective social ties ksi
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Another interesting observation one can make from Table 5.4 is that focusing
on the individuals with lower social ties (i.e., Lows) still reveals some significant
difference across scenarios. In fact, we can reject the null hypothesis that, under
the assumption of low subjective social tie values, Player (1)’s behavior is the
same in the “team” scenario and in the “university” scenario (p < 0.1). This
result therefore suggests that the group itself has some independent effect on its
members’ behavior, even when those members are very weakly tied with each
other. Note, however, that this observation does again not duplicate to Player (2)
whose behavior does not change significantly across scenarios.
Let us now similarly refine the previous analysis from Section 5.3.1.2 to inves-
tigate the effects of the individuals’ subjective social ties with their team in the
context of the Entrance game. As in Section 5.3.1.2 (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3), Tables
5.5 and 5.6 depict the players’ resulting behavior in both stages of the Entrance
game based on this distribution. Note that Tables 5.5 and 5.6 also include results
of the Mann-Whitney tests as in Figure 5.4. Furthermore, we provide the observed
behavior of Player (1) in more details through Figures 5.9 and 5.10, which can be
read as in Figure 5.7 from Section 5.3.1.2.
Subjective Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test
ties (p values)
ksi team club university
team vs. team vs. club vs.
university club university
Highs 63% 49% 40% 0.020 0.058 n.s.
Lows 62% 57% 44% 0.083 n.s. 0.131
Highs vs. Lows n.s. n.s. n.s.(p values)
Table 5.5: Player (1) choosing In in the Entrance game based on subjective
social ties ksi (35 obs.)
One can first see from Table 5.5 that subjective social ties have apparently no
influence on selecting the outside option as Player (1) in the context of the “team”
scenario. In fact, no significant correlation can be found regarding the subjects’
level of subjective ties with the team (i.e., high or low) and their choice between
In/Out in this case. However, concerning Player (1)’s behavior in the subgame
(independently of choosing In/Out first), Table 5.6 suggests that individuals with
higher subjective ties with the team tend to favor choosing B rather than choosing
A. This observation is confirmed by performing a logistic regression between one’s
subjective tie value with a team, and one’s behavior in the “team” scenario of the
Entrance subgame (p < 0.1, no. of obs. = 70).




Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test
ties (p values)
ksi team club university
team vs. team vs. club vs.
university club university
Highs 1 74% 71% 65% 0.179 n.s. n.s.
(35 obs.) 2 83% 71% 71% 0.157 0.157 n.s.
Lows 1 56% 39% 41% 0.095 0.095 n.s.
(35 obs.) 2 70% 61% 56% 0.165 n.s. n.s.
Highs vs. Lows 0.111 0.003 0.042(p values - Player 1)
Highs vs. Lows n.s. n.s. 0.182(p values - Player 2)
Table 5.6: Choosing B in the Entrance subgame based on subjective social ties
ksi
cant differences in behavior still exist across scenarios for both types of (high/low)
subjective social ties. Indeed, as shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, one can observe
some significant change in Player (1)’s behavior in the presence of high subjective
ties with their team. More surprisingly, these results show similar effects in the
context of low subjective tie values. In fact, the subjects tend to distinguish weak
social ties within their team (i.e., the “team” scenario), and weak social ties within
a large group of unknown individuals (i.e., the “university” scenario): the subjects
from Lows actually favor playing In significantly more often in the “team” sce-
nario than in the “university” scenario (p < 0.09 according to Table 5.5). This
observation duplicates to the second stage of the game where they play B (inde-
pendently of initially choosing In or out) significantly more often in the “team”
scenario (p < 0.1 according to Table 5.6).
Furthermore, concerning the subjects’ behavior in the role of Player (2), one
can also observe a correlation between one’s level of subjective social tie with a
team and one’s behavior in any type of scenario: the higher Player (2)’s subjective
tie with his/her team, the more likely Player (2) is to select B (even if Player (2)
interacts with a stranger, as in the “university” scenario). Note, however, that
such a correlation is not very significative, as shown in Table 5.6 (p > 0.18).
5.3.2.2 Behavioral effects of objective social ties
In contrast with the analysis from the previous section, we here verify the relevance
of an objective measure of social ties in determining one’s social behavior.
While subjective ties measure how an individual feels connected to his/her own


































Figure 5.9: Elicited behavior for Player (1) with high subjective social ties ksi
(35 obs.)
connected (i.e., through its members) to a particular individual. In this case, one
may value an individual i’s objective social tie with a group by only considering the
average subjective social tie (as measured in the previous section) of every other
member of that group (excluding i). In this case, one can define an individual i’s
objective social tie koi with a group G (assuming that i ∈ G) as the level with which
i is closely connected to that group according to other members of G. Formally,





Again, applying this measure of objective ties to our population of volleyball
players leads to the corresponding distribution displayed in Figure 5.11. In this
case, we find an average social tie value of 0.35 with a standard deviation of



































Figure 5.10: Elicited behavior for Player (1) with low subjective social ties ksi
(35 obs.)
Let us now analyse the influence of such objective social ties on the subjects’
behavior in both of our economic games. For this purpose, we again propose to split
the entire set of subjects from our experiment into two equally sized sets (Higho
and Lowo) based on their objective social tie values koi : each dataset represents
the subpopulation consisting of the 35 subjects with the highest/lowest social tie
values koi . The resulting behavior based on this distribution is shown in Table 5.7.
One can clearly observe from Table 5.7 that, in the context of the Baseline
game, there exists some correlation that reveals the following rather surprising
observation: the lower one’s objective social tie value, the more one is cooperative
and play B as Player (2) in the Baseline game. Note that this apparent correlation
is confirmed by performing a logistic regression explaining one’s behavior in the
“team” scenario in terms of one’s objective tie value (p < 0.05, no. of obs. =
70). This observation duplicates to Player (1), even though it does not represent
a significant correlation.
However, one may wonder whether this result also applies to the behavior
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Figure 5.11: Distribution of objective social tie values
Obj.
Players
Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test
ties (p values)
koi team club university
team vs. team vs. club vs.
university club university
Higho 1 61% 54% 43% 0.034 n.s. 0.045
(35 obs.) 2 68% 83% 80% 0.095 0.014 n.s.
Lowo 1 71% 60% 54% 0.014 0.157 n.s.
(35 obs.) 2 83% 69% 66% 0.014 0.058 n.s.
Higho vs. Lowo n.s. n.s. n.s.(p values - Player 1)
Higho vs. Lowo 0.103 0.166 0.182(p values - Player 2)
Table 5.7: Choosing B in the Baseline game based on objective social ties koi
elicited in the Entrance game. As a means to answer this question, let us similarly
analyse the players’ resulting behavior in both stages of the Entrance game based
on this distribution (i.e., Higho vs. Lowo), which is depicted in Tables 5.8 and 5.9.
Furthermore, as before, we provide the observed behavior of Player (1) in more
details through Figures 5.12 and 5.13.
One can first observe from Table 5.8 that such objective social ties have a
significant effect on Player (1) selecting In/Out in the first stage of the game.
This result is confirmed by performing a logistic regression, which suggests that
subjects with low objective ties with their team are more likely to play In as
Player (1) (p < 0.07, no. of obs. = 70). However, while this observation confirms
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Objective Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test
ties (p values)
koi team club university
team vs. team vs. club vs.
university club university
Higho 53% 41% 32% 0.034 0.102 n.s.
Lowo 71% 65% 51% 0.052 n.s. 0.131
Higho vs. Lowo 0.087 0.032 0.091(p values)
Table 5.8: Player (1) choosing In in the Entrance game based on objective social
ties koi (35 obs.)
Obj.
Players
Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test
ties (p values)
koi team club university
team vs. team vs. club vs.
university club university
Higho 1 59% 55% 53% n.s. n.s. n.s.
(35 obs.) 2 79% 67% 70% n.s. 0.102 n.s.
Lowo 1 71% 55% 54% 0.033 0.095 n.s.
(35 obs.) 2 74% 65% 57% 0.057 n.s n.s
Higho vs. Lowo n.s. n.s. n.s.(p values - Player 1)
Higho vs. Lowo n.s. n.s. n.s.(p values - Player 2)
Table 5.9: Choosing B in the Entrance subgame based on objective social ties koi
the previous results in the Baseline game, note from Table 5.9 that it does not
duplicate to behavior in the subgame: no significant change in behavior can be
found between individuals with strong objective ties and individuals with weak
objective ties (in either scenario and in both roles of Player (1) and Player (2)).
As a result, while this empirical analysis suggests that objective social ties
have some limited impact on behavior as compared to subjective ties (see previous
section), it also indicates that both types of tie measures are relevant to determine
one’s propensity to cooperate in the context of both the Baseline game and the
Entrance game. We therefore attempt to investigate an intuitive combination of


































Figure 5.12: Elicited behavior for Player (1) with high objective social ties koi
(35 obs.)
5.3.2.3 Behavioral effects of underestimating and overestimating social
ties
We have shown, in the previous sections, that both subjective and objective mea-
sures of social ties matter to specify behavior in the Baseline game as well as the
Entrance game. In this section, we propose to analyse the behavioral effects of a
combination of both concepts. For this purpose, we simply consider the difference
value between one’s subjective tie and one’s objective tie, i.e., ksi − koi . In fact, the
previous analyses from Sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 suggested that high subjective
ties and low objective ties independently tend to promote some fair and cooper-
ative behavior. We therefore investigate whether overestimating one’s social tie
with one’s team (i.e., ksi > koi ) does have some significant effect on one’s behavior.
In our population of volleyball players, the corresponding distribution of the
difference between tie measures (i.e., ksi − koi ) is displayed in Figure 5.14. In this
case, we find an average difference value of 0 with a standard deviation of 0.2. The


































Figure 5.13: Elicited behavior for Player (1) with low objective social ties koi (35
obs.)
population.
One should note from Figure 5.14 that the population of subjects is basically
divided into two categories: a group of individuals who underestimate their social
ties (i.e., 37 individuals i such that ksi < koi ) and a group of individuals who
overestimate their social ties (i.e., 33 individuals i such that ksi > koi ). We therefore
propose to look at the elicited behavior in each of these groups.
Focusing on the Baseline game, the resulting behavior based on this catego-
rization is shown in Table 5.10.
One should note from Table 5.10 that there is a very significant change in
behavior between subjects from the two different groups (i.e., ksi > koi and ksi < koi )
when assigned either the role of Player (1) or Player (2).
Moreover, looking at the Entrance game similarly reveals some strong changes
in behavior, as shown through Tables 5.11 and 5.12.
Although there does not exist a very significant change in behavior between
both groups (i.e., ksi > koi and ksi < koi ) in the first stage of the Entrance game (see
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Figure 5.14: Distribution of (ksi − koi )
Social
Players
Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test
tie (p values)
measures team club university team vs. team vs. club vs.university club university
ksi > k
o
i 1 91% 82% 66% 0.004 0.179 0.025
(33 obs.) 2 88% 88% 79% 0.179 n.s. 0.083
ksi < k
o
i 1 44% 35% 33% 0.095 n.s. n.s.




vs. ksi < koi <0.001 <0.001 0.004




vs. ksi < koi 0.014 0.026 n.s.
(p values - Player 2)
Table 5.10: Choosing B in the Baseline game based on ksi and koi
Table 5.11), it is clear from Table 5.12 that behavior in the subgame follows the
same interpretation as in the previous Baseline game: when overestimating their
social ties, subjects are much more likely to play B in either role (i.e., Player (1)
or Player (2)).
Moreover, another main observation that can be made through this analysis
of both of the above games concerns the subjects’ behavior across scenarios. In
fact, one can observe from Tables 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 that, unlike subjects who
overestimate social ties, subjects who underestimate ties do not appear to modify
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Social Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test
tie (p values)
measures team club university team vs. team vs. club vs.university club university
ksi > k
o
i 69% 51% 33% 0.001 0.033 0.057(33 obs.)
ksi < k
o




vs. ksi < koi 0.182 n.s. 0.197
(p values)
Table 5.11: Player (1) choosing In in the Entrance game based on ksi and koi
Social
Players
Matching types Wilcoxon signed rank test
tie (p values)
measures team club university team vs. team vs. club vs.university club university
ksi > k
o
i 1 82% 70% 67% 0.058 0.102 n.s.
(33 obs.) 2 91% 73% 67% 0.004 0.033 n.s.
ksi < k
o
i 1 50% 43% 42% n.s. n.s. n.s.




vs. ksi < koi 0.005 0.011 0.038




vs. ksi < koi 0.008 n.s. n.s.
(p values - Player 2)
Table 5.12: Choosing B in the Entrance subgame based on ksi and koi
their behavior much across the three different scenarios. This observation can be
particularly emphasized by looking at Player (1)’s behavior in the Entrance game.
More precisely, while Figures 5.15 clearly shows that Player (1)’s behavior when
overestimating the social tie with Player (2) significantly changes across scenarios,
Figure 5.16 indicates that, when underestimating the social tie with Player (2),
Player (1) only changes behavior in the subgame if selecting the outside option
first (i.e., Out), which appears to be irrelevant as the subgame will not be reached
in this case (i.e., it represents strictly hypothetical behavior).
Furthermore, it is also worth noting from Tables 5.10 and 5.12 that the effects


































Figure 5.15: Elicited behavior for Player (1) when ksi > koi (33 obs.)
scenario. In fact, the more one overvalues the tie with a given team, the more
one plays B in the Baseline game and the Entrance subgame when assigned the
role of Player (1) in the “university” scenario, even though Player (1) shares no
apparent tie with Player (2) in this case. This observation therefore suggests that
one’s subjective tie value with a given team relies to some extent on some genuine
notion of “fairness”: individuals who overvalue their social tie with a team are
more prone to express a “fair” behavior when interacting with some stranger. On
the other hand, one should note that this observation does not duplicate to Player
(2)’s behavior.
5.4 Discussion
While our results from Section 5.3.1 show that social ties have a clear effect on
behavior in the context of the Baseline game and the Entrance game from Section
5.1.1, the refined analysis from Section 5.3.2 confirms this observation and adds


































Figure 5.16: Elicited behavior for Player (1) when ksi < koi (37 obs.)
• Both subjective and objective measures of social ties matter to eventually
affect behavior: results from Sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 indicate that high
subjective ties and low objective ties allow to improve coordination in the
above games.
• Overestimating social ties promotes some cooperative behavior. As shown
through Section 5.3.2.3, subjects who overestimate social ties coordinate
more than those who do not. On the other hand, underestimating social
ties leads the subjects to barely differentiate between playing with a team-
mate and playing with a stranger (e.g., a university student).
It is our attempt through this section to extend the previous study with some
relevant analyses in order to better interpret the behavior that we observed. In
Section 5.4.1, we investigate the subjects’ efficiency in both of the above games
and compare these observations with theoretical predictions. Section 5.4.2 pro-
vides experimental data that we collected about the subjects’ beliefs during the
experiment. Finally, in Section 5.4.3, we consider our experiment from a different
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angle, which provides evidence for some fair behavior.
5.4.1 Efficiency
Let us now analyse the efficiency of the subjects’ behavior in both games.
Table 5.13 depicts each player’s expected payoff in the Baseline game according
to various types of scenarios (either “team”, “club”, or “university”) and three
groups of subjects based on their subjective and objective social ties with their
own team: we consider the group of individuals who overestimate their social
ties (i.e., ksi > koi ), the group of individuals who underestimate their social tie
(i.e., ksi < koi ), as well as the group of all individuals. We further assume that
the subjects strictly interact with co-players of the same group (e.g., subjects
overestimating ties interact with a co-player who also overestimate ties).
One can observe from Table 5.13 that, although Player (1)’s behavior is sig-
nificantly changing across scenarios (as shown in Table 5.10), the corresponding
expected payoff remains stable (for any type of subjective tie).
Social tie Players Matching typesmeasures team club university
1 12e 12e 10e
ksi > k
o
i 2 28e 25e 19e
(33 obs.) Total 40e 37e 29e
Difference 16e 13e 9e
1 11e 11e 11e
ksi < k
o
i 2 11e 9e 9e
(37 obs.) Total 22e 20e 20e
Difference 0e 2e 2e
1 11e 11e 10e
All 2 18e 16e 13e
(70 obs.) Total 29e 27e 23e
Difference 7e 5e 3e
Table 5.13: Expected payoffs in the Baseline game based on ksi and koi (rounded
to full euros)
In fact, the change in Player (1)’s behavior appears to mainly benefit Player
(2), whose expected payoff is clearly increasing with increasing ties (see the “team”
scenario). Note however that the expected payoff is very similar for both players
in the case of underestimated social ties when ksi < koi group (i.e., in the “club”
and “university” scenarios in Table 5.13). In other words, underestimating ties
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seems to simply promote equality in the context of our Baseline game. More-
over, note that, in this case, subjects manage to reach a nearly optimal egalitar-
ian outcome since the best expected payoff that both players can equally obtain
through mixed strategies is 11.6e (i.e., when both players choose B with probabil-
ity 3−√6 ≈ 0.55). This means that increasing one player’s expected payoff above
this value has for immediate effect to decrease the other’s expected payoff and
therefore reduce equality. This also implies that overestimating social ties could
not possibly improve the social welfare of the group without reducing equality. As
a consequence, if social ties were to promote equality, then they should induce in-
dividuals to play more randomly when assigned to either role (i.e., choose B with
probability ≈ 0.55), which is clearly not what we observe in our experiment. In
fact, Table 5.13 shows that stronger social ties when ksi > koi instead improve the
pair’s expected payoff1, which could be maximized if both players were to choose
B with probability 1 (the pair’s payoff would then be of 50e).
The unfortunate consequence of improving the group’s expected payoff through
stronger overestimated social ties, as shown in Table 5.13, is thus the unavoid-
able increase of inequality between co-players. This result therefore indicates that
Player (1)’s behavior in the presence of (strong) social ties aims at only promoting
utilitarianism (by improving the group’s total welfare) at the cost of sacrificing
equality. Such an observation can be justified by the attractiveness of reaching
the (B,B) outcome, which not only maximizes the pair’s total payoff, but also
maximizes the payoff of the worst-off individual. Furthermore, note that playing
(B,B) appears to be more beneficial for both players than any randomization of
strategies as suggested by the most equitable expected payoff (no individual can
indeed get more than 15e through randomizing strategies).
Let us now similarly consider the various payoffs each individual can expect in
the Entrance game, based on the observed behavior from Section 5.3.2.3. Accord-
ing to Table 5.14, one can first note that increasing the level of social ties promotes
Player (2)’s expected payoff without changing Player (1)’s whenever ksi > koi . Such
a result appears as a direct consequence of Player (1) selecting (In,B) more often,
which turns out to allow Player (2)’s expected payoff to increase at the expense
of decreasing Player (1)’s. However, one should note that such a behavior is not
purely altruistic as it is more beneficial to Player (2) than it is costly to Player
(1). In other words, social ties simply allow to improve the social welfare of the
pair while also reducing the expected inequality between both players. Note from
Table 5.14 that, while overestimating social ties favors Player (2) (in addition to
promoting group efficiency), underestimating ties tends to favor Player (1).
Unlike for the Baseline game, it appears that maximizing the efficiency of the
pair somehow coincides with maximizing the equitable expected payoff in the En-
1The pair’s payoff is here simply calculated as the total sum of the individual payoffs.
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Social tie Players Matching typesmeasures team club university
1 15e 15e 17e
ksi > k
o
i 2 22e 14e 12e
(33 obs.) Total 37e 29e 29e
Difference 7e 1e 5e
1 15e 15e 16e
ksi < k
o
i 2 9e 11e 10e
(37 obs.) Total 24e 26e 26e
Difference 6e 4e 6e
1 15e 15e 16e
All 2 15e 12e 11e
(70 obs.) Total 30e 27e 27e
Difference 0e 3e 5e
Table 5.14: Expected payoffs in the Entrance game based on ksi and koi
trance game: the unique way to maximize the welfare of the group is for Player
(1) to always choose strategy (In,B) while Player (2) always selects B (i.e., with
probability 1 for both players). In this case, Player (1) obtains 15e and Player (2)
obtains 35e (and the pair therefore gets 50e). On the other hand, the maximum
equitable expected payoff of 18.33e for both players (and therefore 36.66e for the
pair) can be uniquely reached through Player (1) randomizing between Out (with
probability 2/3) and (In,B) (with probability 1/3) while Player (2) always selects
B (i.e., with probability 1). However, as our previous analysis in Section 5.3.2.3
indicates that increasing social ties leads to a decreasing probability of Player (1)
selecting Out, it suggests that subjects do not follow this mixed strategy. As a
consequence of this analysis, one can conclude that subjects of our experiment
act more as utilitarians (i.e., aiming at maximizing the pair’s total expected pay-
off) than as egalitarians (i.e., aiming at maximizing the pair’s equitable expected
payoff) in both the Baseline game and the Entrance game.
5.4.2 Relationship between beliefs and behavior
In this section, we provide a comparative analysis between the subjects’ behavior
and their beliefs in the context of both of the previous games. As shown in Section
B.4 from the Appendix, all participants to our experiments were asked to estimate
their quantitative beliefs about how students from the university would generally
behave (i.e., in the “university” scenario). Table 5.15 depicts, for each player’s
strategy in both the Baseline game and the Entrance game, the rate of individuals
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actually making that choice along with the average quantitative belief that this
choice will be selected in general. These average beliefs are measured through the
answers of all participants to the questions from Section B.4 in the Appendix.
More detailed results can be found in Section B.5 from the Appendix, where the











A if In 53% 59%
B if In 47% 41%
2 B 64% 64%
Table 5.15: Choices versus beliefs in both games
One can observe from Table 5.15 that the average beliefs are surprisingly close
to the actual average behavior, which suggests that subjects behave as they be-
lieve others would behave in the same situation. Such an interpretation however
questions the existence of rational self-regarding behavior in the context of our
experiment. In order to clarify this argument, let us consider the well known
concept of epistemic rationality (Aumann [1995]), which states that a player is
epistemically rational if and only if he does not “knowingly select a strategy that
yields him less than he could have gotten with a different strategy”. Following this
concept, we express, in Table 5.16, every rational choice that is compatible with
every possible type of quantitative belief that can be held by subjects in both roles
(i.e., Player (1) and Player (2)). In this case, we abbreviate Pri(X) to denote
individual i’s quantitative belief that proposition X holds (Pri(X) ∈ [0, 1]). One
should note that the conditions on beliefs in Table 5.16 are determined through
the theoretical equilibrium solutions in mixed strategies presented in Section 4.4
from Chapter 4. As an example, one can indeed state that, in the Baseline game,
if Player (1) believes that Player (2) will choose to uniformly randomize strate-
gies (i.e., Pr1(“2 selects A”) = Pr1(“2 selects B”) = 0.5), then Player (1)’s only
rational move is to select A. However, in the same Baseline game, if Player (1)
believes that Player (2) will play according to the equilibrium solution in mixed
strategies (i.e., Pr1(“2 selects B”) = 0.7), Player (1) is rational to perform either
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of the available options (i.e., A or B).
Games Players Conditions on beliefs Rational Observedchoices rationality
Baseline
1
Pr1(“2 selects B”) = 7/10 A/B
58%Pr1(“2 selects B”) > 7/10 B
Pr1(“2 selects B”) < 7/10 A
2
Pr2(“1 selects B”) = 1/8 A/B
54%Pr2(“1 selects B”) > 1/8 B
Pr2(“1 selects B”) < 1/8 A
Entrance
1
Pr1(“2 selects B”) = 3/7 Out/(In,A)
50%Pr1(“2 selects B”) > 3/7 Out
Pr1(“2 selects B”) < 3/7 (In,A)
2
Pr2(“1 selects B if In”) = 1/8 A/B
59%Pr2(“1 selects B if In”) > 1/8 B
Pr2(“1 selects B if In”) < 1/8 A
Table 5.16: Rationality in both games (“university” scenario)
Furthermore, for every role (i.e., Player (1) and Player (2)) in each game (i.e.,
Baseline and Entrance games), Table 5.16 also depicts the rate of rational behav-
ior that is actually observed throughout our experiment, based on the subjects’
selected actions and beliefs. As a result, Table 5.16 does clearly not support a
strongly rational behavior. For example, in the context of the Entrance game, we
observe that only half of the subjects did actually behave rationally when assigned
the role of Player (1). Moreover, one should note that the data from our experi-
ment does not allow to detect any correlation between one’s choice of action as a
given player and one’s quantitative belief about the co-player’s behavior in either
game. Such results therefore confirm our analyses from the previous sections (see
Section 5.3), which did already not indicate any strong rationality effect.
However, following our previous interpretation of Table 5.15, data from our
experiment provides empirical evidence for an existing connection between the
subjects’ beliefs and their actions. In fact, performing a logistic regression reveals
a clear correlation between one’s action and one’s quantitative belief about what
others would do in the same situation (for every player in each game: p < 0.005,
no. of obs. = 70): for example, in the Baseline game, the higher one’s quan-
titative belief about Player (1) choosing B in general, the more likely one is to
similarly select B when assigned the role of Player (1). Such an observation there-
fore suggests that, when asked to play either of the above coordination games,
subjects favor some sort of normative thinking over the generally assumed princi-
ple of rationality. Such a result can easily be justified by the lack of any salient
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optimal solution in both games: as shown in the previous chapter (see Section 4.4),
while there is no unique Nash equilibrium in both coordination games, the forward
induction solution in the Entrance game may not even be followed by perfectly
rational players who do not believe that their partner is also perfectly rational. As
a result of this inability to perform any rational action, the subjects are therefore
led to follow some simple rule that consists in doing what they believe others would
do in their position. Note, however, that this result does not mean that people
are not self-regarding. In fact, although this study suggests the absence of any
strategic thinking, it also provides evidence for some individualistic behavior: in
the absence of any strong tie, people generally aim at reaching the best outcome
for themselves, hoping that their co-player will act accordingly.
5.4.3 Behind the veil of ignorance
In this section, we interpret our experiment through a different viewpoint, which
refers to the concept of the “original position”, as introduced by Rawls in his theory
of justice (Rawls [1971]). According to Rawls, the original position defines an ideal
situation in which agents have to make a collective agreement about what is fair
for every individual. The main distinguishing feature of this original position is
the so-called “veil of ignorance”, behind which every individual is assumed to be
deprived of all knowledge about his personal identity and characteristics so that
he imagines himself to possibly be in any player’s position.
This concept of the original position is clearly relevant to our experiment. In
fact, Sections B.2.1 and B.3.1 in the Appendix show that the meta-strategy method
used in our design allows the subjects to make their choice behind such a veil of
ignorance: in the context of both the Baseline game and the Entrance game, all
participants were asked to make their decision as both players, not knowing which
role would eventually be effective. However, in order to analyse the corresponding
behavior under this assumption, one needs to interpret both games differently.
Indeed, in the original position, a given strategy corresponds to a combination of
Player (1) and Player (2)’s actions. As a result, the original games are simply
transformed into symmetric two player games where the two players, say X and
Y , have the same strategy space: for example, in the Baseline game, strategy
(A,B) is interpreted as playing A if assigned the role of Player (1), and playing B
if assigned the role of Player (2). In this case, a player’s outcome is determined as
follows: if X chooses strategy (B,A) and Player Y chooses strategy (A,B), then
assigning X to the role of Player (1) (and therefore Y to the role of Player (2))
leads X to obtain 15e (i.e., the effective outcome becomes (B,B)) while assigning
X to the role of Player (2) (and therefore Y to the role of Player (1)) leads X to
obtain 5e (i.e., the effective outcome becomes (A,A)).
In order to determine X’s payoff in such a transformed game, Harsanyi argues
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in Harsanyi [1986] that one should assign equal probabilities to the fact of playing
as either player. Following this assumption, X’s expected payoff is then simply
obtained as the simple average of the two possible assignments (e.g., in the above
example, X gets (15 + 5)/2 =10e). Note that, in the context of the Baseline
game, Players X and Y both have four different strategies. The corresponding
payoff matrix for the whole transformed Baseline game can be found in Table
5.17, where only Player X’s expected payoff is depicted (as the game is symmetric,
Player Y ’s payoff can be obtained by simply inverting X with Y in Table 5.17).
Player X Player Y(A,A) (A,B) (B,A) (B,B)
(A,A) 20 2.5 17.5 0
(A,B) 17.5 0 35 17.5
(B,A) 2.5 10 0 7.5
(B,B) 0 7.5 17.5 25
Table 5.17: Payoffs à la Harsanyi for row Player X in the transformed Baseline
game
Note that, according to Table 5.17, the only strategies that are evolutionary
stable are (A,A) and (B,B).
However, one should note that Player X’s payoff in the transformed Baseline
game could be determined differently. In fact, Rawls alternatively argues, in Rawls
[1971], that one should seek to maximize the utility of the worst-off player when
playing behind the veil of ignorance. For example, if X chooses strategy (B,A)
and Player Y chooses strategy (A,B), then X’s payoff becomes min(15, 5) =5e
(instead of (15 + 5)/2=10e according to Harsanyi’s view presented above). The
corresponding payoff matrix for the new transformed Baseline game can be found
in Table 5.18, where again only Player X’s payoff is depicted.
Player X Player Y(A,A) (A,B) (B,A) (B,B)
(A,A) 5 0 0 0
(A,B) 0 0 35 0
(B,A) 0 5 0 0
(B,B) 0 0 0 15
Table 5.18: Payoffs à la Rawls for row Player X in the transformed Baseline game
According to both Tables 5.17 and 5.18, one can note that the Baseline game
has three different pure Nash equilibria when played behind the veil of ignorance:
• both players selecting (A,A);
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• both players selecting (B,B);
• one player choosing (A,B) while the other chooses (B,A).
In this case, Table 5.19 depicts the actually elicited behavior in our experiment,
according to the various types of matching.
Strategies Matching typesteam club university
(A,A) 14% 14% 13%
(A,B) 19% 29% 39%
(B,A) 10% 10% 14%
(B,B) 57% 47% 34%
Table 5.19: Behavior in the original position of the Baseline game
The first main observation from Table 5.19 lies in the actual dominant strategy
being (A,B) in the “university” scenario, as if the subjects were then trying to take
advantage of each other (by expecting others to select (B,A) as suggested by the
above equilibrium). However, note that, according to the previous section, subjects
who play (A,B) in this game tend to believe that others would also play (A,B),
which is not consistent with the principle of rationality (in both Figures 5.17 and
5.18, this yields a payoff of 0). This observation therefore confirms the presence
of some self-regarding interest without any strategic thinking. Furthermore, Table
5.19 also shows that social ties allow to reduce this individualistic behavior by
significantly increasing the rate of selecting (B,B) (57% in the “team” scenario,
against only 34% in the “university” scenario).
In order to interpret this result, let us consider Binmore’s theory from Binmore
[1994, 1998, 2005], which claims that, when placed behind the veil of ignorance, two
individuals naturally tend to share the same preferences1. In this case, Binmore
argues that, when making a choice in the original position, since the players have
a common aim, any strategic thinking becomes irrelevant. As a result, the players
will simply “agree” to choose whichever solution maximizes the commonly shared
preferences.
Applied to the above Baseline game, this interpretation predicts that, if the
players make their decision behind the veil of ignorance, then they will select
strategy (B,B). In fact, as shown in Tables 5.17 and 5.18, both players selecting
(B,B) is better than both players selecting any other strategy. Following this
theory, our observations from Table 5.19 therefore suggest that social ties promote
1in Binmore [1994, 1998, 2005], Binmore defines one’s preferences in the original position as
one’s empathetic preferences (the next chapter provides a more detailed discussion about such
empathetic preferences).
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the use of the original position as a coordination device in the context of the
Baseline game.
Let us now perform a similar analysis of the Entrance game being played behind
the veil of ignorance. Following Harsanyi’s assumption that the players assign
equal probabilities to the fact of playing as either player (i.e., Player (1) or Player
(2)), the corresponding payoff matrix for the transformed Entrance game can be
found in Table 5.20, where only Player X’s payoff is depicted. One should note
that, in this case, both have six different available strategies1.
Player X Player Y(In,A;A) (In,A;B) (In,B;A) (In,B;B) (Out;A) (Out;B)
(In,A;A) 20 2.5 17.5 0 22.5 5
(In,A;B) 17.5 0 35 17.5 22.5 5
(In,B;A) 2.5 10 0 7.5 5 12.5
(In,B;B) 0 7.5 17.5 25 5 12.5
(Out;A) 12.5 12.5 10 10 15 15
(Out;B) 10 10 27.5 27.5 15 15
Table 5.20: Payoffs à la Harsanyi for row Player X in the transformed Entrance
game
According to Table 5.20, the transformed Entrance game has three different
pure Nash equilibria:
• both players selecting (In,A;A);
• both players selecting (Out;B);
• one player choosing (In,A;B) while the other chooses (Out;A).
Note that, out of these solutions, only strategy (In,A;A) is evolutionary sta-
ble.
However, as for the Baseline game, the player’s payoff in the transformed En-
trance game could be determined according to Rawls’ view. In this case, the
corresponding payoff matrix for the new transformed Entrance game can be found
in Table 5.21, where again only Player X’s payoff is depicted.
According to Table 5.21, the new transformed Entrance game has the following
different pure Nash equilibria (note that it differs from the previous interpretation
in Table 5.20):
• both players selecting (In,A;A);
1For simplicity reasons, we voluntarily omit counterfactual strategies (i.e., (Out,A; ·) and
(Out,B; ·)) that are irrelevant to this analysis.
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Player X Player Y(In,A;A) (In,A;B) (In,B;A) (In,B;B) (Out;A) (Out;B)
(In,A;A) 5 0 0 0 10 0
(In,A;B) 0 0 15 0 10 0
(In,B;A) 0 5 0 0 0 10
(In,B;B) 0 0 0 15 0 10
(Out;A) 5 5 0 0 10 10
(Out;B) 0 0 20 20 10 10
Table 5.21: Payoffs à la Rawls for row Player X in the transformed Entrance game
• both players selecting (Out; ·);
• one player choosing (In,A; ·) while the other chooses (Out;A).
• one player choosing (In,B; ·) while the other chooses (Out;B).
In this case, the subjects’ actually elicited behavior in our experiment is de-
picted in Table 5.22.
Strategies Matching typesteam club university
(In,A;A) 12% 7% 10%
(In,A;B) 11% 16% 12%
(In,B;A) 4% 8% 7%
(In,B;B) 35% 22% 13%
(Out;A) 7% 18% 19%
(Out;B) 31% 29% 39%
Table 5.22: Behavior in the original position of the Entrance game
The first observation one can make regarding interactions with weak ties (i.e.,
in the “university” scenario) is that only few people do actually select the most
optimal and stable strategy (In,A;A). However, Table 5.22 also shows that so-
cial ties significantly increase the rate of selecting (In,B;B) (35% in the “team”
scenario, against only 13% in the “university” scenario).
As for the previous Baseline game, applying Binmore’s theory to the above
Entrance game predicts that, if the players make their decision behind the veil of
ignorance, then they will select strategy (In,B;B). In fact, as shown in Tables
5.20 and 5.21, both players selecting strategy (In,B;B) is better than both players
selecting any other strategy.
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As a main result, this analysis of both the Baseline game and the Entrance
game when played behind the veil of ignorance provides evidence showing that
social ties induce people to use the original position to make their decision, which
has for effect to remove the rate of miscoordination in both games.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that this theory is consistent with the exper-
imental data about the subjects’ beliefs from Section 5.4.2. In fact, this analysis
shows that social ties do not only reinforce the use of normative thinking, they
also allow to replace individualistic behavior with fair behavior: indeed, behind
the veil of ignorance, the only problem an individual faces is to figure out what is
the right thing to do for the group.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented an economic experiment of the coordination
games previously introduced in Chapter 4. As a main result of this study, we
provided some empirical evidence revealing that stronger social ties help people
coordinate and promote the welfare of the group. More specifically, our observa-
tions support the proposed model of social ties from Chapter 4 (see Section 4.2),
while rejecting other relevant theories of social preferences (see Section 4.5). Fur-
thermore, we have shown that social ties allow to promote a sense of fairness in
the context of the above games, thereby driving people to make their decision as
if they were unable to distinguish their own identity from that of their partner (cf.
Rawls’ original position). This analysis therefore suggests that social ties can be
used as a device that leads the players to bridge the gap between individualistic
behavior (when decreasing social ties) and fair behavior (when increasing social
ties), as specified by our model of social ties from the previous chapter.
Moreover, this experimental analysis shows that one’s behavior is affected by
both one’s expected (subjective) social tie with another individual, as well as one’s
actual (objective) social tie. More precisely, we observed that optimistic people
who overestimate the strength of their social ties tend to behave more fairly by
cooperating with others, whereas pessimistic people who underestimate the value
of their social ties do not identify with any group and therefore fail to coordinate
in the above games. Such a result clearly suggests that being self-regarding does
not always pay off, especially in the context of coordination games such as those
introduced here. In fact, in this type of social interactions, it is in one’s own
best interest to be socially tied with other individuals, as a means to eventually
coordinate and maximize profits.
It is also worth mentioning that this study also indicates that there exists no
absolute “zero” on the continuous scale of a social tie between two individuals:
we indeed observe that when interacting with university students (which can be
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assumed to be almost perfect strangers), some subjects already choose to cooperate
as if they were socially tied with those people. In this case, our definition of social
ties from the previous chapter (see Section 4.1) provides a sound explanation for
this behavior: the fact that they share the property of (1) being a student, and (2)
from the same university may indeed create a sufficiently strong social connection
that induces cooperation.
However, while this simple study validates our model of social ties in the context
of simple two player games, it does clearly not allow to explain how social ties affect
individuals’ behavior in larger societies that involve more complex types of social
interactions (i.e., with possibly more than two individuals). We therefore attempt





“In the great non-zero-sum games of history, if you’re




“It has been more profitable for us to bind together in
the wrong direction than to be alone in the right one.”
— Nassim Nicholas Taleb
The Black Swan (2007)
Many everyday tasks require individuals to act collectively and to coordinate for
the pursuit of a common goal. Examples include musicians from an orchestra who
need to act together in a specific way in order to play some intended symphony,
or players from a soccer team who have to coordinate with each other so that
they can eventually score a goal. Even among other tasks that could be done by
a single individual, many would be achieved more effectively through teamwork,
e.g., painting a house, carrying an heavy object. A common property of all these
situations is that each individual in the team acts as a team member and intends
to do his part in the joint action of the team. Collective intentionality has been,
through the last decades, a central topic in social philosophy (see, e.g., Bratman
[1992, 1993]; Searle [1990]; Tuomela and Miller [1988]) as well as in economics (see,
e.g., Bacharach [1999, 2006]; Sugden [1993, 2000]).
The general aim of this chapter is to use game theory to bridge the gap between
individually egoistic behavior and social cooperation in the context of strategic
interactions. For this purpose, we provide an analysis of a central theory from
the economics literature, which explains how agents, either human or artificial,
can manage to solve coordination problems in the context of a joint activity:
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Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning. After discussing the limitations of this
theory in modeling some intuitive social behavior, we present a generalization of
the model of social ties introduced in Chapter 4, and show the various advantages
such a model offers compared to Bacharach’s theory, especially in the context of
social interactions in which different competing groups may coexist.
More precisely, the study we present here focuses on the central concept of
group identification, which often allows to uncover the ‘focal point’ required to
solve a given coordination problem (Schelling [1960]). For example, consider two
individuals, say Alice and her partner Bob who have to paint their room together.
Let us assume that they can paint it either in blue or in green and that they both
prefer to paint it in green. Moreover, each of them is responsible for buying a tin
of paint. Which color of paint will Alice and Bob buy? The solution in which each
of them buys a tin of green paint becomes the ‘focal point’ of their coordination
problem, because it satisfies their common goal, i.e., to paint the room in green.
Therefore, if Alice and Bob reason as team members, they will likely coordinate
on the joint action of buying two tins of green paint, which is the most useful for
the whole team.
However, we argue, through this chapter, that such binary group identification
(i.e., either one identifies with a group or not), as it is assumed by Bacharach’
theory of team reasoning, is not sufficient to model real-life situations where some
individuals identify with a given group up to a certain degree: as an example, one
may indeed be torn between identifying with a group of friends and identifying
with a group of family members. We therefore show how our proposed theory of
social ties allows to efficiently deal with this kind of dilemmas.
6.1 Problems of co-operation
This section is devoted to present the most well-known type of two player games
that involves co-operation, as an illustration of the failure of classical economic
theories to predict the behavior actually followed by human beings. A general
form of this sort of games is depicted in Figure 6.1, in which case each player
(Alice and Bob as respectively the row player and the column player) can either
cooperate (i.e., play C) or defect (i.e., play D). The main obvious characteristics
of this game is that both players can then obtain the same payoffs if and only if
they manage to coordinate with each other (i.e., they each get x or y depending
on whether they both play C or D).
However, another important property of the game in Figure 6.1 is that the
value of the payoff z can provide some incentives for each individual to defect. In
fact, Table 6.1 shows that the game in Figure 6.1 can refer to three different well










Figure 6.1: Game involving co-operation (with 0 < y < x and 0 ≤ z)
Constraints on z Game classifications
z = 0 Hi-Lo matching game
y ≤ z < x Stag-Hunt game
x ≤ z Prisoner’s Dilemma
Table 6.1: Various classifications of games
In the particular case of the Hi-Lo matching game (i.e., when z = 0), one can
detect no incentive for each individual to defect. However, as already shown in
Chapter 2, the interesting observation is that traditional game theory interprets
it as a social dilemma where no prediction can be made under the assumption of
rationality (the game indeed yields two distinct Nash equilibria, i.e., (C,C) and
(D,D)), although it is shown in Bacharach [2006]; Colman et al. [2008] that people
largely coordinate on the most rewarding outcome for both players, i.e., (C,C).
Concerning the Stag-Hunt game (i.e., when y ≤ z < x), also known as the
“assurance game” or the “trust dilemma”, although it appears to have the same
theoretical properties as the Hi-Lo game (the game then yields the same two Nash
equilibria), it introduces some incentives for defecting: in fact, playing C involves
a risk of losing if the other player defects, whereas playing D ensures a payoff of
at least y > 0. However, as for the Hi-Lo game, experimental evidence has shown
that people largely cooperate by playing C even if it is risky to do so (Van Huyck
et al. [1990]).
Finally, the situation characterized by the Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e., when x ≤
z) increases further the above incentives so that cooperating now becomes strictly
dominated by defecting for both players (i.e., (D,D) then becomes the unique Nash
equilibrium). Yet, various experimental studies have also shown a non-negligible
cooperation rate (of reaching the (C,C) outcome) in such scenarios, which varies
between 30-40% (see, e.g., Shafir and Tversky [1992]).
In order to formally analyze such social dilemmas in more details, let us first
consider a classical strategic game structure G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉
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as defined in Definition 2.1 from Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.1). We denote SJ =∏
i∈J Si the set of joint strategies performed by every group of agents J ∈ 2Agt∗
where 2Agt∗ = 2Agt\{∅}. For notational convenience, throughout this chapter we
write S instead of SAgt.
Moreover, for every agent i ∈ Agt, we define Group(i) to be the set of all
groups from Agt that include i:
Group(i) = {J ∈ 2Agt∗|i ∈ J}
One might then wonder whether current theories of social preferences proposed
in the field of behavioral economics (see Fehr and Schmidt [2006] for an overview
of these theories) are able to explain empirical evidences of mutual cooperation in
the previous types of games (i.e., coordinating on (C,C)). The main idea of these
theories consist in ‘transforming’ the agents’ utility in the original game on the
basis of some social feature such as altruism, inequity aversion or fairness in order
to obtain a new game in which equilibria can be computed using classical solution
concepts (e.g., Nash equilibrium).
The theory of social preferences that seems to be most relevant to the above
games relies on the notion of fairness. In Charness and Rabin [2002], Charness &
Rabin indeed propose a specific form of social preferences they call quasi-maximin
preferences. In their model, a collective payoff is computed by means of a social
welfare function which corresponds to a weighted combination of Rawls’ maximin
and of the utilitarian welfare function (i.e., summation of individual payoffs) (see
[Charness and Rabin, 2002, p. 851]).
Formally, for every strategy profile s ∈ S, according to Charness & Rabin’s
fairness model, the utility function of player i ∈ {Alice, Bob} is given by:
UFi (s) = (1− λ) · Ui(s) + λ · SWi(s)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] and SWi(s) defines the social welfare function as follows:
SWi(s) = δ · min
j∈Agt




where δ ∈ [0, 1].
The two parameters λ and δ can be interpreted as follows: λ measures how
much player i cares about pursuing the social welfare versus his own self-interest.
In the social welfare function, δ measures the degree of concern for helping the
worst-off person versus maximizing the total social surplus. Setting δ = 1 corre-
sponds to the pure “maximin” principle (or “Rawlsian” criterion), while setting
δ = 0 corresponds to pure utilitarianism (aiming at global efficiency).
However, although such a model allows to explain why people choose to co-
operate in the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it remains indecisive in the
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case of the Hi-Lo game or the Stag-Hunt game. In fact, in those games, such a
model appears to be of no help because, for any possible value of δ and λ, the
two strategy profiles (C,C) and (D,D) remain Nash equilibria in the resulting
transformed game. As a consequence, similarly to the original game considering
pure self-regarding agents, no prediction can be made.
Since current theories of social preferences are not sufficient to explain the
behavior observed in situations like the Hi-Lo game and the Stag-Hunt game, we
provide through the next sections some alternative theories that allow to correctly
model and explain such observations1. As those theories refer to the concept of
collective utility, let us first extend our previous formalization of a strategic game
from Definition 2.1 in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.1) so that it incorporates the
group utility function.
Definition 6.1 (Game with Group Utility) A strategic game with group util-
ity is a tuple G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}〉 where:
• Agt = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents;
• Si defines the set of strategies for agent i;
• UJ : ∏i∈Agt Si → R is a total payoff function mapping every strategy profile
to some real number for some team J .
For notational convenience, throughout this chapter, we write Ui instead of
U{i}.
While nothing specifies how to compute each group utility in Definition 6.1, one
can define those in terms of individual payoffs. As some examples, the following
principles can be considered, which are well known to be the most realistic.
For every J ∈ 2Agt∗ and every s ∈ S, let us define:
• classical utilitarianism (global efficiency): UJ(s) = ∑i∈J Ui(s)
• Rawlsian criterion of fairness (maximin principle): UJ(s) = mini∈J Ui(s)
Note, however, that such a collective utility function may however be defined
differently.
1Other theories of social preferences such as altruism (Levine [1998]), reciprocity (Rabin
[1993b]), and inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt [2006]) are not discussed here because they
simply reduce the game from Figure 6.1 to another type of Hi-Lo matching game.
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6.2 Team reasoning
In this section, we consider the well-known concept of team reasoning, which was
first introduced by Bacharach in Bacharach [1999] in order to explain observed
behavior in the game from Section 6.1. In order to interpret the intuitive behavior
in such games, some theorists have indeed proposed to incorporate new modes
of reasoning into game theory. For instance, starting from the work of Gilbert
(Gilbert [1989]) and Reagan (Regan [1980]), some economists and logicians (e.g.,
Lorini [2011]) have studied team reasoning (also called we-mode reasoning) as an
alternative to the best-response reasoning assumed in traditional game theory, also
called I-mode reasoning (Bacharach [1999]; Colman et al. [2008]; Sugden [2000]).
Team-directed reasoning is the kind of reasoning that people use when they per-
ceive themselves as acting as members of a group or team (Sugden [2000]). That
is, when an agent i engages in team reasoning, he identifies himself as a member of
a group of agents J and conceives J as a unit of agency acting as a single entity in
pursuit of some collective objective. A team reasoning player acts for the interest
of his group by identifying a strategy profile that maximizes the collective payoff
of the group, and then, if the maximizing strategy profile is unique, by choosing
the action that forms a component of this strategy profile.
6.2.1 Definitions
In order to formally illustrate Bacharach’s original theory introduced in Bacharach
[1999], let us extend the strategic game defined by Definition 6.1 in Section 6.1, and
consider what Bacharach calls an unreliable team interaction (UTI) structure, that
is, a game structure in which there is a probability that a given player identifies
with a team and chooses the action which maximizes the team benefit (i.e., the
player plays in the we-mode), and another probability that the player is a self-
interested agent who tries to maximize his own benefit (i.e., the player plays in the
I-mode)1. In this sense, the interaction is “unreliable” because there is no certainty
that a player will reason and act as a team member.
Definition 6.2 (Unreliable Team Interaction) An unreliable team interaction
structure is a tuple UTI = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉
where:
• 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}〉 is a strategic game with group utility
according to Definition 6.1;
1As a matter of simplicity in our model, we assume the absence of any outside signal ob-
servable by the players, since it does not appear to be relevant to our study (such signals are
considered in Bacharach’s original UTI structure from Bacharach [1999]).
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• Ωi is a probability distribution over the set of all possible groups Group(i).
Intuitively, for any agent i ∈ Agt, Group(i) is the set of groups agent i may
identify with. For every J ∈ Group(i), Ωi(J) is the probability that agent i
identifies with team J (i.e., the probability that agent i reasons and acts as a
member of team J). In the definition of an UTI structure it is implicitly assumed
that an agent i identifies with a unique team at a given moment which can be
either the singleton {i}, which corresponds to agent i playing in the I-mode, or
some set of agents J ∈ Group(i) such that |J | > 1, which corresponds to agent i
playing in the we-mode.





Elements of Groups are denoted by g, g′, . . .. Given some group identification
state g ∈ Groups, we write gi (such that gi ∈ Group(i)) to denote the element of
g corresponding to agent i (i.e., the group agent i identifies with according to g).
The probability distribution Ω over the set Groups is defined as Ω = ∏i∈Agt Ωi.
Given some 〈J1, . . . , Jn〉 ∈ Groups, Ω(〈J1, . . . , Jn〉) is the probability that “agent
1 identifies with team J1 and agent 2 identifies with team J2 and... and agent n
identifies with team Jn”.
In Bacharach [1999], Bacharach further introduces the notion of a protocol,
which consists in specifying, for every agent i and every group J agent i may
identify with, the action that i should play when identifying with J . Formally, a
protocol α is a function mapping every agent i ∈ Agt and every team J ∈ Group(i)
agent i may identify with to a strategy si ∈ Si for agent i. Given J ∈ 2Agt∗ and
i ∈ J , α(i, J) ∈ Si therefore defines agent i’s strategy when identifying with the
group J . The set of all such protocols is denoted by ∆. Moreover, given a protocol
α ∈ ∆ and a group J ∈ 2Agt∗, we write αJ = ∏i∈J α(i, J) to denote the strategy
of group J specified by protocol α (i.e., αJ ∈ SJ). In this case, α{i} is nothing but
the action that agent i should play according to protocol α, when reasoning in the
I-mode.
Given the set of agents Agt = {1, . . . , n} and the probability distribution Ω on
the set of group identification states Groups, one can then express the expected




Ω(g) · UJ(α(1, g1), . . . , α(n, gn))
Intuitively, EVJ(α) measures how much utility team J can expect from the
protocol α.
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Furthermore, given two protocols α and β, and a group J ∈ 2Agt∗, we write
αJ ·β−J to denote the protocol such that: (1) for all i ∈ J , αJ ·β−J(i, J) = α(i, J),
and (2) for all H ∈ 2Agt∗ such that H 6= J , and for all i ∈ H, αJ · β−J(i,H) =
β(i,H).
This allows us to express the concept of an UTI equilibrium as follows:
Definition 6.3 (UTI Equilibrium) A protocol α is an UTI equilibrium if and
only if:
∀J ∈ 2Agt∗, ∀β ∈ ∆, EVJ(βJ · α−J) ≤ EVJ(αJ · α−J)
In order to illustrate the above UTI structure, let us consider the game pre-
sented in Section 6.1. The corresponding structure UTI = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈
2Agt∗}, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉 can therefore be defined as follows:
• Agt = {a, b} where a and b respectively stand for Alice and Bob;
• Sa = Sb = {C,D};
S{a,b} = {(D,D), (D,C), (C,D), (C,C)};
• The individual payoff functions are defined according to Figure 6.1 (where
0 < y < x):
Ua(C,C) = Ub(C,C) = x;
Ua(D,D) = Ub(D,D) = y;
Ua(D,C) = Ub(C,D) = z;
Ua(C,D) = Ub(D,C) = 0;
The collective payoff function may then be freely defined according to Rawls’
criterion of fairness 1, e.g.,
U{a,b}(C,C) = x;
U{a,b}(D,D) = y;
U{a,b}(C,D) = U{a,b}(D,C) = 0;
• for every i ∈ {a, b}, Ωi is defined as follows:
Ωi({a, b}) = 1− ωi
Ωi({i}) = ωi
where ωi and 1 − ωi respectively characterize the probability that player i
reasons in the we-mode / I-mode.
In the case of the preceding game, let us consider the protocol α such that
α(a, {a}) = α(b, {b}) = α(a, {a, b}) = α(b, {a, b}) = C. Protocol α simply specifies
that both players choose strategy C independently of reasoning in the I-mode or
in the we-mode. Similarly, let us consider the alternative protocol β such that
1One could similarly use the classical utilitarian criterion as the collective payoff function.
153
β(a, {a}) = β(b, {b}) = D and β(a, {a, b}) = β(b, {a, b}) = C. In this case,
protocol β specifies that both players choose strategy D when reasoning in the
I-mode and choose strategy C when reasoning in the we-mode.
Table 6.2 then illustrates the conditions under which either of the above proto-
cols (α or β) is the unique UTI equilibrium in the above UTI structure, depending
on the value of payoff z and the group identification parameters ωa and ωb.
collective payoff Conditions Conditions Unique
functions on z on ωa and ωb UTI equilibria













y ≤ z < x max(ωa, ωb) > yx+y−z
x < z ≤ 2x 0 ≤ ωa, ωb ≤ 1 β
2x < z max(ωa, ωb) <
z/2−y
z−x−y
Table 6.2: Conditions for protocols α and β to be a unique UTI equilibrium
The main observation that can be made from Table 6.2 is that, whenever 0 ≤
z < x (e.g., in the Hi-Lo game or the Stag hunt game), for some sufficiently high
probability ωa or ωb that either agent a or b identifies as a member of team {a, b},
playing strategy C becomes the only optimal choice no matter whether a and b
actually reason in the I-mode or in the we-mode (cf. protocol α) and independently
of the collective payoff function (maximin or classical utilitarianism).
However, there exist some notable differences between using Rawls’ criterion
of fairness (maximin) or the principle of classical utilitarianism as the collective
payoff function whenever x ≤ z (e.g., in the Prisoner’s dilemma). In fact, for
some sufficiently high probability of identifying with the group (i.e., ωa and ωb are
sufficiently large), following Rawls’ criterion of fairness leads to β being the unique
UTI equilibrium whenever z ≥ x. On the other hand, when using the classical
utilitarianism criterion, the determination of a UTI equilibrium is more complex
as it relies on some stronger restriction on the value of z. Indeed, protocol β is
the unique optimal solution only if mutual cooperation is the best outcome for the
group (i.e., when x < z < 2x), no matter the probability of each player identifying
with the group (if one identifies with the group, then one will always play C, else
one will always play D)1. In the particular case where there is no unique best
1Note that, whenever z = x, then there exists no unique UTI equilibrium: both protocols α
and β are UTI equilibria.
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outcome for the group (i.e., when z > 2x), if both players sufficiently identify with
the group and ωa = ωb, then there exists no unique UTI equilibrium ((C,D) and
(D,C) become equally good for both players).
Let us now give a more precise interpretation of a team reasoning structure in
terms of a classical strategic form game.
Definition 6.4 (Induced Strategic Game) Given an unreliable team interac-
tion structure UTI = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉, the cor-
responding induced strategic game is a tuple Guti = 〈Agt′, {S ′J |J ∈ Agt′}, {U ′J |J ∈
Agt′}〉 where:
• Agt′ = 2Agt∗;
• for each J ∈ Agt′, S ′J = SJ ;
• for each J ∈ Agt′, U ′J is the utility function on S ′ such that
U ′J(s) = EVJ(α)
where α ∈ ∆ is the protocol such that, for every H ∈ Agt′, αH = sH .
According to Definition 6.4, every UTI structure induce a strategic form game
with a player for every coalition in the original game. For example, in the above
UTI structure for the game from Section 6.1, the induced strategic game would
include three players, i.e., Alice, Bob, and the team whose members are Alice and
Bob.
As already shown in Bacharach [1999], it is straightforward to demonstrate the
following proposition.
Proposition 6.2.1.1 Given an unreliable team interaction structure UTI = 〈Agt,
{Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉, the protocol α ∈ ∆ is an UTI equi-
librium if and only if the strategy profile s such that sJ = αJ for all J ∈ 2Agt∗ is a
Nash equilibrium in the strategic game Guti induced by UTI.
6.2.2 Limitations
Although Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning clearly allows to model complex
situations in which different competing coalitions may coexist, it has however some
limitations that we want to discuss here.
As pointed out in Section 6.2, Bacharach’s theory relies on the assumption
that every agent identifies with a unique team at a given time. This is a strong
assumption, as it prevents from modeling situations in which an agent plays as a
member of more than one group. To illustrate this, consider a scenario where one
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faces the dilemma between cooperating with a close friend, and cooperating with
a family member (assuming the friend and the family member cannot cooperate
with each other). In this case, Bacharach’s theory predicts that the individual
will choose over these two options, even though a more egalitarian solution might
exist that would satisfy equally all players (some concrete examples are discussed
in Sections 6.3.4 and Appendix C.2). This limitation is therefore particularly
relevant when modeling more flexible and heterogenous multiagent systems in
which different coalitions might be formed whose intersections are non-empty.
Another problem of the theory of team reasoning concerns the exogenous prob-
abilistic distributions Ωi in the definition of an UTI structure. In fact, it is not
completely clear how they should be interpreted. While such probabilities may de-
pend on some intrinsic features of the game such as the payoff structure, they may
also be determined by some pre-existent social relationships between the players.
Bacharach’s theory however remains vague regarding this issue.
Apart from the previous conceptual restrictions and ambiguities, the theory of
team reasoning has a technical limitation which lies in the complexity of the prob-
lem of computing equilibria in the context of teamwork by using Nash equilibrium
(see Proposition 6.2.1.1). In fact, as Definition 6.4 indicates, given a structure
UTI = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {U ′J |J ∈ 2Agt∗}, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉, the size of the set of
agent Agt′ in the game Guti induced by UTI is exponential in Agt, in particular
we have |Agt′| = 2|Agt| − 1. In other words, if one wants to use Nash equilibrium
in order to compute UTI equilibria, he has to increase exponentially the size of
the structure of interaction.
In the next section we present a generalization of our model of social ties from
Chapter 4 (see Section 4.2), which provides a simpler approach to group reasoning
and collective decision making. The interesting aspect of this model is that it
allows to compute equilibrium solutions in the context of collaborative activity
by using the concept of Nash equilibrium and without increasing the size of the
structure of interaction.
6.3 A theory of social ties
In this section, we introduce a new model that characterizes well the agents’ behav-
ior in the presence of social ties. Such a model, which extends that from Section
4.2 in Chapter 4, aims at explaining social dilemmas as in the game from Section
6.1 by simply following the main idea on which theories of social preferences are
based (see, e.g., Charness and Rabin [2002]; Fehr and Schmidt [2006]), that is: (1)
performing some utility transformation in a given game, and then (2) of apply-
ing classical solution concepts from game theory (e.g., Nash equilibrium) in the
transformed game in order to find equilibria. Indeed, similarly to theories of social
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preferences, our starting assumption is that the existence of a social tie between
two individuals may have an impact on their utilities, in the sense that the utility
that an agent attaches to a given outcome may be affected by his social ties with
other agents. In the next section, we explain in detail how social ties may affect
an agent’s utility function.
6.3.1 Definitions
Let us introduce our social ties game, which extends the strategic game structure
presented in Definition 6.1 (see Section 6.1).
Definition 6.5 (Social Ties Game) A social ties game is a tuple ST = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈
Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉 where:
• 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}〉 is a strategic game with group utility
according to Definition 6.1;
• every ki is a total function ki : Group(i)→ [0, 1], such that:
C1 for every i ∈ Agt, ∑J∈Group(i) ki(J) = 1
C2 for all i, j ∈ J , ki(J) = kj(J)
Every parameter ki(J) in Definition 6.5 should be seen as a measure of the social
tie between agent i and group J given the current game context. In particular,
ki(J) measures the degree with which agent i identifies with group J . Setting
ki(J) to 0 corresponds to a non-existing tie between agent i and group J (i.e., i
does not identify with J), whereas setting ki(J) to 1 means that agent i is strongly
tied with group J (i.e., i strongly identifies with J). Moreover, note that ki({i})
stands for agent i’s measure of individualism.
According to Constraint C1, an agent’s identifications with different groups
sum up to one, i.e., an agent can neither fully identify with different groups, nor
identify with no group at all (in the most extreme case, the agent i is maximally
individualistic in the sense that ki({i}) = 1). Through Constraint C2, we assume
that a social tie is restricted to be bilateral, which can be interpreted as follows:
the degree of the social tie with some group J is the same for every member of J .
The following definition introduces the notion of Social Ties utility function,
i.e., how an agent’s utility is affected by his social ties.
Definition 6.6 (Social Ties Utility) For every strategy profile s ∈ S, the So-








In Definition 6.6, every s−J ∈ S−J denotes a joint strategy for the coalition
Agt\J (i.e., S−J = SAgt\J), and UJ(s) stands for group J ’s utility function, as it
is described in Definition 6.1.
The general idea of our model, which is formally expressed by the preceding
Social Ties utility function USTi (s), is that, in the presence of a strong social tie
between an individual i and some group J ∈ Group(i), agent i will be motivated
to maximize the benefit of group J represented by collective utility UJ , assuming
that agents in J are also motivated to maximize the benefit of group J . Note that,
in this case, agent i does not face a full strategic problem anymore. Indeed, the
utility of the strategy profile s for agent i becomes independent of the strategies
of members of group H = J\{i} (i.e., sH). Therefore, agent i only needs to reason
strategically regarding the choices of every player outside of J , and choose the
action from the strategy profile which maximizes group J ’s utility.
As in the previous section, let us now interpret the above social ties game in
terms of a classical strategic form game.
Definition 6.7 (Induced Strategic Game) Given a social ties game ST =
〈Agt,
{Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉, the corresponding induced strategic
game is a tuple GST = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {U ′i |i ∈ Agt}〉 where, for all i ∈ Agt
and all s ∈ S:
U ′i(s) = USTi (s)
As a concrete example of such a social ties game, let us again consider the type
of interactions illustrated in Figure 6.1 from Section 6.1. Let us first restate the
Social Ties utility function from Definition 6.6, which can be simplified as follows
when applied to any two player game. For any i, j ∈ Agt such that i 6= j, for every
s ∈ S:
USTi (s) = (1− kij) · Ui(s) + kij ·max
s′j∈Sj
U{i,j}(si, s′j)
where kij stands for ki({i, j}).
Note that this simplification simply corresponds to the previous utility function
introduced in Section 4.2 from Chapter 4. Starting from the matrix payoff from
Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 represents the corresponding transformed utilities for each
player based on Rawls’ maximin principle as the group utility function, and where
an extremely strong social tie exists between Alice and Bob (i.e., kab = kba = 1).
In this case, it is easy to show, through iterated elimination of strictly domi-
nated strategies, that the only Nash equilibrium resulting from this transformation
is (C,C). One should note that each player’s choice becomes independent of the
opponent’s choice. In other words, the initially strategic problem becomes a clas-










Figure 6.2: Transformed utilities (with kab = kba = 1)
generally, Table 6.3 depicts the predictions that can be made in this game depend-
ing on the value of z and social tie parameters kab and kba.
collective payoff Conditions Conditions Unique
functions on z on k = kab = kba Nash equilibria




x+ y ≤ z k >z−xz−y
0 ≤ z ≤ 2y k > y2x−y
classical 2y ≤ z < 2x k >
y
2x+y−z
utilitarianism and k >z−xx
2x ≤ z 0 ≤ k < 1 (D,D)
Table 6.3: Notable predictions in the strategic game induced by ST
The main observation one can make from Table 6.3 is that, as long as there
exists a unique best outcome for the group in the above game (i.e., whenever
0 ≤ z < 2x), strategy C strictly dominates D in the context of some sufficiently
strong social tie between both players. However, one should note that, as for
team reasoning (see Table 6.2 in Section 6.2), some differences appear between
the predictions made by the two types of collective payoff functions. The most
notable distinction concerns the particular case where there exist conflicting col-
lective goals (i.e., when z ≥ 2x, (C,D) and (D,C) become equally best outcomes
for the group). In this case, under the assumption of the maximin principle, strong
social ties still lead to mutual cooperation. On the other hand, when using the
classical utilitarianism criterion, strong social ties allow for the unique most opti-




The following theorem demonstrates the ability of social ties to converge towards
playing a Nash equilibrium solution.
Theorem 6.1 For any strategic game with group utility G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt},
{UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}〉, there exists a social ties game ST = 〈G, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉 whose
induced strategic game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
One can note, through the proof of Theorem 6.1 in the Appendix, that there
exist games with group utility G that do not yield a unique Nash equilibrium in
the strategic game induced by any social ties game ST = 〈G, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉. In
this case, as several distinct equilibria are unable to make any clear prediction,
one should note that exploiting the group utility as done by such a ST game
therefore becomes irrelevant1. However, notice that, for any game with group
utility G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}〉 such that argmaxs′∈SUAgt(s′) is a
singleton (i.e., the group Agt does not have conflicting goals), there exists a social
ties game ST = 〈G, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉 such that ki(Agt) = 1 for every i ∈ Agt, and
the game induced by ST has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
6.3.3 Relationship with team reasoning
Let us now provide a comparative analysis of the social ties game with the previous
theory of team reasoning (see Section 6.2). For this purpose, we first present the
main advantage of our model of social ties over Bacharach’s theory regarding the
problem of gradual group identification. We then restrict the comparative analysis
of both models in the particular context of two-player games before extending it
to any n-player game such that n ≥ 2.
6.3.3.1 Gradual group identification
As already mentioned in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.8), Bacharach’s theory of team
reasoning and our model of social ties have an important difference that is worth
recalling here. While Bacharach’s theory assumes that an agent in a given strategic
setting reasons either in the I-mode or in the we-mode, our theory of social ties
assumes that an agent can be partially tied with a given group or team. In other
words, differently from Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning, our theory of social
ties allows to model a notion of partial identification with a group. As a result
of this difference, it appears that both game structures can disagree about the
predicted outcome.
1This remark also applies to the theory of team reasoning from the previous section.
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In order to illustrate this argument, let us formalize the simple two player dic-
tator game introduced in Section 4.8 from Chapter 4, which can be defined as the
strategic game with group utility G = 〈{i, j}, {Si, Sj}, {Ui, Uj, U{i,j}}〉. According
to G, player i can choose between three options, i.e., Si = {A,B,C}, and player
j is not facing any decision problem, i.e., Sj = {D}. In such a scenario, each
player’s payoff is determined uniquely from these strategies according to Table 6.4
(i.e., player j has no control over the outcome, which is uniquely determined by
player i). Note that the collective payoff function can then be computed both in
terms of global efficiency (i.e., sum of individual payoffs: U{i,j} = Ui(s) + Uj(s))
and in terms of the Rawlsian criterion of fairness (i.e., minimum of individual
payoffs: U{i,j} = min{Ui(s), Uj(s)}).
Player i’s option Payoffs
si ∈ Si Ui Uj U{i,j} = U{i,j} =Ui(s) + Uj(s) min(Ui(s), Uj(s))
A 8 0 8 0
B 5 7 12 5
C 7 4 11 4
Table 6.4: Simple dictator game
Applying team reasoning to this particular situation leads to the following
predictions: in any UTI structure UTI = 〈G, {Ωi,Ωj}〉, player i will play A if
reasoning in I-mode (i.e., player i is then self-regarding), and player i will play B
if reasoning in we-mode (i.e., player i then identifies with the group). As a con-
sequence, according to Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning (and independently
of whether the collective utility function is computed using the sum or the min),
player i will never happen to choose C: there indeed exists no UTI structure with
a probability distribution Ωi of identifying with the group (0 ≤ Ωi({i, j}) ≤ 1) that
can specify this outcome to occur (in either the I-mode, or in the we-mode). Note
that in any such UTI structure, player j’s mode of reasoning (through function
Ωj) is irrelevant to the determination of an equilibrium solution.
On the other hand, considering the same game through our model of social ties
leads to a different interpretation: in some social ties game ST = 〈G, {ki, kj}〉,
player i will select A if both players are extremely close to each other (e.g.,
ki({i, j}) = 1), and player i will select B if they instead are perfect strangers
(e.g., ki({i}) = 1). However, if both players are neither best friends nor perfect
strangers but, say, simple acquaintances (e.g., ki({i, j}) = ki({i}) = 0.5), then
player i will choose C, as a compromise between being self-regarding and group-
regarding. Indeed, one can easily prove that if ki({i, j}) = ki({i}) = 0.5, then
action C is the unique Nash equilibrium in the transformed game where utilities
161
are computed using Definition 6.6, both when the collective utility function is
computed using the sum and when it is computed using the min. In other words,
our model of social ties predicts that if player i partially identifies as a member
of group {i, j}, then he will choose option C. However, although this seems a
reasonable conclusion, it appears to be inconsistent with Bacharach’s theory of
team reasoning, as shown above. Note that a more detailed analysis of the game
from Table 6.4 is provided in Appendix C.2.
Furthermore, as already mentioned in Section 6.2.2, such a difference between
both game structures can be emphasized by considering more complex multiagent
systems that involve the formation of sub-coalitions whose intersections are non-
empty. A concrete illustration of such complex social interactions is provided in
Section 6.3.4.
6.3.3.2 Similarities in any two-player game
In the context of two-player games, let us first specify the various similarities that
can emerge when considering subclasses of the above models of team reasoning
and social ties. In order to do so, we then consider some binary interpretation of
those game structures, which can be defined as in Definitions 6.8 and 6.9.
Definition 6.8 (Binary UTI structure) A binary unreliable team interaction
BUTI is a structure UTI = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉
where there exists g ∈ Groups such that:
• for every i ∈ Agt, Ωi(gi) = 1;
• for all i, j ∈ Agt, we have that either gi = gj, or gi ∩ gj = ∅.
According to the BUTI structure, there is no uncertainty about which group
each agent identifies with. In such a structure, the concept of a protocol can be
reduced to a simple strategy profile, which therefore allows the comparison with
some ST game. Moreover, note that in this case, an agent identifies with a group
if and only if other members of that group also identify with it.
Definition 6.9 (Binary ST Game) A binary social ties game BST is a game
ST = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉 where:
• for every i ∈ Agt and every J ∈ Group(i), ki(J) ∈ {0, 1}.
Similarly, the BST game represents an extreme interpretation of the ST game
where every agent can only identify with a unique group.
Thus performing a detailed analysis of such binary two-player games can reveal
their similarities, as shown through Theorem 6.2.
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Theorem 6.2 Given a strategic game with group utility G = 〈{i, j}, {Si, Sj}, {Ui, Uj,
U{i,j}}〉 where argmaxs∈SU{i,j}(s) is a singleton, let BST = 〈G, {ki, kj}〉 be a bi-
nary social ties game, and BUTI = 〈G, {Ωi,Ωj}〉 a binary unreliable team inter-
action structure such that ki({i, j}) = kj({i, j}) = Ωi({i, j}) = Ωj({i, j}).
If s ∈ S and α ∈ ∆ are such that α{i,j} = (α{i}, α{j}) = s, then s is a
Nash equilibrium in the game induced by BST if and only if α is an UTI
equilibrium in BUTI.
Theorem 6.2 therefore indicates that binary versions of both game structures
can make the same predictions regarding the agents’ behavior in any two-player
game.
Moreover, one should note that the type of game that is considered in Theorem
6.2 is restrictive regarding what determines the best outcome of the group. In fact,
another common property that both of the above models share is their reliance
on the concept of collective goals. In an UTI structure as well as in a ST game,
the formation of a group implies that all members of this group seek to satisfy the
group’s objective, that is, they aim at reaching the highest possible payoff for the
group. However, it appears that, depending on the type of interactive situation
being considered, such a collective goal may not be clearly determined. As an
example, one may consider the two-player game in Figure 6.3, which corresponds







Figure 6.3: Battle of the Sexes
In the context of this game, it is straightforward to show that any UTI struc-
ture and any ST game will always be indecisive, no matter the type of group
identification involved. Such an observation is obviously justified by the fact that
the group made of the two players does not have a unique goal (i.e., both (U,D)
and (D,R) are equally good for the group according to either classical utilitari-
anism or the maximin principle). As a consequence, our theory of social ties and
Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning are simply unable to make any prediction
in such a game (note that Theorem 6.2 does not apply to games as in Figure 6.3).
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6.3.3.3 Further comparison in any n-player game
Let us now extend the previous analysis with considering more complex interactive
situations that involve more than two players.
We have demonstrated in Section 6.3.3.2 that both models UTI and ST face
the same limitation whenever some collective goals are conflicting in two-player
games. We now intend to show that, although this remark remains true, conflicting
collective goals are interpreted differently by the two theories.
As a means to emphasize this difference between our model of social ties and
bacharach’s theory of team reasoning, we define a restricted class of strategic games
with non-conflicting collective goals according to Definition 6.10.
Definition 6.10 (Game with Non-conflicting Collective Goals) A game with
non-
conflicting collective goals is a game with group utility G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {Ui|i ∈
Agt}〉 as defined in Definition 6.1, such that:
C3 for every J ∈ 2Agt∗ s.t. |J | > 1 and every s−J ∈ S−J , argmaxs′J∈SJUJ(s′J , s−J)
is a singleton.
In Definition 6.10, Constraint C3 simply ensures that no team can have multi-
ple conflicting goals at once. Note that this constraint indeed rules out interactive
situations such as the game in Figure 6.3.
Thus performing a detailed analysis of a binary n-player game can reveal their
equivalence under the previous constraint C3, as shown through Theorem 6.3.
Theorem 6.3 Given a strategic game with group utility G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt},
{UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}〉 that satisfies Constraint C3 from Definition 6.10, let BST =
〈G, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉 be a binary social ties game, and BUTI = 〈G, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉 a
binary unreliable team interaction structure such that, for every i ∈ Agt and every
J ∈ Group(i), ki(J) = Ωi(J).
If s ∈ S and α ∈ ∆ are such that, for every J ∈ 2Agt∗, αJ = sJ , then s is
a Nash equilibrium in the game induced by BST if and only if α is an UTI
equilibrium in BUTI.
Theorem 6.3 therefore generalizes Theorem 6.2 from Section 6.3.3.2 and shows
that binary versions of both game structures can make the same predictions re-
garding the agents’ behavior in any n-player game that satisfies Constraint C3.
However, the need for an additional constraint on the original game structure
G in Theorem 6.3 (i.e., Constraint C3) points out to another important concep-
tual difference concerning the type of transformation each model is based upon.
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Indeed, Bacharach’s concept of team reasoning relies on what he calls agency
transformation, which consists in conceiving the situation not as a decision mak-
ing problem for individual agents, but as a decision making problem for the group
as an agent. Alternatively, our concept of group identification relies on the idea
that social ties influence players’ utilities without interfering with their type of
reasoning (i.e., they may then apply the classical principle of rationality to such
transformed utilities).
As a means to illustrate the different predictions that can be made by our theory
of social ties and by Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning whenever Constraint
C3 from Definition 6.10 is removed, let us consider the three player game depicted
in Table 6.5.
Actions Utilities
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
A A A 5 5 0
A A B 5 5 0
A B A 0 0 0
A B B 0 0 0
B A A 4 4 4
B A B 0 0 5
B B A 5 5 0
B B B 3 3 3
Table 6.5: A three-player coordination game
One can indeed observe from the game in Table 6.5 that the group made of
player 1 and player 2 appears to have conflicting goals if player 3 chooses A, that
is, both (A,A,A) and (B,B,A) are equally best outcomes for group {1, 2}. In
this case, considering an UTI structure depicting a strong group identification
with group {1, 2} (i.e., Ω1({1, 2}) = Ω2({1, 2}) = 1) while player 3 is strictly
individualistic (i.e., Ω3({3}) = 1), Bacharach’s theory predicts that player 1 and
player 2 should both select option A. In fact, if player 3 chooses A, then both
player 1 and player 2 are indecisive between playing either (A,A) or (B,B) (both
strategies then yield the same collective payoff). However, in the case they play
(B,B), then player 3 would be better off selecting B. Consequently, the only
equilibrium solution that can be found in this game is for the team {1, 2} to
perform (A,A).
On the other hand, if considering the same scenario through a social ties game
(i.e., k1({1, 2}) = k2({1, 2}) = 1 and Ω3({3}) = 1), a different interpretation arises.
If player 3 chooses B, then the only optimal strategy for both player 1 and player
2 is to select A. However, if player 3 chooses A, then, as a result of being uncertain
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about what is the right thing to do for the group, both options A and B become
equally good for player 1 and player 2. Consequently, the group {1, 2} may come
to miscoordinate and play either (A,B) or (B,A): for example, player 1 may select
A, assuming that player 2 will aim at maximizing the benefit of the group by also
selecting A, while player 2 actually selects B, similarly assuming that player 1 will
aim at maximizing the benefit of the group by also selecting B. As a result, our
theory of social ties does not allow to predict a unique solution in this particular
configuration of social ties in the game from Table 6.5 (See Appendix C.4 for more
details).
More generally, this scenario illustrates the fact that, unlike Bacharach’s theory
of team reasoning, our theory of social ties does not rely on a strong notion of unity
between individuals. In fact, it assumes that individuals do not act as if they were
a single agent (which is implied by Bacharach’s concept of agency transformation),
but instead they act as separated entities that simply share a common goal.
Moreover, another consequence of the different types of transformation each
model relies on concerns the complexity for computing an equilibrium solution.
In fact, unlike for Bacharach’s UTI structures, ST games consider the standard
concept of a strategy profile, as in traditional game theory (UTI structures instead
consider protocols, as depicted in Section 6.2.1). As shown through Definition 6.7,
a consequence is that the strategic game GST induced by any social ties game ST
does not increase the complexity of computing the equilibrium solution, which is
indeed an important difference with Bacharach’s UTI structure: given a game
with group utility G, the game GST induced by any ST = 〈G, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉
only transforms the utility function of the original game G (the number of agents
remains unchanged here). Finding a Nash equilibrium in the game GST therefore
appears to be mathematically simpler than finding such a solution in the game
Guti induced by any UTI = 〈G, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉.
6.3.4 Illustration: the Three Musketeers game
Through this section, we present a concrete scenario that allows to illustrate the
formation of different coalitions whose intersections are non-empty, and its effect
on the each individual’s strategic behavior.
Let us consider a situation involving three individuals named Athos, Porthos,
and Aramis after Alexandre Dumas’s three Musketeers (from his famous histori-
cal novel titled “Les Trois Mousquetaires”). In this fictitious scenario, the three
Musketeers have been arrested by Cardinal Richelieu who suspects them to have
killed one of his most precious officers on the preceding evening. Richelieu reveals
to all Musketeers that he was provided with some evidence proving that:
• Athos is not directly responsible for the crime (i.e., the guilty individual is
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either Porthos or Aramis).
• Athos spent the preceding evening at another innocent Musketeer’s house.
• Porthos and Aramis do not know the exact location of each other’s house.
As an attempt to reveal who, among Porthos and Aramis, is guilty, he therefore
proposes to interrogate all Musketeers individually about their respective location
at the time of the crime: an individual is then considered guilty if he appears
to be the only one having spent the evening alone. In this case, he indicates to
all Musketeers that, if a guilty person is revealed, he will then be condemned
to a death sentence while the others will be freed immediately. Furthermore,
Richelieu also specifies that any detected lie will be severely punished by all three
individuals thereby facing the same death sentence (i.e., if at least two of the
Musketeers’ statements are inconsistent). Richelieu further indicates that if Athos
states that he spent the evening at his own house (which is suspected to be false)
and a guilty person is revealed, then he will still be freed but will lose his affiliation
with the Musketeers of the Guard while the other remaining innocent musketeer
will be promoted as the new captain of the Musketeers. On the other hand, in
the particular case where all three individuals similarly state that they spent the
evening together at Athos’s house (i.e., no lie is detected and no guilty person is
revealed), then they will all be held equally responsible and will consequently have
to equally serve some time in jail. In the meantime, the Cardinal admits that,
if all individuals indicate having spent the evening alone at their own respective
house, he will not have enough evidence to convict any of them on the principal
charge. In this case, while all individuals will then be released, they will simply
lose their affiliation with the Musketeers of the Guard.
A formal representation of this scenario is depicted in Table 6.6. Actions A, B,
and C stand respectively for “spending the evening at Porthos’s house”, “spending
the evening at Aramis’s house”, and “spending the evening at Athos’s house”.
Note that spending the evening at an individual i’s home naturally implies the
presence of i there. Any statement that contradicts this principle will therefore be
considered as a lie by the Cardinal. We then assign, for each Musketeer, a payoff
of 6 for an immediate release along with becoming the captain of the Musketeers of
the Guard, a payoff of 5 for a simple immediate release (without any promotion),
a payoff of 4 for an immediate release along with the loss of affiliation with the
Musketeers of the Guard , a payoff of 3 for a prison sentence, and a payoff of 0 for
a death sentence.
One should note that the game in Figure 6.6 may be considered as a combina-
tion of the simple games presented in Section 6.1. In fact, one can observe that the
interaction between Athos and Porthos is similar to the Hi-Lo game. Similarly,
this remark also applies to the type of interaction existing between Athos and
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Actions Payoffs
Athos Porthos Aramis Athos Porthos Aramis
A A B 5 5 0
A A C 5 5 0
A C B 0 0 0
A C C 0 0 0
B A B 5 0 5
B A C 0 0 0
B C B 5 0 5
B C C 0 0 0
C A B 4 4 4
C A C 4 0 6
C C B 4 6 0
C C C 3 3 3
Table 6.6: The Three Musketeers game
Aramis. Moreover, whenever Athos plays C, then the interaction between Porthos
and Aramis simply corresponds to a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
All along the following cases, we assume that the collective group utility func-
tion is based on the Rawlsian criterion of fairness described in Section 6.1.
Let us first assume that the players are purely self-interested, that is, for every
i ∈ {Athos, Porthos, Aramis}, ki({i}) = 1 in the corresponding social ties game.
In this case, the game depicted in Table 6.6 yields the following three distinct Nash
equilibria in pure strategy:
• (A,A, ·): Athos and Porthos both play A (Aramis’s action is irrelevant here);
• (B,B, ·): Athos and Aramis both play B (as before, Aramis’s action is also
irrelevant here);
• (C,C,C): Athos, Porthos, and Aramis all play C.
As a result of having multiple equilibria, no reasonable prediction can be made
regarding each individual’s choice here.
However, according to Dumas’s original story, those Musketeers are considered
to be inseparable friends who live by the motto “one for all, and all for one”. This
interpretation can therefore imply that strong social ties exist between them (i.e.,
for every i ∈ {Athos, Porthos, Aramis}, ki({Athos, Porthos, Aramis}) = 1 in the
social ties game) and therefore all players identify with the same unique team. In
this particular case, the unique Nash equilibrium that results is (C,A,B) where
all Musketeers maximize the group’s preferences.
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On the other hand, other fictional but realistic scenarios that differ from the
previous situations could also be considered. For example, one may assume that
Athos and Porthos are still very good friends, but both of them strongly dislike
Aramis. Intuitively, this implies that Athos and Porthos make their own coalition
that competes with Aramis (i.e., for every i ∈ {Athos, Porthos}, ki({Athos, Porthos}) =
1 and kAramis({Aramis, i}) = 0 in the social ties game). As a result, the unique
Nash equilibrium in the game induced by the corresponding social ties game then
becomes (A,A, ·), that is, Athos and Porthos should both select A, independently
of Aramis’s action. Following the same way of reasoning, assuming that Porthos is
isolated by the two others who form a coalition (i.e., for every i ∈ {Athos,Aramis},
ki({Athos,Aramis}) = 1 and kPorthos({Porthos, i}) = 0 in the social ties game),
then the unique solution would similarly become (B,B, ·).
Finally, let us consider the most illustrative situation in the above game that
consists in Athos being extremely close to both Porthos and Aramis while the
latter individuals are extremely weakly tied with each other. Intuitively, it is
clear that nobody should then identify with the whole group because Porthos
and Aramis are not willing to collaborate with each other (i.e., for every i ∈
{Athos, Porthos, Aramis}, ki({Athos, Porthos, Aramis}) = 0). Instead, such a
scenario implies the existence of two different sub-coalitions whose intersection is
non-empty: one coalition is made of Athos and Porthos whereas the other is made
of Athos and Aramis (i.e., for every i ∈ {Porthos, Aramis}, kAthos({Athos, i}) =
0.5 and ki({Porthos, Aramis}) = 0 in the social ties game). In this case, our the-
ory specifies that, while Athos will aim at equally satisfying both of these teams,
Porthos and Aramis will value their own respective sub-coalition exactly as much as
they value their self-interest (i.e., for every i ∈ {Porthos, Aramis}, ki({i}) = 0.5
in the social ties game). Yet in this case, in spite of the obvious lack of unity ex-
isting among the three Musketeers (i.e., no individual will identify with the largest
group), our theory of social ties specifies that the unique equilibrium solution is for
all individuals to select C, which illustrates another important difference in inter-
pretation that exists between our social ties game and Bacharach’s UTI structure.
In fact, it can be shown that there exists no UTI structure based on this game
that uniquely specifies that Athos should play C under the assumption that iden-
tification with the largest group is negligible (i.e., when all players do not identify
with the largest group as much as they identify with another sub-coalition). More
specifically, whenever Athos is torn between satisfying group {Athos, Porthos}
and satisfying group {Athos,Aramis}, then Bacharach’s theory of team reason-
ing predicts that he will play either A or B, which is clearly counter-intuitive. A
more detailed mathematical analysis underlying this distinction can be found in
Appendix C.5.
As a main result, the analysis of this game simply illustrates the way in which
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social ties can be used as some equilibrium selection device: indeed, we have shown
that, in this particular situation, a different equilibrium solution is predicted for
each type of social ties.
6.4 A theory of empathetic preferences
In this section, we discuss another alternative theory that supports the intuition
behind our model of social ties from the previous section: Binmore’s theory of
empathetic preferences (Binmore [1994, 1998, 2005]).
According to such a theory, the concept of empathizing with some individual(s)
simply corresponds to making a decision as if being in the so-called “original po-
sition”, as introduced in Rawls’s theory of justice (Rawls [1971]). The original
position is an ideal situation in which agents have to make a collective agreement
about the fundamental principles of justice defining the society. The main dis-
tinguishing feature of this original position is the so-called “veil of ignorance”,
behind which every agent is assumed to be deprived of all knowledge about his
personal identity and characteristics so that he imagines himself to possibly be
in any player’s position. The veil of ignorance is conceived by Rawls as a device
which insures impartiality of judgment. In fact, if the agents do not know who
they are and under which circumstances they will be acting in the future, they will
be more prone to choose principles of justice supporting the entire society rather
than those supporting a single agent (or a minority of agents).
However, in order to use this original position, Binmore argues that an agent
must be equipped with some empathetic preferences, which consist in combining
his actual own preferences with his preferences when imagining himself to be in the
other agents’ positions. In other words, an individual must be able to evaluate the
options available to him when identifying with any player (including himself). As
an example of such empathetic preferences, Alice may have to compare eating an
apple while being herself with eating an orange while being Bob. In this case, Bin-
more points out that, when projecting herself to be in Bob’s position, Alice must
not consider her own preferences, she must instead imagine herself while having
Bob’s preferences: if Bob prefers to eat an apple rather than to eat an orange,
then Alice should share this preference when putting herself in Bob’s position,
even though she might herself prefer to eat an orange rather than to eat an apple.
If making a decision based on such an interpersonal comparison of preferences,
Alice is then said to empathize with Bob 1.
1It is worth noting that, when empathizing with Bob, Alice must always separate her pref-
erences as being herself from her preferences as being Bob. According to Binmore in Binmore
[1994, 2005], if Alice identifies so strongly with Bob that she forgets her own preferences (as
being herself), then she is instead said to sympathize with Bob.
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Furthermore, Binmore justifies the natural development of such empathetic
preferences by the obvious need for some equilibrium selection mechanism in many
interactive situations that regularly occur in human societies. In order to formally
illustrate to what extent such preferences could be used to reach cooperation (e.g.,
in the game in Figure 6.1 from Section 6.1), let us first define a game with empa-
thetic preferences by extending the notion of strategic game as defined in Definition
2.1 from Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.1).
Definition 6.11 (Game with Empathetic Preferences) A game with empa-
thetic preferences is a tuple EM = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}, {UEi,j|i, j ∈
Agt}〉 where:
• 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}〉 is a strategic game as defined in Definition
2.1 from Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.1);
• UEi,j : S → R is a total function defining agent i’s empathetic utility for being
agent j such that:
C4 there exists α ∈ R∗+ and β ∈ R such that, for every s ∈ S, UEi,j(s) =
α× Uj(s) + β.
For any strategy profile s ∈ S, which may be interpreted as a social contract in
this game, and for any pair of players i, j ∈ Agt, UEi,j(s) represents the utility of s
for agent i when playing as if he was agent j (when i imagines himself to be agent
j). One should note that, because of Constraint C4, UEi,j(s) is simply a linear
transformation of Uj. Therefore for every s, s′ ∈ S, we have UEi,j(s) ≤ UEi,j(s′) if
and only if Uj(s) ≤ Uj(s′). The special case where UEi,j = Uj for every j ∈ J simply
expresses agent i’s indifference for being either player within the group J ∈ 2Agt∗
(in other words, i empathizes equally with every member of J).
Binmore argues that an empathetic agent i (as if i was in the original position)
imagines himself to be in any other agent’s position and seeks to maximize the
utility function determined by a combination of his empathetic preferences. Ac-
cording to Binmore, there are two possible ways of defining such a utility function:
the approach based on Harsanyi’s view of the aggregation of individual utilities
([Binmore, 1994, p. 293]) or the approach based on Rawls’s view ([Binmore, 1994,
p. 295]).
If we follow Harsanyi (Harsanyi [1986]), then we should assume that the agent
i assigns equal probabilities to the fact of playing as any other agent, as shown
through function UHi :







If we follow Rawls (Rawls [1971]), then we should assume that agent i is not
able to attach probabilities to the fact of playing as a given agent in Agt. Instead
of maximizing the total empathetic utilities of all agents in Agt, agent i will seek
to maximize the empathetic utility for being the worst-off individual in Agt, as
shown through function URi :
(6.3) URi (s) = min
j∈Agt
UEi,j(s)
It is worth noting that both the principle of classical utilitarianism and the
maximin criterion, as introduced in the previous sections, can be obtained by
considering respectively the functions UHi and URi where UEi,j = Uj for every j ∈
Agt.
Moreover, while determining which utility function one should follow in the
original position clearly remains an open question, one can fairly state that the
answer simply depends on the context1.
Binmore further argues in Binmore [1994, 1998, 2005] that individuals natu-
rally tend to share the same empathetic preferences behind the veil of ignorance:
“Insofar as people from similar cultural backgrounds have similar empathetic pref-
erences, it is because the use of the original position in this way creates evolutionary
pressures that tend to favor some empathetic preferences at the expense of others”
([Binmore, 1998, p. 178]). As a consequence, it appears that any strategic issue
becomes irrelevant in the original position: while assuming that others share the
same empathetic preferences in the original position, every player i will simply
choose whichever solution s ∈ S maximizes the empathetic utility function UHi (s)
or URi (s) (Binmore [1994]). Following this interpretation, we specify a player’s
empathetic behavior as in Definitions 6.12 and 6.13.
Definition 6.12 (Empathetic behavior à la Harsanyi) In a game with em-
pathetic preferences EM = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}, {UEi,j|i, j ∈ Agt}〉, if
an agent i ∈ Agt empathizes with every other player from Agt, then i chooses to
perform strategy si such that:
s ∈ argmaxs′∈SUHi (s′)
where UHi is defined according to Equation (6.2).
Definition 6.13 (Empathetic behavior à la Rawls) In a game with empathetic
preferences EM = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {Ui|i ∈ Agt}, {UEi,j|i, j ∈ Agt}〉, if an agent
1In Binmore [1998, 2005], Binmore proposes a theory, which states that Harsanyi’s utilitarian
function only makes sense under the control of some real external enforcement agency (e.g., an
all-powerful government), whereas Rawls’ egalitarian function is ideal in the absence of any such
external enforcement (Rawls’ egalitarian solution becomes self-enforcing in this case).
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i ∈ Agt empathizes with every other player from Agt, then i chooses to perform
strategy si such that:
s ∈ argmaxs′∈SURi (s′)
where URi is defined according to Equation (6.3).
When applied to the Hi-Lo game and the Stag-Hunt game from Section 6.1,
one can observe that every game with aligned empathetic preferences based on
Figure 6.1 (where 0 ≤ z < x) has a unique way to empathize (à la Harsanyi or
à la Rawls), which leads the players to reach the (C,C) outcome. More specifi-
cally, the corresponding game with aligned empathetic preferences (where a and b
respectively stand for Alice and Bob) can be defined as follows:
EM = 〈{a, b}, {Sa, Sb}, {Ua, Ub}, {UEi,j|i, j ∈ {a, b}}〉
with Sa = Sb = {C,D}, Ua(C,C) = Ub(C,C) = x, Ua(D,D) = Ub(D,D) = y,
Ua(D,C) = Ub(C,D) = z, Ua(C,D) = Ub(D,C) = 0, and 0 < y < x. Thus,
we have that, whenever 0 ≤ z < x, for any setting of the functions UEi,j in EM ,
any empathetic player (according to either Definition 6.12 or Definition 6.13) will
select option C. On the other hand, in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, (where
z ≥ x), one should note that some agent i’s empathetic behavior depends on the
setting of i’s empathetic utility functions UEi,j: for example, if UEi,a(s) >> UEi,b(s) for
every s ∈ S (i.e., i always largely prefers to be a than b), i’s empathetic behavior à
la Harsanyi will be to choose D. Note that, while such an interpretation is clearly
counter-intuitive (one would indeed intuitively expect empathetic individuals to
only select C in the prisoner’s dilemma), Binmore provides a more precise theory of
determining “reasonable” empathetic preferences (i.e., functions UEi,j) in Binmore
[1994, 1998].
However, although Binmore’s theory is highly relevant to explain cooperation
in various types of social situations, it also has some limitations regarding its
connection with strategic thinking. More precisely, his theory does clearly not
allow to explain under which conditions individuals will consider their individual
preferences and play strategically, and under which conditions they will consider
their empathetic preferences and play according to either Definition 6.12 or Def-
inition 6.13. In other words, such a model does not provide an interpretation of
the strength with which a particular individual (more or less) empathizes with
another person. This remark is even more striking when considering larger games
with more than two individuals. In fact, in this type of interactions, an agent may
reasonably strictly empathize with some individual(s) while reasoning strategically
with the other(s) (see Section 6.3.4 for a concrete illustration). In fact, Binmore’s
theory of empathetic preferences does not allow to model this kind of complex
situations because it does not incorporate strategic reasoning between competing
coalitions.
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However, it is worth noting that Binmore’s concept of empathy is closely related
to our theory of social ties introduced in Section 6.3. In fact, it appears that
an empathetic behavior as in Definitions 6.12 and 6.13 corresponds to solving a
decision problem in the context of a strong social tie with the group of all agents
(see Definition 6.6 from Section 6.3). However, as our model of ties incorporates
strategic reasoning, it clearly allows to resolve the above issues related to Binmore’s
model.
6.5 Conclusion
In this work, we have provided an analysis of a well known economic theory
that allows to explain collective behavior in situations that involve co-operation:
Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning. After discussing the limitations of this
theory, we have presented our theory of social ties, which, by generalizing the
model introduced in Chapter 4, appears to be well suited to formalize collective
behavior in the context of complex strategic interactions. The advantages of our
model compared to Bacharach’s theory have been highlighted: while Bacharach’s
theory solely relies on binary group identification, social ties require the more
general concept of gradual group identification, as already suggested in Chapter
4. More precisely, the proposed comparative analysis has shown that considering
this assumption allows us to formalize more intuitively complex types of social
interactions that can involve the formation of various coalitions. In fact, suppose
that two of my best friends are involved in a fight against each other (which ob-
viously implies the existence of a weak social tie between them). Clearly, in this
particular scenario, identifying with the whole group is out of the question since I
know that my friends are not willing to collaborate with each other. Our theory of
social ties then suggests that I should identify simultaneously with two subgroups
(each of which includes only one of my friends) so that I can rationally choose
whichever action allows me to resolve the conflict between them, as an attempt to
avoid any further damage on the welfare of these subgroups (and consequently on
each friend’s own welfare). On the other hand, Bacharach’s theory suggests that
I should instead team up with one of my friends and fight against the other (as a
result of identifying with either one subgroup or the other), which clearly appears
to be overly unrealistic.
Furthermore, we have shown through this study that our theory of social ties
could also interpret some empathetic behavior as it shares some common intuitions
with Binmore’s own theory of empathetic preferences.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Future Research
“Selfishness is not living as one wishes to live, it is
asking others to live as one wishes to live.”
— Oscar Wilde
The Soul of Man Under Socialism (1891)
“I believe in one thing - that only a life lived for others
is a life worth living.”
— Albert Einstein
(1948)
For many years, it has been assumed that rational behavior was solely deter-
mined by one’s individual preferences and one’s ability to think logically. In the
line of more recent work, we have argued, through this dissertation, that other rele-
vant factors are also necessary. Among those, it is clear that knowledge and beliefs
play an important role in determining one’s rational choice in social interactions.
While there indeed exist many different sources of uncertainty (e.g., about each in-
dividual’s preferences, past and future moves, available strategies), our main focus
in Chapter 3, was to strictly investigate what individuals know and ignore about
each other’s future behavior, and how their prediction about what will happen
does affect their own behavior (under the assumption that everything else about
the game structure, including the players’ preferences, is commonly known). The
main result of such a study is that it provides an intuitive explanation for why
people deviate from the most optimal behavior. While it is sometimes argued that
such behavior is the result of irrationality, we here claim that it is often compatible
with some bounded rationality principle. In fact, most human beings are unable
to accurately reason about complex interactive knowledge and beliefs (e.g., about
what I know that you know that I know that you know that . . . ). In the same
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way, people have also bounded memories, which prevent them to perfectly recall
what previously happened and use that information in predicting what will hap-
pen next. However, while this kind of cognitive limitations clearly allows to justify
such non optimal behavior, its most interesting consequence lies in the fact that
it is commonly believed by all individuals involved. Indeed, even though I may be
able to perfectly reason about very complex statements, if I do not believe that
others share the same ability, then all that cognitive power simply becomes useless
as it may then be in my best interest to deviate from the most optimal solution
(e.g., the centipede game discussed in Chapter 3 shows that assuming common
knowledge of rationality can sometimes lead to some poor outcome).
As another principal component that drives rational decisions in social interac-
tions, we claim through this dissertation that social relationships existing between
individuals play a major role in promoting cooperation. More precisely, we first
hypothesize, in Chapter 4, that such social ties are used to shape our preferences
in a way that simplifies decision making. We show that, through this theory,
strong social ties can remove any strategic component from the original situa-
tion by simply transforming the individuals’ preferences. As a means to compare
this interpretation with other relevant economic theories of social preferences, we
introduced a particular two-player coordination game that allows to disentangle
between their predictions. We also investigated the well known alternative theory
of team reasoning, which relies on group identification, and showed that it is not
adequate to model social ties as continuous variables. More generally, this analysis
shows that cooperation is compatible with a rational behavior in the context of
social ties.
We then validated this theory through an experimental study in Chapter 5,
which involved participants who share some existing social ties with one another.
While this study shows that increasing the strength of social ties improves the level
of coordination by playing fair, it also reveals that such cooperative behavior relies
on a combination of a subjective measure of ties (i.e., what they believe to be the
social ties) as well as an objective measure of ties (i.e., what the social ties actually
are). More precisely, our study shows that being overly optimistic in terms of the
expected value of a social tie (i.e., overestimating the strength of a social tie) does
not only benefit the welfare of the group but can also serve each individual’s own
best interest in situations involving coordination. In fact, it appears that being
self-regarding in coordination games similar to those studied in Chapter 5 is the
worst possible strategy one could follow to maximize one’s own payoffs.
Finally, through the last chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 8), we have ex-
plored this theory of social ties in more details by considering its interpretation in
complex social situations that can often be found in various human societies. In
fact, societies are made of large amounts of interconnections between individuals,
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which result in the formation of groups that may compete with one another. We
have therefore shown that our model of social ties provides an intuitive and alter-
native way to represent such situations where a given individual does, at the same
time, (1) cooperate with other members of the group(s) he identifies with, and
(2) compete with members of other groups he does not identify with. Through a
formal comparison with Bacharach’s team reasoning, we also illustrated the rele-
vance of our model by considering decision making in the particular case of multiple
gradual group identifications (which are not allowed in Bacharach’s theory). More
generally, our study suggests that, when making a social decision, people naturally
evaluate the quality of the links existing between all individuals that they come
to interact with. In other words, one’s perception of the structure of a society
(through its interconnections) has a direct impact on one’s contribution to the
promotion of that society (by maximizing various group utilities).
However, while we believe that the study presented through this dissertation
allows to clarify the concept of social rationality, we also realize that it only rep-
resents a premise to a multitude of related research paths that should deserve
particular attention in the future. Let us provide a few examples here.
Although Chapter 3 has illustrated the relevance of using modal logic as an
alternative powerful tool to formally model strategic reasoning in multi-player in-
teractions, it also suggests some further logical analyses. In fact, while the study
proposed here strictly focuses on games with perfect information, extending this
analysis to games with imperfect information could similarly offer interesting re-
sults. However, the corresponding logical framework would then require intro-
ducing additional modalities allowing to reason about past events (which is not
allowed in ELEG from Chapter 3 that only reasons about future events). Indeed,
in order to realistically investigate the epistemic foundations of relevant solution
concepts such as the well known forward induction principle introduced in Chapter
4, it is required to formalize how agents can think about counterfactual situations,
that is, about what they could have done and what they would have known. While
the concept of forward induction has already been studied in economics (see, e.g.,
Battigalli and Siniscalchi [2002]; Perea [2010]), those analyses remain purely se-
mantic. Providing a formal language that is sufficiently expressive to explicitly
reason about counterfactuals on the syntactic level may therefore be useful to
study more precisely the epistemic foundations of rationality.
Moreover, the study of games with incomplete information represents a simi-
larly promising area of research. This type of games represent situations where the
agents may be uncertain about each other’s preferences. While such games have
already been widely studied by economists, there exists no work that considers
any of the recent theories of social preferences from the literature. As an exam-
ple, considering the theory of social ties introduced in this dissertation, we have
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argued that their strength directly determine the individuals’ preferences. In this
case, as a means to uncover an individual’s true preferences, one may simply need
to adjust one’s beliefs about that individual’s social ties with others. However, it
appears that acquiring such accurate beliefs does not appear to be an easy task. In
fact, while we assumed in Chapter 4 that the existence of a social tie is commonly
believed by the two individuals involved, Chapter 5 suggests that estimating social
ties between other individuals is more complex and therefore approximated (see
the difference between subjective and objective ties in Chapter 5). In this case,
relevant research questions may then include the following: how do my beliefs
about ties between others affect my own ties with them? How do my ties with
others influence my beliefs about the ties between them? While answering those
questions clearly requires some further experimental study, the use of logic may
be particularly adequate to formalize its results.
As another perspective of future research, it is clear that a logical analysis of
normative reasoning also deserves particular attention. In fact, the experimental
study from Chapter 5 reveals that, when people do not think strategically, then
they tend to follow what they believe to be the norm, that is, what everybody
should do in a given situation (see Section 5.4.2 for more details). In this case, it
appears that modal deontic logic is a very adequate tool to formalize such reasoning
about obligations (what agents ought to do) and permissions (what agents are
allowed to do). As an example, we have proposed, through a separated work
(Herzig et al. [2011]), a logical framework that allows to represent and reason about
agent interactions in normative systems. More specifically, we have shown that
a dynamic logic of propositional assignments was sufficient to express interesting
properties related to the dynamics of abilities and permissions (e.g., an agent may
allow/prevent/authorize/forbid a person to perform a particular action). However,
in order to be able to fully characterize normative behavior as it is observed in
Section 5.4.2, it is clear that such a logical framework is not sufficient and should
then be combined with a game theoretic setting similar to that introduced in
Chapter 3 (or in Lorini [2011]; Lorini and Schwarzentruber [2010]). Such a study
would therefore allow to bring some interesting insight to the existing relation
between strategic reasoning and such normative thinking.
Besides the need for such relevant logical analyses, it is also worth noting that
the study of social ties presented in this dissertation also suggests another required
improvement of the model presented in Chapter 8, which only considers ties with
groups (through the level with which each individual identifies with every given
group). One may then wonder how such group identification is determined in the
first place. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that a group is made of agents who
share some individual ties between each of its members. Expressing the above
functions ki (for every agent i) strictly in terms of individual ties however does not
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appear to be an easy task: as already shown in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.3.2.1),
one may indeed be very close individually to every member of a group without
being socially close to the group itself.
In order to illustrate the existing relation between these two different concepts
of social ties, let us consider the case of a three player social interaction, in which
case the corresponding network of social ties can be represented as in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: Individual social ties in a three player game
In Figure 7.1, for every pair of individuals i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the strength of the
individual tie between i and j can be characterized by stij ∈ [0, 1] (i.e., stij = 0
if the tie is extremely weak, and stij = 1 if the tie is extremely strong). In
this case, it is easy to see that if all three players are extremely close to one
another (i.e., st12 = st13 = st23 = 1), then it intuitively implies that all individuals
will identify with the same group (i.e., for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ki({1, 2, 3}) = 1).
Similarly, if they are not tied with one another (i.e., st12 = st13 = st23 = 0),
then it intuitively implies that all players will be self-regarding (i.e., for every
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ki({i}) = 1). However, expressing group identification may become
less straightforward in some alternative situation where player 1 is extremely close
to both players 2 and 3 (i.e., st12 = st13 = 1) while players 2 and 3 are extremely
weakly tied with each other (i.e., st23 = 0). In this case, a particularly intuitive
interpretation would be that player 1 extremely identifies with the two subgroups
(i.e., k1({1, 2}) = k1({1, 3}) = 0.5, while both players 2 and 3 are partly self-
regarding (i.e., k2({2}) = k3({3}) = 0.5). In this case, one should note that the
example presented in Section 6.3.4 from Chapter 8 allows to illustrate this very
plausible interpretation.
More generally, the aim of this refinement of the social ties model from Chapter
8 is to provide an economic analysis of the impact of group identification on strate-
gic interactions within social networks. It is worth noting that this work should
also include some comparative analyses with various existing economic models
from the recently growing literature on social networks (see, e.g., Bramoullé et al.
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[2011]; Galeotti et al. [2010]; Goyal [2009]; Jackson [2005, 2007]).
Other related directions of research concern the analysis of social ties and
collective reasoning in the context of sequential interactions. As such sequential
games can be represented in strategic form (as shown in Section 2.2.2 from Chapter
2), one can therefore apply the model of social ties from Chapter 8 to specify both
individualistic and cooperative behavior. For example, it allows to explain mutual
cooperation in the well known trust game (see Figure 2.8 in Chapter 2) as well
as in the ultimatum game (see Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2). However, one should
note that this theory cannot capture the type of apparently irrational behavior
elicited in the latter game. Indeed, experimental studies have shown that people
sometimes appear to select an option that is bad for themselves as well as for the
group, in response to a prior behavior of their partner that they judge to be unfair
(see, e.g., Falk et al. [2003]). Our theory of social ties is clearly unable to express
such negative reciprocity or punishment. Yet, such behavior appears to be of high
relevance to the concept of social ties. One may intuitively expect that more severe
punishments are performed when strong social ties are involved (e.g., the higher
the tie between two individuals, the more important the impact of betrayal of one
towards the other). Some further experimental study would therefore be required
to investigate this issue.
Moreover, such an interpretation, combined with the quantitative aspect of
social ties (i.e., the fact that two individuals can be more or less tied with each
other), clearly suggests a dynamic characterization of those ties, which we did
not consider here. In fact, one may reasonably assume that cooperative behavior
allows to strengthen a tie between individuals while individualistic behavior simply
weakens it. While there exists no clear evidence in the literature that supports
this intuitive claim, it therefore requires some further experimental study that
investigates social ties in the context of dynamic interactive situations (i.e., in
sequential games or repeated games).
Similarly, one should note that the comparative theoretical analysis of our
model of social ties with Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning from Chapter 8
also suggests some further relevant experimental work. Indeed, while the coor-
dination game introduced in Chapter 4 does not allow to disentangle predictions
made by the two theories, the games presented in Section 6.3.3 from Chapter 8
illustrate some clear disagreement between both models. Testing the validity of
both theories would therefore require testing experimentally those games, which
would also improve our general understanding of social ties.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the work presented in this dissertation
remains ambiguously regarding what characterizes a fair solution for every member
of a group. Through Chapters 4 and 8, we consider two different approaches to
compute collective payoff: either one follows Rawls’ criterion of fairness and aims
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at maximizing the worst-off individual within the group, or one follows classical
utilitarianism and aims at maximizing the global efficiency of the group. However,
one might wonder which of these methods an individual should actually follow.
While it is fair to state that this choice depends on the context, Binmore proposes
a theory in Binmore [1998, 2005] that relies on Rawls’ concept of the original
position (see Section 6.4 from Chapter 8). Such a theory states that classical
utilitarianism only makes sense under the control of some real external enforcement
agency (e.g., an all-powerful government). Binmore indeed argues that such an
enforcement is necessary to ensure that any fair decision that is taken in the original
position, based on global efficiency, is actually followed when the veil of ignorance
is removed and roles are randomly assigned to individuals. In other words, without
any such enforcement, individuals that are assigned roles of disadvantaged players
may then deviate from the utilitarian solution they committed to in the original
position (i.e., what looks fair in the original position does not necessarily look
fair when one gets to know his own true identity), which may eventually result
in damaging the collective welfare. On the other hand, Binmore also states that
Rawls’ criterion of fairness is ideal in the absence of any external enforcement. In
this case, as an egalitarian decision is taken in the original position, removing the
veil of ignorance cannot create any incentives for deviating from it. In fact, such
a decision already maximizes the interests of those individuals that are assigned
roles of disadvantaged players (i.e., what looks fair in the original position also
necessarily looks fair when one gets to know his own identity). In that sense,
Rawls’ egalitarian solution is simply self-enforcing.
As a means to verify such a reasonable theory and investigate other plausible
hypotheses that could clarify which collective payoff function should apply to the
above model of social ties and in which context, the use of computer agent-based
simulations appears as an obvious choice. However, while in most such social
simulations, interactions between agents rely on some random matching process
(i.e., an agent has the same probability to interact with any other agent), one
could reasonably assume that people have a natural tendency to interact more
often with individuals they are strongly tied with. This assumption is also sup-
ported by some recent work in Alger and Weibull [2012], which suggests that one’s
degree of morality somehow corresponds to the probability of interacting with
individuals who share the same preferences. Therefore, in addition to bringing
some more insight to the determination of the collective payoff function within
our model of social ties, such simulations may also become particularly useful to
study the dynamic properties of social relationships (e.g., when does it pay off to





Que signifie être rationnel? Il est juste de dire que cette simple question a soulevé
de nombreux débats au cours des dernières années à travers de nombreuses disci-
plines parmi lesquelles la philosophie, l’économie, la psychologie, et la sociologie.
Néanmoins, malgré la difficulté pour les scientifiques de fournir une définition
claire, le terme “rationnel” est excessivement utilisé dans les conversations quoti-
diennes, ce qui indique que les gens ont au moins une idée générale de son concept.
En effet, chacun conviendra que, d’une manière générale, la rationalité évoque le
fait de penser et de se comporter raisonnablement ou logiquement. Cependant,
une si simple définition reste largement ambiguë puisqu’elle repousse simplement
le problème: que signifie penser et se comporter raisonnablement? Afin de donner
une réponse plus précise à cette question et d’étudier le rôle qu’un tel principe joue
dans la coopération humaine, cette thèse combine des approches et des méthodolo-
gies différentes provenant de l’informatique (la logique) et l’économie (la théorie
des jeux, l’expérimentation). Cependant, dans le but de justifier la besoin pour
une telle étude interdisciplinaire, il est utile de distinguer d’abord les concepts de
raison et de rationalité: alors que la raison peut être définie à travers la capac-
ité psychologique à établir et à vérifier des faits à partir d’informations perçus,
la rationalité concerne plutôt la procédure d’optimisation de choix. Dans ce cas,
puisque de tel choix conscients résultent clairement d’une réflexion intérieure, one
peut affirmer que la rationalité implique naturellement l’usage de la raison.
De plus, il est coutume parmi les philosophes de distinguer les notions de
rationalité théorique et rationalité pratique (voir, e.g., Kalberg [1980]). D’une
part, la rationalité théorique, qui repose sur une argumentation et des preuves,
traite simplement de la régulation de nos propres croyances 1. En revanche, la
1De manière plus rigoureuse, l’acceptance devrait être distinguée de la croyances, comme
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rationalité pratique correspond à la stratégie de vivre la meilleure vie possible,
atteindre ses objectifs les plus importants, et maximiser ses propres préférences
autant que possible.
Afin d’illustrer ces concepts philosophiques, supposons que je sais que fumer
abondamment tue, et que cela implique que fumer va, de manière certaine, détéri-
orer ma santé physique. En assumant que je préfère rester en vie et en bonne santé
aussi longtemps que possible, je serais alors pratiquement irrationnel de fumer ne
serait-ce qu’une seule cigarette car ce simple choix ne me permettrait pas d’être
dans le meilleur état de santé possible (i.e., ce choix n’est pas optimal). Par con-
tre, fumer en étant pratiquement rationnel exigerait la reconsidération soit des
mes croyances (e.g., finalement, je ne crois pas que fumer va détériorer ma santé),
soit mes préférences (e.g., finalement, il n’est pas important pour moi de vivre
une longue vie). En revanche, il peut être théorétiquement rationnel pour moi de
croire que fumer une seule cigarette n’aura qu’un effet négligeable sur ma santé.
Cependant, il faut noter qu’il serait théoriquement irrationnel de croire que cela
ne va pas du tout détériorer ma santé (ceci serait incompatible avec ma croyance
initiale de la déclaration contraire).
Ce simple exemple intuitif clarifie le fait que les êtres humains ne sont pas
rationnels par définition, mais ils peuvent penser et se comporter rationnellement
ou pas, selon qu’ils appliquent les stratégies de la rationalité théorique et de la
rationalité pratique aux pensées qu’ils acceptent ainsi qu’aux actions qu’ils accom-
plissent. Par ailleurs, ils est à noter que ces concepts se soutiennent mutuellement.
De fait, alors que la rationalité théorique m’aide à accomplir mes but pratiques,
la rationalité pratique peux me permettre d’améliorer la qualité de mes croyances.
Compte tenu de la forte pertinence de chacune de ces notions de rationalité par
rapport au fonctionnement du comportement humain, ils caractérisent alors le
thème principal dont fait l’objet cette thèse.
Au cours des dernières décades, étudier le rôle que la rationalité pratique
joue réellement dans la monde social est devenu l’objectif principal de nombreux
économistes qui ont utilisé les outils mathématiques pour modéliser la prise de
décision. Cette intérêt a naturellement mené au développement de la théorie
des jeux, qui représente l’étude de la prise de décision stratégique à travers des
modèles mathématiques de conflits et de coopération entre agents intelligents ra-
tionnels (Gintis [2000]; Myerson [1997]; Osborne and Rubinstein [1994]; Osborne
[2004]). Le concept d’un jeu dont cette théorie fait référence peux théorique-
ment représenter n’importe quelle sorte d’interaction sociale. Formellement, un jeu
(non-coopératif) 1 consiste en un ensemble de joueurs, un ensemble d’actions (ou
argumenté dans Tuomela [2000]: bien que chacun de ces concepts représente des états cognitifs,
les croyances sont involontaires (i.e., elles ne sont pas sujets à un contrôle direct volontaire), alors
que les acceptances sont volontaire et intentionnelles.
1Un jeu est non coopératif dans le sens où il représente un modèle détaillé de toutes les actions
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stratégies) disponibles pour ces joueurs, et une spécification des récompenses (ou
conséquences) pour chaque combinaison d’actions. Il convient de noter que, bien
que la théorie des jeux a été principalement ancrée en économie, elle est désormais
largement utilisée et étudiée dans d’autres domaines tels que les sciences politiques,
la psychologies, ainsi que la philosophie et la biologie. Notamment, l’intérêt pour
cette théorie s’est étendu plus récemment au domaine de l’informatique à travers le
développement grandissant de l’intelligence artificielle et les systèmes multi-agents.
Les applications concrètes sont nombreuses et incluent la robotique, les réseaux de
communication électronique (e.g., le commerce électronique), l’éducation interac-
tive, le divertissement interactif (i.e., les interactions humains-ordinateurs), et la
résolution des problèmes de sureté et de sécurité. Dans chacune de ces situations,
afin pour ces agents artificiels d’interagir efficacement avec des êtres humains,
ils doivent clairement être capable de comprendre les principes de base du com-
portement social, tels qu’ils apparaissent dans les sociétés humaines. Une telle
problématique suggère alors fortement le besoin de définir une théorie formelle de
la rationalité dans le contexte d’interactions sociales.
Cependant, malgré son importance indéniable envers l’étude de la rationalité
pratique, la théorie des jeux classique n’apparait pas comme l’outil le plus efficace
pour analyser les connections fondamentales avec la rationalité théorique. En ef-
fet, comme suggéré précédemment, la rationalité théorique consiste simplement à
suivre une manière de raisonner consistante et optimale, et la théorie des jeux ne
fournit pas un langage suffisamment riche qui permette de modéliser de façon non
ambiguë ce type de raisonnement. Afin de répondre aux besoins de formaliser une
réflexion logique, l’utilisation de la logique propositionnelle est souvent privilégiée
par les informaticiens. Un tel système formel concerne en effet le raisonnement
sur des propositions, chacune représentant simplement une description possible du
monde: par exemple, étant donné deux propositions p et q, si p est vrai et il est le
cas que “si p est vrai, alors q est vrai”, alors on peut en déduire que q est également
vrai (cette règle d’inférence est connu sous le nom de Modus Ponens). Néanmoins,
en contrepartie d’être extrêmement simple, une telle logique est insuffisante pour
exprimer les différents états mentaux tels qu’ils peuvent apparaitre dans les inter-
actions sociales. A cet effet, un autre système formel a été introduit pour étendre
cette logique avec l’addition d’opérateurs supplémentaires exprimant des modal-
ités du type “il est possible/nécessaire que . . . ”, “il est permis/obligatoire que . . . ”,
“je crois/sais que . . . ”, etc. . . Ces opérateurs modaux supplémentaires sont en ef-
fet particulièrement intéressant à l’étude de la rationalité car ils permettent de
formaliser le raisonnement sur les attitudes mentales des agents. Par exemple, il
disponibles pour tous les joueurs, contrairement aux jeux coopératifs qui font abstraction de ce
niveau de détail et décrivent seulement les conséquences qui résultent lorsque les joueurs se
regroupent ensembles dans des combinaisons différentes.
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est possible de définir la règle suivante dans un tel langage: si l’individu i croit
que la proposition p est vrai, alors i croit que i croit que p est vrai (cette règle
est généralement connu sous le nom de introspection positive). Ce type de logique,
qui est connu sous le nom de logique modale (Blackburn et al. [2002]; Chellas
[1980]; Hintikka [1962]; Hughes and Cresswell [1968]), est également souvent as-
sociée à d’autres logiques telles que la logique épistémique (raisonnement sur la
connaissance), la logique temporelle (raisonnement sur le temps), la logique déon-
tique (raisonnement sur les obligations), et la logique dynamique (raisonnement
sur les programmes complexes). Plus généralement, les applications de la logique
modale sont particulièrement importantes en philosophie, linguistique, et dans les
différents domaines de l’informatique tels que l’intelligence artificielle, les systèmes
distribués, les bases de données, la vérification de programmes, et la cryptogra-
phie. Un objectif de cette thèse est de montrer que cette logique est également
particulièrement pertinente dans le domaine de l’économie.
Néanmoins, bien que la combinaison de la théorie des jeux et la logique représente
un outil analytique puissant pour analyser les principes essentiels de la rationalité,
leur seule limitation concerne la vue largement idéalisée qu’elle procure. Comme
suggéré précédemment, la motivation principale pour formaliser la rationalité est
de pouvoir correctement prédire le comportement humain dans les interactions
sociales. En effet, être rationnel devient inutile si je crois, à tort, que tous les
individus sont rationnels, me conduisant ainsi à réaliser de mauvais choix avec po-
tentiellement des conséquences catastrophiques. Il est aujourd’hui largement admis
que la théorie des jeux classique n’a effectivement pas réussi à remplir sa motivation
originale de prédire correctement la prise de décision humaine, ce qui explique le
récent intérêt grandissant pour l’expérimentation économique. Similairement aux
science physiques, l’utilisation d’expériences contrôlées s’est trouvée être largement
pertinente à l’étude de questions économiques (Camerer [2003]; Roth and Kagel
[1995]). Dans le but de tester la validité de certaines théories économiques, de
telles expériences utilisent généralement de l’argent pour motiver les sujets hu-
mains afin de mimer les incitations existantes de la vie de tous les jours. De telles
méthodes empiriques permettent d’explorer des concepts très importants parmi
lesquels l’altruisme, la réciprocité, et les émotions, qui ont tous, pour longtemps,
été ignorés par la théorie économique classique. De fait, de nombreuses preuves
empiriques ont déjà suggéré que les êtres humains considèrent naturellement le
bien-être des autres dans les interactions sociales. Cependant, alors que ces études
ont permis de clarifier la manière avec laquelle chaque individu peut contribuer à
la promotion de la société (e.g., à travers un comportement juste et coopératif), il
reste à déterminer l’impact qu’une société peut avoir sur le comportement de ces
membres. En effet, toute société humaine est constituée d’un groupe d’individus
liés les uns aux autres à travers des relations sociales plus ou moins persistantes.
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En conséquence, il est raisonnable d’affirmer que l’environnement d’une personne
est largement responsable à la détermination de son propre bien-être. Apres tout,
la contribution d’un individu au bien-être d’une société a pour principal (si ce n’est
le seul) but d’améliorer sa propre qualité de vie au sein de cette société.
La contribution principale de cette thèse est alors d’analyser ce problème par
l’étude de certains aspects cruciaux de la rationalité humaine telle qu’elle apparait
dans les interactions sociales. Notre objectif est d’expliquer comment ces facteurs
peuvent déterminer un comportement sociale qui promeut le bien être de la so-
ciété entière. Dans le but d’obtenir une définition formelle et réaliste du concept
complexe de la rationalité sociale, cette étude repose sur les différentes méthodolo-
gies qui ont été précédemment citées: la théorie des jeux, la logique modale, et
l’expérimentation économique. Plus spécifiquement, nous soutenons que les com-
posantes suivantes sont essentielles à la définition de la rationalité sociale dans les
situations d’interaction sociale:
• Les préférences individuelles. Puisque la rationalité pratique traite de l’optimisation
de buts, il est nécessaire de définir ce qui caractérise la meilleure solution pour
chaque individu. L’approche que nous suivons ici est quantitative à ce sujet,
c’est à dire, elle repose sur la mesure de l’utilité pour chaque conséquence
possible.
• Les connaissances et croyances. Il est clair que la rationalité théorique
dépend largement de l’état épistémique d’un agent. En considérant l’exemple
ci-dessus, si je ne sais pas que fumer tue, alors il peut être rationnel pour
moi de fumer. Dans le contexte des interactions sociales, le problème devient
même plus complexe puisque tous les agents doivent alors considérer ce qu’ils
savent à propos de ce que chacun sait.
• Les liens sociaux entre individus . Ce facteur n’est généralement pas men-
tionné dans la littérature pour définir la rationalité. Nous affirmons ici que
le type de relations sociales qui peut exister entre individus impliqués dans
certaines interactions sociales a un effet sur leur rationalité respective. Plus
précisément, nous défendons le fait que le niveau avec lequel chaque agent est
lié avec chaque autre agent affecte directement les préférences individuelles,
et par conséquent le comportement.
8.2 Rationalités dans les interactions sociales
Ce chapitre fourni une brève introduction concernant les théories formelles exis-
tantes qui caractérisent le concept de rationalité. Plus précisément, nous présen-
tons la théories de l’utilité ainsi que la théorie des jeux dans le but de représenter
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les préférences rationnelles ainsi que la prise de décision rationnelle dans le con-
texte d’interactions stratégiques sociales. Afin de raisonner sur la connaissance
et les croyances, nous présentons la logique modale épistémique et illustrons la
puissance descriptive de cette méthode par un simple exemple. De plus, nous
démontrons la nécessité d’étendre la théorie des jeux classique de manière à ce
qu’elle puisse incorporer les types de raisonnement suivis par les sujets humains
dans de nombreuses expériences économiques. Nous défendons alors le fait que,
souvent, les preuves apparentes de comportement irrationnel ne contredisent pas
l’hypothèse classique de la rationalité.
8.3 La rationalité épistémique dans les jeux ex-
tensifs
A travers ce chapitre, nous étudions les fondations épistémiques de la rationalité
grâce à une analyse logique des interactions sociales séquentielles. Bien que des
travaux similaires ont déjà été réalisés en économie (e.g., Aumann [1995, 1999a];
Aumann and Brandenburger [1995]; Battigalli and Siniscalchi [1999, 2002]), la
particularité de cette analyse est qu’elle repose sur la logique modale. En effet,
nous argumentons que la logique modale est un outil inestimable qui permet des
analyses détaillées tout en exprimant des concepts qui sont informellement ou
vaguement capturés par le langage classique de la théorie des jeux. En particulier,
nous montrons qu’un tel outil formel est idéal pour modéliser de manière non am-
biguë les connaissances d’agents à propos de ce que chacun sait. Cette étude fait
alors référence au domaine récent appelé “épistémologie interactive formelle” (un
terme inventé par Aumann [1999b]), qui traite de la logique de la connaissance et
de la croyance lorsqu’il existe plus d’un agent. De plus, l’autre principale carac-
téristique de ce travail est qu’il considère la dimension temporelle de la rationalité
qui est souvent ignorée dans la littérature. Nous montrons alors que la grande
capacité expressive de la logique proposée permet d’améliorer la compréhension de
la relation existante entre le temps et la connaissance dans les interactions sociales.
Afin d’illustrer l’utilisation d’une telle logique, nous fournissons une preuve syn-
tactique du théorème bien connu d’Aumann indiquant que l’induction rétrograde
dans les jeux à information parfaite peut être dérivée à partir de l’hypothèse de
connaissance commune de rationalité mutuelle (Aumann [1995]). La définition de
rationalité qui est considéré dans ce theoreme peut être décrite de la manière suiv-
ante: “Peut importe où le joueur se trouve - à quelle point du jeu - il ne choisira
pas une stratégie en sachant que cela lui apportera moins que ce qu’il aurait pu
obtenir avec une strategie différente" (Aumann [1995]).
En conséquence, nous montrons qu’une telle étude logique ne permet pas seule-
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ment de clairement identifier les hypothèses épistémiques requises qui sont seule-
ment implicites dans la preuve originale d’Aumann, mais elle permet également
d’affaiblir l’énoncé original du théorème et de répondre à des questions perti-
nentes liées aux mécanismes d’apprentissage et de mémorisation, aux introspec-
tions positives et négatives, au raisonnement temporel et à la rationalité lim-
itée. De plus, nous montrons qu’une telle analyse permet également d’obtenir une
réponse formelle à la critique principale du théorème d’Aumann dans la littérature
de la théorie des jeux (voir Stalnaker [1998]).
8.4 Les liens sociaux et la coordination stratégique
Dans les théories économiques classiques, la plupart des modèles assume que les
agents sont individualistes et maximisent leur propre profit matériel. Cepen-
dant, comme mentionné précédemment, d’importantes preuves expérimentales en
économie et psychologie sociale ont démontré l’existence de déviations persistantes
d’un tel comportement individualiste dans de nombreuses situations stratégiques.
Ces résultats suggèrent le besoin d’incorporer les préférences sociales dans les mod-
èles de la théorie des jeux. De telles préférences décrivent le fait qu’un joueur ne
considère pas seulement son propre profit matériel, mais également celui des autres
joueurs (Margolis [1982]). Les différentes normes sociales crées par l’environnement
culturel dans lequel les êtres humains vivent apportent des précisions concernant
la manière dont de telles données expérimentales peuvent être interprétées: la jus-
tice, l’aversion à l’inégalité, la réciprocité, et la maximisation du bien-être social
sont des concepts bien connus des économistes comportementaux qui jouent un
rôle important dans la prise de décision interactive (e.g., voir Charness and Rabin
[2002]; Fehr and Schmidt [1999]; Rabin [1993a]).
En effet, de nombreux jeux économiques simples, tels que le jeu de confiance
(Berg et al. [1995]) et le jeu de l’ultimatum (Güth et al. [1982]), ont été largement
étudiés dans les années passées parce qu’ils illustrent bien la faiblesse de la théorie
des jeux traditionnelle et son hypothèse de rationalité individualiste. De plus, étant
donné la simplicité de tels jeux, l’argument d’une rationalité limitée (Gigerenzer
and Selten [2001]) ne semble pas être suffisant pour justifier le comportement
observé. Les préférences sociales apparaissent alors comme une option plus réaliste
car elles permettent d’expliquer les comportement résultant tout en considérant
des agents rationnels.
Cependant, bien que de nombreuses études expérimentales (e.g., Berg et al.
[1995]; Güth et al. [1982]) ont montré que les gens manifestent naturellement des
préférences incorporant le profit des autres lors d’interactions avec des parfaits
étrangers, on peut s’interroger dans quelle mesure l’existence de relations sociales
peut influencer le comportement. L’aspect dynamique des préférences sociales
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semble très lié à celui des liens sociaux: intuitivement, un individu va coopérer
plus avec un ami qu’avec un étranger, ce qui peut ainsi avoir comme conséquence
de renforcer le niveau d’amitié.
L’énoncé suivant caractérise la condition minimale que nous considérons pour
l’existence d’un tel lien social entre deux individus:
Statement 8.4.0.1 Un lien social existe entre deux individus si et seulement
si ils partagent les même propriétés sociales qui définissent leur identité sociale,
et cela est croyance commune entre eux.
De plus, une propriété important des liens sociaux repose sur son aspect quanti-
tatif, c’est à dire, deux individus peuvent être plus ou moins liés l’un avec l’autre.
Plus précisément, nous assumons qu’un lien social entre deux individus peut être
mesuré sur une échelle variant de 0 à 1, où 0 et 1 correspondent respectivement
à la valeur minimale et la valeur maximale du lien. Selon notre interprétation, la
dimension quantitative d’un lien social entre deux individus dépend des variables
suivantes:
• La quantité et l’importance des propriétés sociales partagées qui définissent
les identités sociales des deux individus.
• La quantité et la qualité des interactions passées entre les deux individus.
Formellement, considérons deux joueurs i et j. Soit Si et Sj respectivement
l’ensemble des stratégies de i et j, et soit pii(si, sj) la fonction déterminant le profit
matériel pour le joueur i lorsque i et j jouent respectivement leur stratégie si et
sj. Pour chaque si ∈ Si et sj ∈ Sj, la fonction d’utilité de Liens Sociaux pour le
joueur i est donnée par:
USTi (si, sj) = (1− kij) · pii(si, sj) + kij ·max
s′j∈Sj
U(si, s′j)
où kij ∈ [0, 1] défini le lien social entre i et j.
La fonction U(si, sj) correspond à la fonction d’utilité de groupe qui peut (par
exemple) être caractérisé par l’un des deux principes suivants bien connus.
Définissons premièrement la fonction d’utilité de groupe Um(si, sj) qui satisfait
le critère de maximin de Rawls (Rawls [1971]).
Um(si, sj) = min{pii(si, sj), pij(si, sj)}
Ce critère correspond à donner un poids infiniment grand aux bénéfices de la
personne qui se trouve dans la situation la moins avantageuse.
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Une alternative consiste à considérer une fonction du bien-être social Us(si, sj)
qui satisfait l’utilitarisme classique (i.e., en maximisant la somme totale des profits
de tous les joueurs).
Us(si, sj) = pii(si, sj) + pij(si, sj)
Dans ce cas, l’interpretation de la fonction d’utilité de Liens Sociaux peut etre
interprété de la manière suivante. Mettre kij à 0 correspond à un lien inexistant
entre les individus (e.g., j est un parfait étranger pour i) alors que mettre kij à
1 signifie que i se sent socialement très proche de j (e.g., j est le meilleur ami de
i). Dans ce dernier cas, il faut noter que, en présence d’un fort lien social avec
l’agent j, l’agent i ne perçoit plus un problème stratégique: en effet, la stratégie
sj de j devient inutile au calcul de l’utilité de i. Ainsi, l’agent i a seulement
besoin de résoudre un problème classique de la prise de décision individuelle en
sélectionnant l’action à partir du profile de stratégies qui maximise l’utilité du
groupe. En conséquence, l’action de i peut être interprétée comme “faire ce qui
est bien pour le groupe, en assumant que l’autre joueur fait également ce qui est
bien pour le groupe”.
En d’autres termes, l’hypothèse principale qui résulte de ce modèle est que
les relations sociales peuvent influencer le choix des joueurs en modifiant leurs
préférences: un agent peut choisir d’être juste conditionnellement à la proximité
relative envers son partenaire. Afin d’examiner cette hypothèse, nous proposons
une analyse théorique d’un nouveau genre de jeu de coordination à deux joueurs
qui permet de séparer les prédictions de théories basées sur l’intérêt personnel,
les préférences sociales, et les liens sociaux. Le jeu correspondant, dénomé le jeu
d’entrée, est illustré par la Figure 8.1.
A travers ce jeu, nous démontrons également la nécessité d’introduire le modèle
précédent pour capturer le concept de liens sociaux comme des variable contin-
ues. En effet, en plus de défendre le fait que les liens sociaux reposent fortement
sur l’identification de groupe, nous montrons que les théories de raisonnement en
équipe (Bacharach [1999]; Colman et al. [2008]; Hakli et al. [2010]; Sugden [2000,
2003]; Tuomela [2010]) sont trop limitées pour remplir ce rôle car elles sont con-
struites à partir d’une interprétation binaire d’identification de groupe (i.e., soit
un individu s’identifie à un groupe ou pas).
Afin d’illustrer les différences entre notre modèle de liens sociaux et le concept
de raisonnement par équipe, nous considérons un jeu simple et concret de deux
joueurs où un joueur i peut choisir entre trois options: A, B, et C. Dans un
tel scénario, le profit de chaque joueur est déterminé uniquement par ces options
selon la Table 8.1 (pour simplicité, le joueur j n’a aucun contrôle sur le résultat).
Il faut noter que la fonction d’utilité de groupe peut alors correspondre soit à
l’utilitarisme (i.e., la somme des profits individuels), soit au principe du maximin















Figure 8.1: Jeu d’entrée
Option du joueur (i) ProfitsJoueur (i) Joueur (j) Somme Min
A 8 0 8 0
B 5 7 12 5
C 7 4 11 4
Table 8.1: Jeu de dictateur
Appliquer le raisonnement par équipe à cette situation particulière mène à
la prédiction suivante: l’agent i va joueur A s’il raisonne en I-mode (le joueur i
est individualiste), et le joueur i va joueur B s’il raisonne en we-mode (le joueur
i s’identifie au groupe). En conséquence, selon les théories de raisonnement en
équipe (et indépendamment de la fonction d’utilité de groupe qui peut correspon-
dre à l’utilitarisme ou au principe du maximin), le joueur i ne choisira jamais
l’option C.
D’un autre coté, considérer le même jeu à travers notre modèle de liens sociaux
mène à une interprétation différente: dans ce cas, le joueur i sélectionnera A si les
individus sont parfait étrangers (e.g., kij = kji = 0), et le joueur i sélectionnera B
si, par contre, les individus sont extrêmement proches l’un de l’autre (e.g., kij =
kji = 1). Cependant, si les joueurs sont ni très proche, ni très étrangers, mais, par
exemple, de simples connaissances (e.g., kij = kji = 0.5), alors le joueur i choisira
C (en assumant soit l’utilitarisme, soit le principe du maximin pour la fonction
d’utilité de groupe), comme un compromis entre être strictement individualiste et
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strictement motivé par l’intérêt du groupe.
8.5 Les effets comportementaux des liens soci-
aux
Mesurer les effets des relations sociales sur le comportement humain n’est pas nou-
veau dans les domaines de l’économie et de la psychologie sociale. Dans les années
passées, de nombreuses études ont effectivement montré que les gens tendent à
coopérer plus avec des individus qui appartiennent au même groupe qu’avec des
individus qui appartiennent à des groupes différents (voir, e.g., Brewer [1979, 1999];
Chen and Li [2009]; Tajfel and Turner [1979]; Tajfel et al. [1971]). Ces observations
ont mené à la distinction entre le concept de in-group qui constitue un groupe so-
cial auquel un individu s’identifie psychologiquement comme un de ses membres,
et celui de out-group qui, au contraire, représente un groupe auquel un individu
ne s’identifie pas comme un de ses membres. Alors qu’un tel comportement de
in-group peut raisonnablement être induit par une large variété de phénomènes
tels que la culture, la religion, le genre, et la race, le paradigme bien connu du
group minimal (Tajfel [1970]) suggère que même des caractéristiques sans aucune
signification peuvent suffire à déclencher une identification de groupe. Cepen-
dant, malgré les preuves empiriques pour un favoritisme in-group (i.e., favoriser
des membres de son groupe par rapport aux non-membres), il reste à clarifier ce
qui détermine un in-group en premier lieu. En fait, on peut facilement imaginer
que différents niveaux de in-group existent, comme suggéré précédemment: par
exemple, un individu peut simultanément s’identifier comme un économiste, un
informaticien, et un membre de son club de sport favoris. Notre objectif ici est
alors d’examiner l’impact que la variation de ce niveau de in-group peut avoir sur le
comportement humain: un individu se comporte-t-il de la même manière lorsqu’il
interagit avec un ami proche, une simple connaissance, ou un étranger?
Afin de répondre à ce genre de questions, nous proposons une expérience qui
concerne deux versions du jeu de coordination asymétrique présenté dans la section
précédente (i.e., le jeu d’entré de la Figure 8.1 avec et sans l’option de sortie). Dans
ce contexte, nous varions le niveau de liens sociaux en créant des interactions avec
des partenaires de différents in-groups (i.e., coéquipiers dans un sport collectif,
membres du même club de sport, membres de la même université). L’objectif
général de cette étude expérimentale est de vérifier la validité du modèle de liens
sociaux présenté dans la section précédente.
De plus, nous utilisons des questionnaires directs afin de mesurer plus précisé-
ment les connections sociales entre chaque individu et leur propre équipe sportive.
Dans ce cas, nous distinguons deux types différents de liens sociaux: un lien sub-
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jectif mesure le niveau avec lequel un individu particulier ressent une connexion
avec sa propre équipe (à travers l’évaluation de l’individu à propos des autres
membres de l’équipe), alors que un lien objectif mesure le niveau avec lequel une
équipe est réellement proche d’un individu (à travers l’évaluation des membres
de l’équipe à propos de l’individu). Après avoir comparer les deux types de liens
sociaux (subjectif and objectif) l’un avec l’autre, nous examinons alors le rôle que
chacun joue dans la détermination du comportement individuel.
Le résultat principal de cette étude est la preuve empirique révélant que de
forts liens sociaux aident les gens à se coordonner et à promouvoir le bien-être du
groupe. Plus précisément, nos observations supportent le modèle de liens sociaux
proposé dans la section précédente, et rejettent les autres théories pertinentes de
préférences sociales. De plus, nous montrons que les liens sociaux permettent de
promouvoir un sens de la justice dans le contexte des jeux de coordination présentés
ci-dessus (i.e., le jeu d’entré de la Figure 8.1 avec et sans l’option de sortie), ce qui
mène les gens à prendre des décisions comme s’ils étaient incapable de distinguer
leur propre identité de celle de leur partenaire (cf. la position originale de Rawls).
Cette analyse suggère donc que les liens sociaux peuvent être utilisés comme un
appareil qui permet d’augmenter le degré d’individualisme (lorsque le lien social
diminue), ou d’augmenter le degré de justice (lorsque le lien social augmente), tel
que spécifié par notre modèle de liens sociaux.
De plus, cette analyse expérimentale montre que le comportement d’un indi-
vidu est affecté par son lien social ressenti (subjectif) avec l’autre, ainsi que par
son lien social réel (objectif). Plus précisément, nous observons que les gens opti-
mistes qui surestime la force du lien social tendent à se comporter de manière plus
juste en coopérant avec l’autre, alors que les gens pessimistes qui sous-estiment
la force du lien social ne s’identifient à aucun groupe et ne parviennent donc pas
à se coordonner dans le jeu proposé. Un tel résultat suggère clairement qu’être
individualiste ne profite pas toujours dans le contexte des jeux de coordination.
En effet, dans ce type d’interaction, il est dans l’intérêt personnel d’un individu
d’être lié socialement avec les autres, ce qui permet donc de maximiser ses profits
à travers la coordination.
8.6 Vers des sociétés collaboratives
De nombreuses tâches de la vie de tous les jours requièrent les individus d’agir col-
lectivement et de se coordonner afin de poursuivre un but commun. Les exemples
incluent les musiciens d’un orchestre qui ont besoin d’agir ensemble d’une manière
bien spécifique pour jouer une symphonie particulière, ou les joueurs d’une équipe
de football qui doivent se coordonner les uns avec les autres pour pouvoir marquer
un but. Même parmi les autres tâches qui sont réalisables par un unique indi-
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vidu, celles-ci peuvent être réalisées de manière plus efficace à travers un travail
d’équipe, e.g., peindre une maison, porter un objet lourd. Une propriété commune
de toutes ces situations est que chaque individu dans l’équipe agis comme un mem-
bre du même groupe et avec l’intention de remplir sa part dans l’action commune
de l’équipe. L’intentionnalité collective a été, à travers les dernières décades, un
sujet central en philosophie sociale (voir, e.g., Bratman [1992, 1993]; Searle [1990];
Tuomela and Miller [1988]) ainsi qu’en économie (voir, e.g., Bacharach [1999, 2006];
Sugden [1993, 2000]).
L’objectif général, ici, est d’utiliser la théorie des jeux pour combler l’écart
entre un comportement individuellement égoïste et la coopération sociale dans
le contexte d’interactions stratégiques. Dans cette perspective, nous fournissons
l’analyse d’une théorie bien connue dans la littérature économique qui explique
comment les agents, humains ou artificiels, réussissent à résoudre les problèmes de
coordination dans le contexte d’une activité commune: la théorie de raisonnement
par équipe de Bacharach. A la suite d’une discussion des limitations de cette
théorie dans la modélisation de comportements sociaux intuitifs, nous proposons
la généralisation suivante du modèle de liens sociaux présenté précédemment.
Considérons un ensemble de joueurs Agt, un ensemble de conséquences S, et
pour chaque coalition J ⊆ Agt d’au moins un agent, SJ et UJ dénotent respective-
ment l’ensemble des stratégies pour J et la fonction déterminant le profit matériel
pour la coalition J pour chaque conséquence. Pour chaque conséquence s ∈ S, la




ki(J ∪ {i}) · max
s′J∈SJ
UJ∪{i}(s−J , s′J)
où s−J ∈ S−J denote la stratégie commune pour la coalition Agt\J (i.e., S−J =
SAgt\J), et UJ(s) peut être défini selon l’utilitarisme ou le principe de maximin,
comme introduit dans la section 8.4.
De plus, la fonction de liens sociaux k est défini de la manière suivante. Pour
chaque agent i ∈ Agt et pour chaque groupe J = {G ∈ 2Agt∗|i ∈ G}, le paramètre
ki(J) défini la mesure du lien social entre l’agent i et le groupe J dans le contexte du
jeu concerné. En particulier, ki(J) mesure le degré avec lequel l’agent i s’identifie
au groupe J . Mettre ki(J) à 0 correspond à un lien non-existant entre l’agent i
et le groupe J (i.e., i ne s’identifie pas à J), alors que mettre ki(J) à 1 signifie
que l’agent i est fortement lié au groupe J (i.e., i s’identifie fortement au groupe
J). Il faut également noter que ki({i}) correspond à la mesure d’individualisme
de l’agent i.
La fonction k est également soumise aux contraintes suivantes:
C1 for every i ∈ Agt, ∑J∈Group(i) ki(J) = 1
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C2 for all i, j ∈ J , ki(J) = kj(J)
Selon la contrainte C1, ki défini, pour l’individu i, une distribution de liens
sociaux avec chaque groupe J = {G ∈ 2Agt∗|i ∈ G}. Dans ce cas, un agent ne peut
ni s’identifier totalement à plusieurs groupes, ni s’identifier à aucun groupe (dans
le pire cas, l’agent i est extrêmement individualiste, i.e., ki({i}) = 1). A travers la
contrainte C2, nous assumons que le lien social est restreint à être bilatéral, c’est
à dire, le degré de lien social avec un groupe J est le même pour chaque membre
de J .
Nous montrons ensuite les différents avantages offerts par un tel modèle par
rapport à la théorie de Bacharach, particulièrement dans le contexte d’interactions
sociales où différents groupes concurrents peuvent coexister.
Plus précisément, l’étude que nous présentons ici se concentre sur le concept
central de l’identification de groupe qui permet de dévoiler le point focal requis
pour résoudre les problèmes de coordination (Schelling [1960]).
Cependant, nous argumentons qu’une telle identification binaire de groupe (i.e.,
soit l’individu s’identifie au groupe ou pas), selon la théorie de raisonnement en
équipe de Bacharach, n’est pas suffisante pour modéliser les situations de la vie
de tous les jours où des individus s’identifient avec un groupe particulier avec
un certain degré : par exemple, un individu peut être partagé entre s’identifier
à un groupe d’amis, et s’identifier à un groupe de membres de sa famille. En
conséquence, nous montrons comment la théorie que nous proposons permet de
traiter efficacement ce genre de dilemmes.
8.7 Conclusion
Dans cette thèse, nous fournissons des arguments intuitifs expliquant pourquoi les
gens dévient souvent du comportement optimal. Bien qu’il soit souvent dit qu’un
tel comportement résulte d’irrationalité, nous défendons plutôt sa compatibilité
avec un principe de rationalité limité. En effet, la plupart des êtres humains
sont incapables de raisonner correctement à propos de connaissances et croyances
interactives complexes (e.g., à propos de ce que je sais que tu sais que je sais
que tu sais que . . . ). De la même manière, les gens ont également des mémoires
limitées, ce qui les empêche de se souvenir parfaitement de ce qui s’est passé
précédemment et d’utiliser cette information pour prédire ce qui se passera ensuite.
Comme autre composante principale qui dirige les décisions rationnelles dans les
interactions sociales, nous considérons également les relations sociales existantes
entre les individus qui jouent un rôle majeur pour favoriser la coopération.
Cependant, bien que l’étude présentée dans cette thèse permet de clarifier le
concept de rationalité sociale, il est clair qu’elle représente seulement un prémisse à
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de multiple directions de recherche future qui méritent une attention particulière.
En voici quelques exemples:
• Etendre l’étude logique présentée dans cette thèse afin de raisonner sur des
évènements passés, présents et futures, ce qui permettrait de raisonner sur
des situations contrefactuelles. Une telle logique semble particulièrement
intéressante pour une analyse détaillée des jeux extensifs avec information
imparfaite ou information incomplète.
• Fournir une analyse logique de raisonnement normatif: l’étude expérimentale
présenté dans cette thèse indique que les gens ne raisonnent pas stratégique-
ment, mais tendent à suivre ce qu’ils croient être la norme, c’est à dire, ce
que tout le monde devrait faire dans une situation déterminée. La logique
déontique semble alors représenter un outil adéquat pour répondre à cette
problématique.
• Améliorer le modèle de liens sociaux présenté dans cette thèse qui consid-
ère seulement les relations avec des groupes (à travers le niveau avec lequel
chaque individu s’identifie avec chaque groupe). En effet, un groupe est
composé d’agents qui partagent des liens individuels les uns avec les autres.
Cependant, exprimer les fonctions ci-dessus ki (pour chaque agent i) stricte-
ment en terme de relations individuelles n’apparait pas comme une tâche
facile: un individu peut effectivement être très proche individuellement de
chaque membre du groupe sans être proche socialement du groupe lui-même.
Plus généralement, l’objectif de ce raffinement du modèle de liens sociaux est
de fournir une analyse économique de l’impacte de l’identification de groupe
sur les interactions stratégiques au sein des réseaux sociaux. Une telle étude
inclue également une analyse comparative avec les modèles économiques ex-
istant dans la littérature sur les réseaux sociaux (voir, e.g., Bramoullé et al.
[2011]; Galeotti et al. [2010]; Goyal [2009]; Jackson [2005, 2007]).
• Analyser les liens sociaux et le raisonnement collectif dans le contexte d’interactions
séquentielles. Par exemple, la relation entre trahison, punitions et liens so-
ciaux représente un problème de recherche particulièrement pertinent: intu-
itivement, plus fort est la relation sociale entre deux individus, plus fort est
l’impact d’une trahison de l’un envers l’autre, ce qui entrainera une puni-
tion plus importante de l’individu trahi envers l’acteur responsable (i.e., le
traitre). Plus généralement, ce genre d’étude suggère l’analyse du caractère
dynamique des liens sociaux: en effet, il est raisonnable d’assumer qu’un
comportement coopératif permet de renforcer une relation entre individus
alors qu’un comportement individualiste l’affaibli. Des études expérimen-
tales semblent alors requises afin d’examiner la création et l’évolution des
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liens sociaux dans le contexte de situations interactives dynamiques (i.e.,
dans des jeux séquentiel ou des jeux répétés).
• Etudier expérimentalement les différences entre les prédictions de notre mod-
èle de liens sociaux et celles de la théorie de raisonnement par équipe de
Bacharach (e.g., voir le jeu de dictateur de la table 8.1).
• Comparer le modèle de liens sociaux présenté dans cette thèse avec le modèle
d’Homo Moralis présenté dans Alger and Weibull [2012] qui suggère que le
degré de moralité d’un individu dépend de la probabilité d’interagir avec des
individus qui partagent les même préférences.
• Clarifier ce qui défini une solution juste pour un groupe. Dans cette thèse,
nous considérons deux approches pour calculer le profit collectif: soit les in-
dividus suivent le critère de justice de Rawls dont l’objectif est de maximiser
la personne dans la situation la moins favorable, soit les individus suivent
l’utilitarisme classique dont l’objectif est de maximiser l’efficacité globale
du groupe. Cependant, laquelle de ces méthodes faut-il suivre reste une
question ouverte dont la réponse dépend probablement du contexte. Afin
d’examiner les hypothèses plausibles qui pourraient clarifier quelle fonction
de profit collectif devrait être utilisée dans quel contexte (voir, e.g., Binmore




Proofs in modal logic ELEG
To make the proofs of Lemmas and Theorems more readable, we use the following
abbreviation:
AllRat def= ∧i∈Agt Rati
A.1 Proof of Lemmas
We first provide the proof of the following Lemmas that are necessary to later
prove Theorems.
1. `ELEG [Ki]Rati → Rati
2. `ELEG Rati → [Ki]Rati
3. `ELEG [CKn+1Agt ]AXnAllRat→ [CKnAgt ]AXnAllRat
4. `ELEG Depthn+1 → AXDepthn
5. `ELEG GenPosn+1 → AXGenPosn
6. `ELEG (Depthn ∧ GenPosn ∧ ki ∧ hj)→ (ki ↔ hj)
7. `ELEG (Depthn ∧ GenPosn ∧ ki ∧ BIn)→ (BIn → ki)
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A.1.1 Syntactic proof of lemma A.1
We prove the following:
Lemma A.1 For every i ∈ Agt:
`ELEG [Ki]Rati → Rati
1. `ELEG end ∧ turni
→ (end ∧ turni)
by Axioms EndVert and TurnStr;
2. `ELEG ¬end ∧ turni
→ (¬end ∧ turni)
by Axioms EndVert and TurnStr, and Axiom 5 for ;
3. `ELEG end ∧ turni ∧ ki
→ ∨α∈Act αi ∧ ki
by Axioms OneAct;
4. `ELEG end ∧ turni ∧ ki
→ [Ki]ki
by 3, Axioms EndAct, PerfectInfo, and Aware, and Axiom K for [Ki];
5. `ELEG [Ki]Rati
→ [Ki]Ratendi ∧ [Ki]Rat¬endi
by the definitions of Rati and boolean principles;
6. `ELEG [Ki]Ratendi
→ ((end ∧ turni)→ [Ki]∨k∈I(ki ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k hi))
by 1, the definitions of Ratendi , Axiom PerfectInfo, and Axioms T and K for
[Ki] (or AxiomsD andK if [Ki] isKD45 modal operator), and Axiom 5 for;
7. `ELEG [Ki]Ratendi
→ ((end ∧ turni)→ ∨k′∈I k′i ∧ [Ki]∨k∈I(ki ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k hi))
by 6 and Axiom CompletePref ;
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8. `ELEG [Ki]Ratendi
→ ((end ∧ turni)→ ∨k∈I ki ∧ [Ki](ki ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k hi))
by 7 and 4, and Axiom SinglePref ;
9. `ELEG [Ki]Ratendi
→ ((end ∧ turni)→ ∨k∈I ki ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k hi)
by 8, Axiom PerfectInfo, Axiom T for [Ki] (or Axiom D if [Ki] is KD45
modal operator), and Axiom 5 for ;
10. `ELEG [Ki]Ratendi
→ Ratendi
by 9 and the definition of Ratendi ;
11. `ELEG [Ki]Rat¬endi
→ (¬end ∧ turni)→ [Ki]∨k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k〈Ki〉hi))
by 2, the definitions of Rat¬endi , Axiom PerfectInfo, and Axioms T and K
for [Ki] (or Axioms D and K if [Ki] is KD45 modal operator), and Axiom 5
for ;
12. `ELEG [Ki]Rat¬endi
→ (¬end ∧ turni)→ ∨k∈I〈Ki〉〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k〈Ki〉hi))
by 11 and boolean principles;
13. `ELEG [Ki]Rat¬endi
→ (¬end ∧ turni)→ ∨k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k〈Ki〉hi))
by 12 and Axiom 4 for [Ki];
14. `ELEG [Ki]Rat¬endi
→ Rat¬endi
by 13 and the definition of Rat¬endi ;
15. `ELEG [Ki]Rati
→ Ratendi ∧ Rat¬endi




by 15 and the definition of Rati;
A.1.2 Syntactic proof of lemma A.2
We prove the following:
Lemma A.2 For every i ∈ Agt:
`ELEG Rati → [Ki]Rati
1. `ELEG end ∧ turni
→ (end ∧ turni)
by Axioms EndVert and TurnStr;
2. `ELEG ¬end ∧ turni
→ (¬end ∧ turni)
by Axioms EndVert and TurnStr, and Axiom 5 for ;
3. `ELEG end ∧ turni ∧ ki
→ ∨α∈Act αi ∧ ki
by Axioms OneAct;
4. `ELEG end ∧ turni ∧ ki
→ [Ki]ki
by 3, Axioms EndAct, PerfectInfo, and Aware, and Axiom K for [Ki];
5. `ELEG Rati
→ Ratendi ∧ Rat¬endi
by the definition of Rati;
6. `ELEG Ratendi
→ ((end ∧ turni)→ ∨k∈I(ki ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k hi))
by the definition of Ratendi ;
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7. `ELEG Ratendi
→ ((end ∧ turni)→ ∨k∈I [Ki](ki ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k hi))
by 6 and 4, Axiom PerfectInfo, and Axiom 4 for ;
8. `ELEG Ratendi
→ [Ki]((end ∧ turni)→ ∨k∈I(ki ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k hi))
by 7 and 1, Axiom PerfectInfo, and boolean principles;
9. `ELEG Ratendi
→ [Ki]Ratendi
by 8 and the definition of Ratendi ;
10. `ELEG Rat¬endi
→ ((¬end ∧ turni)→ ∨k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k〈Ki〉hi)))
by the definition of Rat¬endi ;
11. `ELEG Rat¬endi
→ ((¬end ∧ turni)→ [Ki]∨k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k〈Ki〉hi)))
by 10, Axiom 5 for [Ki], and boolean principles;
12. `ELEG Rat¬endi
→ [Ki]((¬end ∧ turni)→ ∨k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k〈Ki〉hi)))
by 11 and 2, Axiom PerfectInfo, and boolean principles;
13. `ELEG Rat¬endi
→ [Ki]Rat¬endi
by 12 and the definition of Rat¬endi ;
14. `ELEG Rati
→ [Ki]Ratendi ∧ [Ki]Rat¬endi
by 5, 9, and 13;
15. `ELEG Rati
→ [Ki]Rati
by 14 and boolean principles;
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A.1.3 Syntactic proof of lemma A.3
We prove the following:
Lemma A.3 For every n ∈ N:
`ELEG [CKn+1Agt ]AXnAllRat→ [CKnAgt ]AXnAllRat
Basic case (n = 0):
1. `ELEG [CK1Agt ]AllRat
→ [EKAgt ]AllRat
by the definition of [CK1Agt ];
2. `ELEG [CK1Agt ]AllRat
→ ∧i∈Agt [Ki]Rati
by 1 and the definitions of [EK1Agt ] and AllRat;
3. `ELEG [CK1Agt ]AllRat
→ ∧i∈Agt Rati
by 2 and Lemma A.1;
4. `ELEG [CK1Agt ]AllRat
→ AllRat
by 3 and the definition of AllRat (i.e. [CK0Agt ]AllRat);
General case (for n > 0):
1. `ELEG [CKn+1Agt ]AXnAllRat
→ ∧1≤k≤n+1[EKkAgt ]AXnAllRat
by the definition of [CKn+1Agt ];
2. `ELEG [CKn+1Agt ]AXnAllRat
→ ∧1≤k≤n[EKkAgt ]AXnAllRat ∧ [EKn+1Agt ]AXnAllRat
by 1 and boolean principles;
3. `ELEG [CKn+1Agt ]AXnAllRat
→ [CKnAgt ]AXnAllRat
by 2 and the definition of [CKnAgt ];
203
A.1.4 Syntactic proof of lemma A.4
We prove the following:
Lemma A.4 For every n ∈ N:
`ELEG Depthn+1 → AXDepthn
1. `ELEG Depthn+1
→ X(X)nend
by definition of Depthn+1;
2. `ELEG Depthn+1
→ AX(X)nend
by 1, Axioms 4 and T for  and Axiom NxtVert;
3. `ELEG Depthn+1
→ AXDepthn
by 2 and definition of Depthn;
A.1.5 Syntactic proof of lemma A.5
We prove the following:
Lemma A.5 For every n ∈ N:
`ELEG GenPosn+1 → AXGenPosn
1. `ELEG GenPosn+1
→ ∧0≤k≤n+1∧k∈I,i∈Agt,∈Seqk AX≤n+1((ki ∧ 〈〉end)→ (〈〉end↔ ki))
by definition of GenPosn+1;
2. `ELEG GenPosn+1
→ AX∧0≤k≤n+1∧k∈I,i∈Agt,∈Seqk AX≤n((ki ∧ 〈〉end)→ (〈〉end↔ ki))
by 1, Theorem `ELEG AXn+1ϕ→ AXAX≤nϕ, and boolean principles;
3. `ELEG GenPosn+1 → AXGenPosn
by 2 and the definition of GenPosn;
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A.1.6 Syntactic proof of lemma A.6
We prove the following inductively:
Lemma A.6 For every n ∈ N, i, j ∈ Agt:
`ELEG (Depthn ∧ GenPosn ∧ ki ∧ hj)→ (ki ↔ hj)
Basic case n=0:
Here, we prove
`ELEG (end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ ki ∧ hj)→ (ki ↔ hj)
1. `ELEG end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ ∨α∈Act α ∧((α ∧ end)↔ ki) ∧((α ∧ end)↔ hj)
by definition of GenPos0, Axiom OneAct, and Axiom T for ;
2. `ELEG end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ (ki ↔ hj)
by 1 and boolean principles;
Inductive case:
Let n ∈ N and let us prove that if the theorem is true for all k ≤ n, then it is true
for n+ 1.
1. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ ki ∧ hj ∧ X(ki ∧ hj ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)
by Axiom TimePref , and Lemmas A.4 and A.5;
2. `ELEG Depthn ∧ GenPosn ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ (ki ↔ hj)
by induction;
3. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ ∨α∈Act α ∧ ki ∧ X(ki ↔ hj)
by 1 and 2, and Axiom OneAct;
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4. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ ∨α∈Act α ∧ ki ∧(α→ X(ki ↔ hj))
by 3, and Axiom StrAct;
5. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ ∨α∈Act,∈Seqn α ∧ X〈〉end ∧ ki ∧(α→ (ki ↔ hj))
by 4, Axiom TimePref and the definition of Depthn+1;
6. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ ∨α∈Act,∈Seqn (ki ↔ (α ∧ X〈〉end)) ∧(α→ (ki ↔ hj))
by 5 and the definition of GenPosn+1;
7. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ ∨α∈Act (ki → α) ∧(α→ (ki ↔ hj))
by 6 and boolean principles;
8. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ ∨α∈Act (α↔ (ki ↔ hj))
by 7, and boolean principles;
9. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ ki ∧ hj
→ (ki ↔ hj)
by 8, and boolean principles;
A.1.7 Syntactic proof of lemma A.7
We prove the following:
Lemma A.7 For every n ∈ N, i, j ∈ Agt:
`ELEG (Depthn ∧ GenPosn ∧ kj ∧ BIn)→ (BIn → kj)
Basic case (n = 0):
Here, we prove:
`ELEG (end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ kj ∧ BI0)→ (BI0 → kj)
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1. `ELEG (end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ kj ∧ BI0)
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I turni ∧ k′i ∧ BI0 ∧3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧ BI0)
by Axioms TurnTaking, TurnStr andCompletePref and Axiom T for ;
2. `ELEG (end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ kj ∧ BI0)
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I turni ∧ k′i ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k′ hi) ∧3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k′′ hi))
by 1 and the definition of BI0;
3. `ELEG (end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ kj ∧ BI0)
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I turni ∧ k′i ∧3(turni ∧ k′′i ) ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k′,h≤k′′ hi))
by 2, Axiom 5 for , and boolean principles;
4. `ELEG (end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ kj ∧ BI0)
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I turni ∧ k′i ∧ ∨h∈I:h≤k′,h≤k′′ hi ∧3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧ ∨h∈I:h≤k′,h≤k′′ hi)
by 5, Axiom K and T for , and boolean principles;
5. `ELEG (end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ kj ∧ BI0)
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I:k′≤k′′,k′′≤k′ turni ∧ k′i ∧ BI0 ∧3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧ BI0)
by 7, Axiom SinglePref , and boolean principles;
6. `ELEG (end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ kj ∧ BI0)
→ (∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I:k′ 6=k′′ turni ∧ k′i ∧ BI0 ∧3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧ BI0))→ ⊥
by 8, and boolean principles;
7. `ELEG (end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ kj ∧ BI0)
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′∈I turni ∧ k′i ∧ BI0 ∧(BI0 → k′i)
by 9 and boolean principles;
8. `ELEG (end ∧ GenPos0 ∧ kj ∧ BI0)
→ (BI0 → kj)
by 10 and Lemma A.6;
Inductive case:
Let n ∈ N and let us prove that if the theorem is true for all k ≤ n, then it is true
for n+ 1.
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1. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ kj ∧ BIn+1
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I turni ∧ k′i ∧ BIn+1 ∧3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧ BIn+1)
by Axioms TurnTaking, TurnStr andCompletePref and Axiom T for ;
2. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ kj ∧ BIn+1
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I turni ∧ k′i ∧ AX(BIn ∧ ∨h∈I:h≤k′ hi) ∧ 3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧ AX(BIn ∧∨
h∈I:h≤k′′ hi))
by 1 and the definition of BIn+1;
3. `ELEG Depthn ∧ GenPosn ∧ kj ∧ BIn
→ (BIn → kj)
by induction;
4. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ kj ∧ BIn+1
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I turni∧k′i∧AX(BIn → ∨h∈I:h≤k′ hi)∧3(turni∧k′′i ∧AX(BIn →∨
h∈I:h≤k′′ hi))
by 2 and 3, Lemmas A.4 and A.5, Axiom Perm,AX, and Axiom 4 for ;
5. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ kj ∧ BIn+1
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I turni ∧ k′i ∧ AXBIn ∧ 3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧ AXBIn) ∧ AX(BIn →∨
h∈I:h≤k′,h≤k′′ hi))
by 4 and 2, Axiom Perm,AX, Axiom 5 for ;
6. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ kj ∧ BIn+1
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I turni∧k′i∧AX(∨h∈I:h≤k′,h≤k′′ hi)∧3(turni∧k′′i∧AX(∨h∈I:h≤k′,h≤k′′ hi)))
by 5, Axiom T for , and boolean principles;
7. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ kj ∧ BIn+1
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I turni ∧ k′i ∧ ∨h∈I:h≤k′,h≤k′′ hi ∧3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧ ∨h∈I:h≤k′,h≤k′′ hi)
by 6, the definition of Depthn+1, Axioms TimeVert and TimePref ;
8. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ kj ∧ BIn+1
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I:k′≤k′′,k′′≤k′ turni ∧ k′i ∧ BIn+1 ∧3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧ BIn+1)
by 7, Axiom SinglePref , and boolean principles;
208
9. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ kj ∧ BIn+1
→ (∨i∈Agt,k′,k′′∈I:k′ 6=k′′ turni ∧ k′i ∧ BIn+1 ∧3(turni ∧ k′′i ∧ BIn+1))→ ⊥
by 8, and boolean principles;
10. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ kj ∧ BIn+1
→ ∨i∈Agt,k′∈I turni ∧ k′i ∧ BIn+1 ∧(BIn+1 → k′i)
by 9 and boolean principles;
11. `ELEG Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1 ∧ kj ∧ BIn+1
→ (BIn+1 → kj)
by 10 and Lemma A.6;
A.2 Proofs of Theorems
We here provide the proof of the following Theorems.
1. `ELEG Nashn+1 → XNashn
2. `ELEG BIn ↔ ∧0≤m≤n AXmNashn−m
3. `ELEG SRatni ↔ [Ki]SRatni
4. `ELEG ([CKnAgt ]
∧
i∈Agt SRatni ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)→ BIn
A.2.1 Syntactic proof of theorem 3.1
We prove the following (for every n ∈ N):
`ELEG Nashn+1 → XNashn
1. `ELEG Nashn+1 → ¬end ∧ ∧i∈Agt ∨k∈I ki ∧ BRn+1(i, k)
by the definition of Nashn+1;
2. `ELEG Nashn+1 → ¬end ∧ ∧i∈Agt ∨k∈I ki ∧ XBRn(i, k)
by 1 and the definition of BRn+1(i, k);
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3. `ELEG Nashn+1 → X(∧i∈Agt ∨k∈I ki ∧ BRn(i, k))
by 2 and Axiom TimeVert;
4. `ELEG Nashn+1 → XNashn
by 3 and the definition of Nashn;
A.2.2 Syntactic proof of theorem 3.2






Here, we prove `ELEG BI0 ↔ Nash0.
1. `ELEG BI0 ↔ end ∧ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧(∨h∈I:h≤k hi)
by the definition of BI0;
2. `ELEG BI0 ↔ end ∧ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ (turni → ∨h∈I:h≤k hi)
by 1 and boolean principle;
3. `ELEG BI0 ↔ end ∧ ∧i∈Agt ∨k∈I ki ∧ (turni → ∨h∈I:h≤k hi)
by 2, Axioms SingleTurn and CompletePref , and boolean principles;
4. `ELEG BI0 ↔ ∧i∈Agt ∨k∈I ki ∧ BR0(i, k)
by 3 and the definition of BR0(i, k);
5. `ELEG BI0 ↔ Nash0
by 4 and the definition of Nash0;
Inductive case:
Let n ∈ N and let us prove that if the theorem is true for all k ≤ n, then it is true
for n+ 1.
1. `ELEG BIn+1 ↔ ¬end ∧ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ AX(BIn ∧ ∨h∈I:h≤k hi)
by the definition of BIn+1;
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2. `ELEG BIn ↔ ∧0≤m≤n AXmNashn−m
by induction;
3. `ELEG BIn+1 ↔
¬end ∧ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ AX(∧0≤m≤n AXmNashn−m ∧ ∨h∈I:h≤k hi)
by 1 and 2;
4. `ELEG BIn+1 ↔
¬end∧∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni∧ki∧AX(∨h∈I:h≤k hi∧Nashn)∧∧1≤m≤n+1 AXmNashn+1−m
by 3, K principles for AX, the definition of AXm, and boolean principles;
5. `ELEG ¬end ∧ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ Nashn)↔∨
i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ X(
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ Nashn) ∧ AX(
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ Nashn)
by Axioms TimeVert and EndVert;
6. `ELEG ¬end ∧ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ Nashn)↔∨
i∈Agt,k∈I turni∧ki∧X(
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi∧Nashn)∧(turni → AX(
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi∧Nashn))
by 5 and boolean principles;
7. `ELEG ¬end ∧ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ Nashn)↔∧
i∈Agt
∨
k∈I ki ∧ X(
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ Nashn) ∧ (turni → AX(
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ Nashn))
by 6, Axioms SingleTurn and CompletePref , and boolean principles;





h∈I:h≤k hi∧BRn(i, h))∧(turni → AX(
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi∧BRn(i, h)))
by 7 and the definition of Nashn;
9. `ELEG (∨h∈I:h≤k BRn(i, h))↔ BRn(i, k)
by the definition of BRn(i, h);
10. `ELEG ¬end ∧ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ Nashn)↔∧
i∈Agt
∨
k∈I ki ∧ XBRn(i, k) ∧ (turni → AXBRn(i, k))
by 8 and 9;
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11. `ELEG ¬end ∧ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ Nashn)↔∧
i∈Agt
∨
k∈I ki ∧ BRn+1(i, k)
by 10 and the definition of BRn+1(i, k);
12. `ELEG ¬end ∧ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ Nashn)↔
Nashn+1
by 11 and the definition of Nashn+1;
13. `ELEG BIn+1 ↔ (Nashn+1 ∧ ∧1≤m≤n+1 AXmNashn+1−m)
by 4 and 12;
14. `ELEG BIn+1 ↔ ∧0≤m≤n+1 AXmNashn+1−m
by 13, the definition of AX0, and boolean principles;
A.2.3 Syntactic proof of theorem 3.3
We prove the following (for every n ∈ N, i ∈ Agt):
`ELEG SRatni ↔ [Ki]SRatni
1. `ELEG Rati ↔ [Ki]Rati
by Lemmas A.1 and A.2;
2. `ELEG AX≤nRati ↔ AX≤n[Ki]Rati
by 1 and Axiom K for AX, and the definition of AX≤n;
3. `ELEG AX≤nRati ↔ [Ki]AX≤nRati
by 2 and Axiom Perm[Ki],AX;
4. `ELEG SRatni ↔ [Ki]SRatni
by 3 and the definition of SRatni ;
A.2.4 Syntactic proof of theorem 3.4




SRatni ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)→ BIn
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[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)→ BIn
Basic case n=0:
Here, we prove `ELEG AllRat ∧ end ∧ GenPos0 → BI0.
1. `ELEG (AllRat ∧ end ∧ GenPos0)
→ ∨i∈Agt(turni ∧ Ratendi )
by the definition of Rati, and Axiom TurnTaking;
2. `ELEG (AllRat ∧ end ∧ GenPos0)
→ ∨i∈Agt(end ∧ turni ∧ ∨k∈I ki ∧(∨h∈I:k≥h hi)
by 1, and the definition of Ratendi ;
3. `ELEG (AllRat ∧ end ∧ GenPos0)→ BI0
by 2 and the definition of BI0;
Inductive case:
Let n ∈ N and let us prove that if the theorem is true for all k ≤ n, then it is true
for n+ 1.
1. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ (∧0≤m≤n[CKm+1Agt ]AXAXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
by Theorem `ELEG AXn+1ϕ→ AXAXnϕ;
2. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ AX(∧0≤m≤n[CKm+1Agt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)
by 1, Lemmas A.4 and A.5, and Axiom Perm[Ki],AX (or Perm∗[Ki],AX);
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3. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ AX(∧0≤m≤n[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)
by 2 and Lemma A.3;
4. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ [EK1Agt ]AX(
∧
0≤m≤n[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)
by 1, Lemmas A.4 and A.5, and Axiom Perm[Ki],AX (or Perm∗[Ki],AX);
5. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)→ BIn
by induction;
6. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ AXBIn ∧ [EK1Agt ]AXBIn
by 3, 4 and 5;
7. `ELEG GenPosn → [Kj]GenPosn
by Axioms Perm,AX and PerfectInfo, and Axiom 4 for  and [Kj];
8. `ELEG Depthn → [Kj]Depthn
by Axiom PerfectInfo, and Axiom 4 for ;
9. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ AX(∨k∈I ki ∧ BIn ∧ [Kj]BIn ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn) ∧ [Kj]AX(∨k∈I ki ∧ BIn ∧
[Kj]BIn ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)
by 6, 7, and 8, Lemmas A.4 and A.5, AxiomsCompletePref andPerm[Ki],AX
(or Perm∗[Ki],AX), and Axiom 4 for [Ki];
10. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt,α∈Act turni ∧ αi ∧ [Ki]αi ∧ X∨k∈I (BIn → ki)
by 9, Lemma A.7, and Axioms TurnTaking, TimeVert, OneAct, and
Aware;
11. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt,α∈Act turni ∧ αi ∧ [Ki]αi ∧ ∨k∈I (αi → X(BIn → ki))
by 10 and Axiom StrAct;
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12. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt turni ∧ XBIn ∧ [Ki]XBIn ∧ ∨k∈I X(BIn → ki) ∧ [Ki]X(BIn → ki)
by 11 and 6, Axioms PerfectInfo and TimeVert, Axiom T for , Axiom
K for [Ki], and boolean principles;
13. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ Xki ∧ [Ki]Xki
by 12 and Axiom K for [Ki] and X;
14. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ [Ki]ki
by 13 and Axiom TimePref ;
15. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ [Kj]AX([Kj]BIn ∧ ∨k∈I ki ∧(BIn → ki))
by 9 and Lemma A.7;
16. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ [Kj]AX(∨k∈I ki ∧ [Kj]ki)
by 15, Axiom PerfectInfo, and Axiom K for [Kj];
17. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt(turni ∧ Rat¬endi ∧ [Ki]AX∨k∈I(ki ∧ [Ki]ki))
by 6 and 16, the definition of Rati, Axiom TurnTaking, and boolean prin-
ciples;
18. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt(turni ∧ ∨k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX∨h∈I:h≤k〈Ki〉hi) ∧ [Ki]AX∨h∈I(hi ∧ [Ki]hi))
by 17, the definition of Rat¬endi ;
19. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt(turni ∧ ∨k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX∨h∈I:h≤k hi))
by 18, Axiom SinglePref , and Axiom T for [Ki] (or Axiom D if [Ki] isKD45
modal operator);
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20. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt(turni ∧ ∨k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX(BIn → ∨h∈I:h≤k hi)))
by 19 and 9, Lemma A.7, and Axiom T for [Ki] (or Axiom D if [Ki] is KD45
modal operator);
21. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt(turni ∧ ∨k∈I〈Ki〉ki ∧ AX(BIn → ∨h∈I:h≤k hi))
by 20, Axioms Perm,AX and PerfectInfo, and Axioms T and 5 for ;
22. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt(turni ∧ ∨k∈I〈Ki〉ki ∧ AX(BIn ∧ ∨h∈I:h≤k hi))
by 21 and 6, and Axiom K for AX;
23. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ¬end ∧ ∨i∈Agt(turni ∧ ∨k∈I ki ∧ AX(∨h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ BIn))
by 22 and 14, the definition of Depthn+1, and boolean principles;
24. `ELEG (∧0≤m≤n+1[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ BIn+1
by 23 and the definition of BIn+1;
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Appendix B
Instructions of the Experimental
Study
B.1 Preliminary Instructions
We are going to present two games that you will have to play with some unknown
participants. One of these games will then be drawn in order to determine your
actual winnings.
Each game considers two players. You will be asked to take a decision as Player
(1) and as Player (2). At the end of the experiment, we will randomly assign one
of these two roles to you.
Your actual payoff will then depend on your decision in the role that will be
assigned to you as well as your partner’s decision in the selected game. Therefore,
each of your decisions is important. So please take every question seriously by
carefully answering them.
Moreover your participation to this experiment relies on the fact that you
answered every single question.
If anything is unclear or if you have any question, please do not hesitate to
raise your hand so that we can bring you the clarification that you need.
B.2 Instructions of the Baseline game
During this experiment, you will interact with some randomly selected player in a
game that is defined as follows.
In the first stage, some initial amount are given to both you and your oppo-
nent:
• 20 Euros for Player (1)
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• 10 Euros for Player (2)
No decision needs to be taken by any player during this stage.
In the second stage, every player will then have to choose simultaneously be-
tween two distinct moves A and B.
In the second stage:
• If every player chooses to play A, 5 Euros will be withdrawn from Player
(2)’s initial amount and 15 Euros will be added to Player (1)’s initial amount.
Thus Player (1) will get 35 Euros while Player (2) will get 5 Euros.
• If every player chooses to play B, 5 Euros will be withdrawn from Player
(1)’s initial amount and 25 Euros will be added to Player (2)’s initial amount.
Thus Player (1) will get 15 Euros while Player (2) will get 35 Euros.
• If the players’ choices are different, then both players’ amount will be reset
to zero (each will thus get 0 euro).














This simultaneous decision ends both the second stage and the game. All along
the game, both players will remain anonymous to one another. You will receive
the corresponding amount if this game is eventually being selected.
These instructions concern the three situations described below.
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B.2.1 Questions
In the context of the previous game, you will play with X 1 (select one answer per
question)
• Please indicate your choice while you are acting as Player (1):
In the second stage, you play:
A B
• Please indicate your choice while you are acting as Player (2):
In the second stage, you play:
A B
Note that the three previous questions are independent from one another.
Please make sure to answer each of them
B.3 Instructions of the Entrance game
During this experiment, you will interact with some randomly selected player in a
game that is defined as follows.
In the first stage, some initial amount are given to both you and your oppo-
nent:
• 20 Euros for Player (1)
• 10 Euros for Player (2)
Then, the two following options become available to Player (1):
• The “Out” option implies that every player keeps their initial amount and
the game ends.
• The alternative option (“In”) implies entering a second stage where each
player will have to take another decision. In the latter case, both players will
then have to choose simultaneously between two distinct moves A and B.
1Depending on the matching process, X may stand for “a university student”, “a club mem-
ber”, or “a teammate” (See Section 5.2 for details about the matching process).
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In the second stage:
• If every player chooses to play A, 5 Euros will be withdrawn from Player
(2)’s initial amount and 15 Euros will be added to Player (1)’s initial amount.
Thus Player (1) will get 35 Euros while Player (2) will get 5 Euros.
• If every player chooses to play B, 5 Euros will be withdrawn from Player
(1)’s initial amount and 25 Euros will be added to Player (2)’s initial amount.
Thus Player (1) will get 15 Euros while Player (2) will get 35 Euros.
• If the players’ choices are different, then both players’ amount will be reset
to zero (each will thus get 0 euro).














This simultaneous decision ends both the second stage and the game. All along
the game, both players will remain anonymous to one another. You will receive
the corresponding amount if this game is eventually being selected.
These instructions concern the three situations described below.
220
B.3.1 Questions
In the context of the previous game, you will play with X 1 (select one answer per
question)
• Please indicate your choice while you are acting as Player (1):
In the first stage, you play:
In Out
In the second stage (assume that you played “In” first), you play:
A B
• Please indicate your choice while you are acting as Player (2):
In the second stage (assume that your opponent played “In” first), you play:
A B
Note that the three previous questions are independent from one another.
Please make sure to answer each of them
B.4 Belief questions
B.4.1 In the Baseline game
In a previous study concerning this game, 20 students from Toulouse 1 university
capitole were randomly selected. Among these, 10 subjects played as player (1)
and 10 subjects played as player (2). It was common knowledge among all these
subjects that they were interacting between student from the same university.
In this context, we ask you to indicate what you believe these people did
actually play. Each of the two following answers (one for each player) that matches
the actual behavior will earn you 5 euros (after each proposition, please indicate
a number ranging from 0 to 10).
• (5 euros) Out of the 10 players (1), indicate how many did choose A: ____
and B: ____
1Depending on the matching process, X may stand for “a university student”, “a club mem-
ber”, or “a teammate” (See Section 5.2 for details about the matching process).
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• (5 euros) Out of the 10 players (2), indicate how many did choose A: ____
and B: ____
B.4.2 In the Entrance game
In a previous study concerning this game, 20 students from Toulouse 1 university
capitole were randomly selected. Among these, 10 subjects played as player (1)
and 10 subjects played as player (2). It was common knowledge among all these
subjects that they were interacting between student from the same university.
In this context, we ask you to indicate what you believe these people did
actually play. Each of the two following answers (one for each player) that matches
the actual behavior will earn you 5 euros (after each proposition, please indicate
a number ranging from 0 to 10).
• (5 euros) Out of the 10 players (1), indicate how many did choose “In”:
____
Out of these subjects, how many did then choose A: ____ and B: ____




Figure B.1: Beliefs about Player (1)’s actual choice in the Baseline game
Figure B.2: Beliefs about Player (2)’s actual choice in the Baseline game
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(a) Belief about playing In/Out
(b) Belief about playing (In,A)/(In,B)
Figure B.3: Beliefs about Player (1)’s actual choice in the Entrance game
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Figure B.4: Beliefs about Player (2)’s actual choice in the Entrance game
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Appendix C
Social ties and team reasoning
C.1 Proof of Theorem 6.2
We here demonstrate that, given a strategic game with group utilityG = 〈{i, j}, {Si, Sj},
{Ui, Uj, U{i,j}}〉 where argmaxs∈SU{i,j}(s) is a singleton, the predictions made by
both game structures BST = 〈G, {ki, kj}〉 and BUTI = 〈G, {Ωi,Ωj}〉 are equiva-
lent whenever ki({i, j}) = kj({i, j}) = Ωi({i, j}) = Ωj({i, j}).
For this purpose, one can distinguish between two different cases.
If ki({i, j}) = kj({i, j}) = Ωi({i, j}) = Ωj({i, j}) = 0, then both agents i and
j reason in I-mode, i.e., ki({i}) = kj({j}) = Ωi({i}) = Ωj({j}) = 1. In this case,
for any protocol α ∈ ∆, the value of α{i,j} has therefore no influence on finding an
UTI equilibrium in BUTI. Moreover, it is easy to show, through Definition 6.7,
that the game induced by BST corresponds to the original game G. Following
Definition 6.3, given s ∈ S and α ∈ ∆ such that s = (α{i}, α{j}), we then have
that s is a Nash equilibrium in G if and only if α is an UTI equilibrium in BUTI.
Let us similarly consider the case where ki({i, j}) = kj({i, j}) = Ωi({i, j}) =
Ωj({i, j}) = 1, which implies that both agents i and j reason in we-mode.
From Definitions 6.9 and 6.6, it follows that, in BST , for every s ∈ S, we have:








Then (1) and (2) allow to state that, given s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium solution
in the strategic game induced by BST , then we have:
(3) USTi (s) = USTj (s) = U{i,j}(s) = max
s′∈S
U{i,j}(s′)
Similarly considering the BUTI structure, it follows from Definition 6.8 that
for the team {i, j} and every protocol α ∈ ∆, the expected value can be simplified
as follows:
(4) EV{i,j}(α) = U{i,j}(α(i, {i, j}), α(j, {i, j})) = U{i,j}(α{i,j})
In fact, for any protocol α ∈ ∆, the values of α{i} and α{j} are then no influence
on determining the group’s expected value.
Moreover, according to (4) and Definition 6.3, α ∈ ∆ is an UTI equilibrium if
and only if:
(5) EV{i,j}(α) = max
s′∈S
U{i,j}(s′)
It then follows from (3) and (5) that, for some s ∈ S and α ∈ ∆ such that
s = α{i,j}, if argmaxs′∈SU{i,j}(s′) is a singleton, then s is a Nash equilibrium in
the game induced by BST if and only if α is an UTI equilibrium in BUTI.
C.2 Gradual group identification
We consider a two-player strategic game with group utility G = 〈{i, j}, {Si, Sj},
{Ui, Uj, U{i,j}}〉 where Si = {A,B,C} and Sj = {D}, and the individual payoff
matrix is represented in Table 6.4 from Section 6.3.3.1 for both players from {i, j}.
Moreover, we consider as the collective payoff function either the classical utili-
tarian principle (i.e., for any s ∈ S, U{i,j}(s) = Ui(s) + Uj(s)) or the Rawlsian
criterion of fairness (i.e., for any s ∈ S, U{i,j}(s) = min(Ui(s), Uj(s))).
The obvious main characteristics of the game depicted in Table 6.4 is that the
outcome is uniquely determined by a single player (i.e., player i).
We then define a corresponding social ties game ST = 〈G, {ki, kj}〉 such that
ki({i, j}) = kj({i, j}) = 0.5. One should then note that, in order to satisfy Con-
straint C4 from Definition 6.5, we must have that ki({i}) = kj({j}) = 0.5. The
resulting strategic game induced by ST when considering the classical utilitarian
principle as the collective payoff function is depicted in Figure C.1(a) (in Figure
C.1, player i corresponds to the row player while player j corresponds to the col-
umn player). Similarly, the strategic game induced by ST when considering Rawls’
















Figure C.1: Induced strategic games
In this case, it is straightforward to show that in both games from Figure C.1,
the best strategy for player i is to play C.
On the other hand, let us now consider a corresponding structure UTI =
〈G, {Ωi,Ωj}〉 such that ω defines the probability that player i reasons in we-mode,
that is ω = Ωi({i, j}) and ω = 1− Ωi({i}) = 1 1.
Table C.1 illustrates the expected values for every possible protocol in the game
from Table 6.4. Note that two different interpretations of the group’s expected
value is provided depending on the type of collective payoff function: EV u{i,j} is
calculated based on the classical utilitarian principle whereas EV m{i,j} is calculated
based on the Rawlsian principle of fairness (i.e., maximin).
Protocols Expected values
αn αn(a, {a}) αn(a, {a, b}) EVa(αn) EV u{a,b}(αn) EV m{a,b}(αn)
α1 A A 8 8 0
α2 B B 5 12 5
α3 C C 7 11 4
α4 A B 8− 3ω 8 + 4ω 5ω
α5 A C 8− ω 8 + 3ω 4ω
α6 B A 5 + 3ω 12− 4ω 5− 5ω
α7 B C 5 + 2ω 12− ω 5− ω
α8 C A 7 + ω 11− 3ω 4− 4ω
α9 C B 7− 2ω 11 + ω 4 + ω
Table C.1: All protocols in the dictator game (see Table 6.4)
It is then straightforward to show from Table C.1 and Definition 6.3 that, for
1Note that the probability function Ωj is irrelevant here as player j cannot influence the
outcome of the game.
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any value of ω such that 0 < ω < 1, the structure UTI yields the unique UTI
equilibrium α4. Indeed, for every 0 < ω < 1, we have:
EV{i}(α4) > EV{i}(α2) EV{i}(α5) > EV{i}(α7)
EV{i}(α5) > EV{i}(α3) EV{i}(α1) > EV{i}(α8)
EV{i}(α1) > EV{i}(α6) EV{i}(α4) > EV{i}(α9)
EV u{i,j}(α4) > EV u{i,j}(α1) EV u{i,j}(α4) > EV u{i,j}(α5)
EV m{i,j}(α4) > EV m{i,j}(α1) EV m{i,j}(α4) > EV m{i,j}(α5)
Moreover, player i will play A whenever ω = 0 whereas player i will play B
whenever ω = 1. As a result, there exist no UTI structure built on the game G
that has an UTI equilibrium specifying player i to play C, as predicted by the
above social ties game ST .
C.3 Proof of Theorem 6.3
We here demonstrate that, given a strategic game with group utilityG = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈
Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}〉 that satisfies ConstraintC3 from Definition 6.10, both game
structures BST = 〈G, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉 and BUTI = 〈G, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉 can be trans-
formed respectively into simpler equivalent strategic games Gbst and Gbuti.
Let us first consider the BST game.
From Definitions 6.9 and 6.6, it follows that, for every i ∈ Agt, s ∈ S, and for
some J ⊆ Agt\{i}:
(1) USTi (s) = max
s′J∈SJ
UJ∪{i}(s−J , s′J)
From (1), Definition 6.5 and Constraint C2 allow to state that, for every agent
j ∈ J such that j 6= i:
USTj (s) = max
s′K∈SK
UK∪{j}(s−K , s′K)(2)
where K = J ∪ {i}\{j}
Then (1) and (2) allow to state that, given s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium solution
in the strategic game induced by BST , then for every coalition J ∈ C and every
agent i ∈ J , we have:
(3) USTi (s) = UJ(s) = max
s′J∈SJ
UJ(s′J , s−J)
Moreover, let C denote the set of actual coalitions in the BST game:
(4) C = {J ∈ 2Agt∗|∀i∈J , ki(J) = 1}
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Note that ⋃J∈C J = Agt and ⋂J∈C = ∅.
As a result from (3) and (4), the current gameBST = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈
2Agt∗}, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉 can be transformed into a simplified strategic game Gbst =
〈Agt′, {S ′J |J ∈ Agt′}, {U ′J |J ∈ Agt′}〉 where each group J ∈ C acts as a single
agent, that is:
• Agt′ = C;
• for every J ∈ C, S ′J = SJ ;
• fore every J ∈ C and every s ∈ ∏K∈C S ′K , U ′J(s) = UJ(s).
Note that through this game transformation, 1 ≤ |Agt′| ≤ |Agt|. In the par-
ticular case where every agent in Agt is individualistic (i.e., ki({i}) = 1 for every
i ∈ Agt), then |Agt′| = |Agt|.
It is then straightforward to show that, as Constraint C3 from Definition 6.10
ensures that every group J ∈ C has no conflicting goals in G (and in Gbst),
it implies that s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium in Gbst if and only if s is a Nash
equilibrium in the game induced by BST .
Let us now similarly consider the BUTI structure.
Definition 6.8 means that every agent can only identify with a unique group.
It follows from this definition that there exists a unique group identification state








Given the unique group identification state g that satisfies (5), one can therefore
define the set of active teams A as follows:
(6) A = {J ∈ 2Agt∗|∀i ∈ J, gi = J}
It follows from (6) and Definition 6.8 that for every team J ∈ 2Agt∗ and every
protocol α ∈ ∆, the expected value can be simplified as follows:
(7) EVJ(α) = UJ(α(1, g1), . . . , α(n, gn))
One can note from (7) and Definition 6.3 that, if protocol α is an UTI equi-
librium, then, for every J ∈ A, we have:





J ′∈A:J ′ 6=J αJ
′ is the combination of actions of all agents i ∈ Agt\J
specified by protocol α when identifying with any group from A. Note that, for
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every coalition J ∈ 2Agt∗ such that J 6∈ A (i.e., for every team nobody identifies
with), and for every α ∈ ∆, EVJ(α) remains constant. This implies that every
such group J has simply no influence on the computation of an UTI equilibrium.
As a result from (5), (6), (7) and (8), a structure BUTI = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt},
{UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉 can be transformed into a simplified strategic game
Gbuti = 〈Agt′′, {S ′′J |J ∈ Agt′′}, {U ′′J |J ∈ Agt′′}〉 where every active team J ∈ A
acts as a single agent, that is:
• Agt′′ = A;
• for every J ∈ A, S ′′J = SJ ;
• for every J ∈ A and every s ∈ ∏J∈A S ′′J , U ′′J (s) = UJ(s).
Note that through this game transformation, 1 ≤ |Agt′′| ≤ |Agt|. In the
particular case where every agent is individualistic (i.e., gi = {i} for every i ∈ Agt),
then |Agt′′| = |Agt|.
Given s ∈ S, let α ∈ ∆ be a protocol such that, for every J ∈ 2Agt∗, αJ = sJ .
It is then straightforward to demonstrate from (8) and Definition 6.3 that s is a
Nash equilibrium in Gbuti if and only if α is an UTI equilibrium in BUTI. Note
however that this equivalence does here not rely on Constraint C3 from Definition
6.10.
Finally, given that for every i ∈ Agt and every J ∈ Group(i), ki(J) = Ωi(J),
it follows from (4) and (6) that A = C and consequently Gbuti = Gbst. As a result,
given s ∈ S and α ∈ ∆ such that, for every J ∈ 2Agt∗, αJ = sJ , it implies that
s is a Nash equilibrium in the game induced by BST if and only if α is an UTI
equilibrium in BUTI.
C.4 Utility transformation vs. agency transfor-
mation
We consider a three-player strategic game with group utility G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈
Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}〉 where Agt = {1, 2, 3}, Si = {A,B} for every i ∈ Agt,
and the individual payoff matrix is represented in Table 6.5 from Section 6.3.3.3
for all players from Agt. Moreover, we take as the collective payoff function the
Ralwsian criterion of fairness (i.e., for every J ∈ 2Agt∗ and every s ∈ S, UJ(s) =
mini∈J Ui(s)).
The main characteristics of this game is that G does not satisfy Constraint C3
from Definition 6.10. In fact, if player 3 selects A, then the team {1, 2} made of
the two other players appears to have conflicting goals, that is, both (A,A,A) and
(B,B,A) are equally the best options for the group {1, 2}.
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Let us now define a corresponding structure BUTI = 〈G, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉 such
that Ω1({1, 2}) = Ω2({1, 2}) = 1, and Ω1({1, 3}) = Ω3({1, 3}) = Ω2({2, 3}) =
Ω3({2, 3}) = Ω1({1, 2, 3}) = Ω2({1, 2, 3}) = Ω3({1, 2, 3}) = 0.
In this case, it is straightforward to show that every protocol α ∈ ∆ that is an
UTI equilibrium is such that α{1,2} = (A,A) 1.
Similarly, we define a binary social ties game BST = 〈G, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉 and de-
termine the various predictions such a game can make depending on the valuation
of the functions ki. The corresponding sets of Nash equilibria in the game induced
by BST can be found in Table C.2.
ki({1, 2}) ki({1, 3}) ki({2, 3}) ki({1, 2, 3}) Predicted outcomes
(A,A,A)
0 0 0 0 (A,A,B)
(B,B,B)
(A,A,A)
1 0 0 0 (A,A,B)
(A,B,A)
0 1 0 0 (B,B,B)
(A,A,A)
0 0 1 0 (A,A,B)
(B,B,B)
0 0 0 1 (B,A,A)
Table C.2: A three-player coordination game
One can therefore observe from Table C.2 that there exits no BST structure
such that (A,A,B) is the unique Nash equilibrium in the game induced by BST .
C.5 Forming sub-coalitions in the Three Muske-
teers game
We here analyse in more details the Three Musketeers game presented in Sec-
tion 6.3.3 (see the payoff matrix in Table 6.6), depending on the settings of the
players’ social ties. To do so, let us define a strategic game with group utility
G = 〈Agt, {Si|i ∈ Agt}, {UJ |J ∈ 2Agt∗}〉 such that Agt = {1, 2, 3} (we assume
that players 1, 2, and 3 respectively stand for Athos, Porthos, and Aramis), and
functions Si and UJ are defined according to Table 6.6 and Rawls’ criterion of
fairness (i.e., maximin).
1Note that α{3} may then play either A or B, and every other group J ∈ 2Agt∗ such that
J 6= {1, 2} and J 6= {3} is irrelevant as J is an inactive team.
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Moreover, in the following analysis, we strictly focus on the most relevant sit-
uation where two sub-coalitions (whose intersection is non-empty) may be formed
within the game. More specifically, we only consider situations where identify-
ing with the largest coalition is negligible compared to identifying with any sub-
coalition.
C.5.1 Prediction in a social ties game
Let us define a social ties game ST = 〈G, {ki|i ∈ Agt}〉 where the function k is
defined as follows:
• k1({1, 2, 3}) = k2({1, 2, 3}) = k3({1, 2, 3}) = k2({2, 3}) = k3({2, 3}) =
k1({1}) = 0;
• k1({1, 2}) = k1({1, 3}) = k2({2}) = k3({3}) = 0.5.
The most notable characteristics of this scenario is that it creates two coalitions
whose intersection is non-empty: the team {1, 2} is made of Athos and Porthos
while the team {1, 3} is made of Athos and Aramis. More specifically, Porthos and
Aramis are torn between satisfying their respective coalition (resp. groups {1, 2}
and {1, 3}) and maximizing their own self-interest (resp. groups {2} and {3}).
On the other hand, Athos is torn between satisfying either coalitions he identifies
with (in this case, Athos is not driven by any self-interest, i.e., k1({1}) = 0).
Furthermore, one should note that, as a consequence of the absence of any tie
between Porthos and Aramis, this scenario induces no identification with the large
group {1, 2, 3} (i.e., ki({1, 2, 3}) = 0 for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}).
The corresponding transformed game taking into account each player’s Social
Ties utility based on the previous parameters and Definition 6.6 is found in Table
C.3.
It is therefore straightforward to show through Table C.3 that the unique Nash
equilibrium in the transformed game is (C,C,C). In other words, even though
the players are not unified as a unique coalition, our theory predicts that they will
manage to coordinate on the same outcome.
C.5.2 Prediction in an unreliable team interaction struc-
ture
Let us now perform a similar analysis of this game through Bacharach’s theory of
team reasoning. Our aim here is to demonstrate that interpreting social ties within
some unreliable team interaction structure cannot yield any stable solution where
all individuals select C in the absence of a unique strong coalition (i.e., where the
probability of identifying with the largest group is negligible).
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Actions Utilities
Athos Porthos Aramis Athos Porthos Aramis
A A B 2.5 5 2.5
A A C 2.5 5 2
A C B 2.5 2 2.5
A C C 2.5 1.5 1.5
B A B 2.5 2.5 5
B A C 2.5 2.5 2
B C B 2.5 2 5
B C C 2.5 1.5 1.5
C A B 4 4.5 4.5
C A C 3.5 2.5 5
C C B 3.5 5 2.5
C C C 3 3 3
Table C.3: The transformed game with updated utilities
In order to allow for the comparison with the previous ST game, we define a
corresponding structure UTI = 〈G, {Ωi|i ∈ Agt}〉 where we assume that an agent
identifies with a group if and only if other members of that group also identify with
it. Thus, let ω12, ω13, and ω23 denote respectively the probability of identifying
with the coalition {1, 2} (i.e., Ω1({1, 2}) = Ω2({1, 2}) = ω12), the probability of
identifying with the coalition {1, 3} (i.e., Ω1({1, 3}) = Ω3({1, 3}) = ω13), and the
probability of identifying with the coalition {2, 3} (i.e., Ω2({2, 3}) = Ω3({2, 3}) =
ω23). Similarly, the probability of identifying with the largest group is defined by
ω123 (i.e., Ω1({1, 2, 3}) = Ω2({1, 2, 3}) = Ω3({1, 2, 3}) = ω123). In order to satisfy
Definition 6.3, we recall that the following constraints must hold:
ω12 + ω13 + ω123 ≤ 1(1)
ω12 + ω23 + ω123 ≤ 1(2)
ω13 + ω23 + ω123 ≤ 1(3)
Moreover, one should note that such a representation implies that Ω1({1}) =
1−ω12−ω13−ω123, Ω2({2}) = 1−ω12−ω23−ω123, and Ω3({3}) = 1−ω13−ω23−ω123.
In this context, let us define nine protocols α1 . . . α9 in UTI that are relevant
to our analysis. Detailed specifications of these protocols can be found in Table
C.4. Our aim is to demonstrate that protocol α1 is necessarily an UTI equilibrium
according to Definition 6.3 if ω12 > ω123 and ω13 > ω123 (i.e., the probability of
identifying with the largest group is negligible compared to that of identifying with
any sub-coalition). In order to do so, one needs to evaluate whether one of the


















α1 A A B (A,A) (B,B) (A,B) (C,A,B)
α2 A C B (A,A) (B,B) (A,B) (C,A,B)
α3 A A C (A,A) (B,B) (A,B) (C,A,B)
α4 A A B (C,C) (B,B) (A,B) (C,A,B)
α5 A A B (C,A) (B,B) (A,B) (C,A,B)
α6 A A B (A,A) (C,C) (A,B) (C,A,B)
α7 A A B (A,A) (C,B) (A,B) (C,A,B)
α8 A A B (A,A) (B,B) (C,C) (C,A,B)
α9 A A B (A,A) (B,B) (A,B) (C,C,C)
Table C.4: Various protocols in the Three Musketeers game
Protocols Expected Values
EV{1}(α1) = 5
EV{2}(α1) = 5(1− ω13 − ω123) + 4ω123
EV{3}(α1) = 5ω13 + 4ω123
α1 EV{1,2}(α1) = 5(1− ω13 − ω123) + 4ω123
EV{1,3}(α1) = 5ω13 + 4ω123
EV{2,3}(α1) = 4ω123
EV{1,2,3}(α1) = 4ω123
EV{2}(α2) = 4(ω12 + ω123)ω123
α2 +5(ω12 + ω123)(1− ω13 − ω123)
+6ω123(1− ω12 − ω123)
α3 EV{3}(α3) = 6ω123(1− ω13 − ω123)
+(ω13 + ω123)(4ω123 + 5ω13)
α4
EV{1,2}(α4) = (ω12 + ω123)4
+5(1− ω12)(1− ω12 − ω13 − ω123)
α5 EV{1,2}(α5) = 4(ω12 + ω123)
+5(1− ω12 − ω13 − ω123)
α6 EV{1,3}(α6) = 4(ω13 + ω123)
α7 EV{1,3}(α7) = 4(ω13 + ω123)
α8 EV{2,3}(α8) = 3ω123ω223 + 4ω123(1− ω23)2
α9 EV{1,2,3}(α9) = 3ω2123 + 4ω123(1− ω123)2
Table C.5: Expected values of protocols α1 . . . α9
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α1, Porthos will always choose A, Aramis will always choose B, and Athos will
select C if identifying with the largest group, B if identifying with the sub-coalition
including only Aramis, and A otherwise. In the following analysis, we will then
refer to Table C.5, which provides a set of relevant expected values of each protocol
from Table C.4.
Let us first focus on player 1 (i.e., Athos). It is straightforward to show that the
expected value of α for Athos is maximal (i.e., according to Table C.5, EV{1}(α1) =
5), independently of the probabilities ω12, ω13, ω23, and ω123 (Athos is certain about
both Porthos and Aramis’s actions). This implies that Athos has no personal
interest for deviating from α1.
Now, concerning player 2 (i.e., Porthos), protocol α1 indicates that he is un-
certain about Athos’s action. In order to evaluate whether Porthos should deviate
from α1 (i.e., by playing C instead of A), let us consider protocol α2. According
to Table C.5, it is straightforward to show that EV{2}(α2) > EV{2}(α1) if and only
if the following condition holds:
(4) ω123 >
5
7 · (1− ω13)
Performing a similar analysis for player 3 (i.e., Aramis) leads us to consider the
alternative protocol α3, as a means to verify whether Aramis can personally benefit
by deviating from α1 (i.e., by playing C instead of B). In this case, According to





So far, we have stated under which conditions each of the three players can
increase their individual expected value by deviating unilaterally from protocol
α1. However, it remains to be shown under which conditions they can benefit by
deviating from α1 while they team-reason.
Let us then consider the team {1, 2} made of Athos and Porthos. Note from
Table C.5 that the team’s expected value of the protocol α1 is the same as that of
Porthos alone, that is, EV{1,2}(α1) = EV{2}(α1). As before, in order to determi-
nate whether the team, as a whole, could be better off deviating from α1, let us
define any possible alternative protocol. One can then note that the only relevant
protocols are α4 and α5 from Table C.4 1.
1In fact, it is straightforward to show from Table 6.6 that any other protocol β such that
β{1,2} 6= (A,A) and β{1,2} 6= (C, ·) would always yield a lower expected value for the team than
α1 (a team is indeed always better off coordinating).
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In this case, it can then be shown from Table C.5 that α4 outperforms α1 for
the team {1, 2} if only if the following holds:
(6) ω12 + ω13 + ω123 >
6
5
As (6) is in obvious contradiction with (1), this therefore implies that the team
{1, 2} can never benefit by playing (C,C) instead of (A,A) (i.e., EV{1,2}(α1) ≥
EV{1,2}(α4) for any values of probabilities ω12, ω13, ω23, and ω123). Moreover, it
is also straightforward to show from Table 6.6 that the team {1, 2} can also not
benefit by playing (C,A) instead of (A,A) (i.e., EV{1,2}(α1) ≥ EV{1,2}(α5) for any
values of probabilities ω12, ω13, ω23, and ω123). As a result, one can states that the
protocol α1 is optimal for the team {1, 2}.
Let us perform the same analysis to the other team {1, 3} made of Athos and
Aramis. Note, from Table C.5, that the team’s expected value for α1 happens to
be the same as that of Aramis alone, that is, EV{1,3}(α) = EV{3}(α). Furthermore,
as in the previous case, we consider the only relevant alternative protocols α6 and
α7 from Table C.41.
In this case, it can then be shown from Table C.5 that α6 outperforms α1 for
the team {1, 3} if only if the following holds:
(7) ω13 + ω123 > 1
As (7) is in obvious contradiction with (1) and (2), this therefore implies
that the team {1, 3} can never benefit by playing (C,C) instead of (B,B) (i.e.,
EV{1,3}(α1) ≥ EV{1,3}(α6) for any values of probabilities ω12, ω13, ω23, and ω123).
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that protocol α7 can never strictly
outperform α1 for the team {1, 3}, that is, EV{1,3}(α1) ≥ EV{1,3}(α7) for any values
of probabilities ω12, ω13, ω23, and ω123). In other words, one can states that the
protocol α1 is also optimal for the team {1, 3}.
Applying the same analysis to the team {2, 3} made of Porthos and Aramis
leads us, as before, to consider the only relevant alternative protocol α8 from Table
C.42. In this case, it is straightforward to show that protocol α8 can never strictly
outperform α1 for the team {2, 3}, that is, EV{2,3}(α1) ≥ EV{2,3}(α8) for any values
1As in the previous case, it is straightforward to show from Table 6.6 that any other protocol
β′ such that β′{1,3} 6= (B,B) and β′{1,3} 6= (C, ·) would always yield a lower expected value for
the team than α1.
2Here again, it is straightforward to show from Table 6.6 that any other protocol β′′ such
that β′′{2,3} 6= (A,B) and β′′{2,3} 6= (C,C) would always yield a lower expected value for the
team than α1.
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of probabilities ω12, ω13, ω23, and ω123. In other words, one can states that the
protocol α1 is optimal for the team {2, 3}.
Finally, we consider the largest team {1, 2, 3} made of all three Musketeers. As
in the previous case, one can note that the only relevant alternative protocol to
α1 is α9 from Table C.4 1. Here again, it is straightforward to show that protocol
α9 can never strictly outperform α1 for the team {1, 2, 3}, that is, EV{1,2,3}(α1) ≥
EV{1,2,3}(α9) for any values of probabilities ω12, ω13, ω23, and ω123. In other words,
one can states that the protocol α1 is optimal for the team {1, 2, 3}.
The first observation one can make from this analysis is that no team reasoner
has any interest to deviate from protocol α1. In fact, only the conditions (4) and
(5) allow to render α1 non-optimal respectively for Porthos and Aramis when they
reason in I-mode (i.e., when they are strictly self-interested).











1 = = (A,A)
β
{1,3}
1 = = (B,B)
β
{2,3}
1 = = (A,B)
β
{1,2,3}
1 = = (C,A,B)
One should note that the symmetrical property in the payoff matrix of the
game (i.e., exchanging Athos’s payoffs with Aramis’s would not alter the game)
allows us to state that the protocol β1 shares the same properties as α12, that is,
β1 is an UTI equilibrium if and only if the two following conditions hold:
ω123 ≤ 57 · (1− ω12)(8)
ω123 ≤ 52 · ω12(9)
Therefore, following Conditions (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), and (9), it is straight-
forward to show that both protocols α1 and β1 are always UTI equilibria whenever
ω12 > ω123 and ω13 > ω123. In other words, whenever the probability of identifying
with the largest group is negligible compared to the probabilities of identifying
with some sub-coalition, the corresponding UTI structure cannot yield a unique
1Indeed, it is straightforward to show from Table 6.6 that any other protocol γ such that
γ{1,2,3} 6= (C,A,B) and γ{1,2,3} 6= (C,C,C) would always yield a lower expected value for the
team than α1.
2The only difference between protocols β1 and α1 is that player 1 (i.e., Athos) selects B in
β1 instead of A in α1 while being self-regarding (i.e., in the I-mode).
238
solution where all individuals select C. In this case, one should note that the
study of additional solutions simply becomes irrelevant as the resulting multiple
equilibria can only render the model indecisive. As a result of this analysis, it
appears that this situation illustrates the disagreement that can exist between
Bacharach’s UTI structure and our ST game in terms of the predicted outcome
when sub-coalitions are formed.
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